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ABORDAGENS POLÍTICO-ECONÓMICAS DAS FINANÇAS 
PÚBLICAS 
 
 
Ana Paula Catarino Barreira 
 
 
RESUMO 
A presente tese de doutoramento é composta por três partes que abordam a 
problemática da gestão das finanças públicas numa óptica político-económica. As 
primeiras duas partes versam sobre a forma como governos instituídos exercem as 
suas funções orçamentais de gestão da despesa pública e a terceira parte apresenta um 
modelo que analisa a forma eficiente de fornecimento numa nação do bem público 
“governo”. 
As duas primeiras partes demonstram o comportamento oportunista dos governos 
através da manipulação da composição da despesa pública ao longo da legislatura, 
dando origem ao aparecimento de um ciclo  orçamental  induzido pela ocorrência de 
períodos eleitorais.  
A primeira parte apresenta um modelo teórico com informação completa no 
sentido em que o governante e os eleitores têm acesso, em simultâneo, à mesma 
informação referente às escolhas orçamentais, nos períodos pré- e pós-eleitorais. O 
modelo mostra que no período pré-eleitoral, o governante manipula a composição da 
despesa pública para aquelas categorias que geram utilidade no período a que se 
refere a decisão do gasto. Essa manipulação resulta do facto da reeleição ser um 
acontecimento incerto, o que implica que apenas no caso da permanência no poder o 
governante retirará utilidade da despesa efectuada nas categorias que geram benefício 
no período seguinte. Dado que na primeira categoria se enquadram as denominadas 
despesas públicas correntes e na segunda categoria estão contempladas as designadas 
despesas públicas de investimento, a composição orçamental é enviesada no período 
pré-eleitoral em favor da primeira categoria. O governante é apresentado como sendo 
ideologicamente neutro, podendo o eleitorado evidenciar preferência por uma das 
categorias de despesa pública. Nesse sentido, se os eleitores não tiverem, no período 
pós-eleitoral, qualquer enviesamento nas suas preferências não será de esperar 
qualquer manipulação orçamental por parte do governante. 
Usando uma repartição da despesa pública entre categorias que são preferidas 
pelos eleitores e categorias que favorecem a sociedade no geral, o modelo teórico 
mostra que quando há um enviesamento nas preferências do eleitorado/sociedade em 
favor da despesa corrente, os governantes manipulam a composição da despesa 
pública em favor daquela categoria nos dois períodos da legislatura. Caso o 
 xiv 
enviesamento nas preferências do eleitorado/sociedade seja no sentido de favorecer a 
despesa de investimento, o modelo demonstra a existência de um ciclo político-
eleitoral de sinal ambíguo. 
A segunda parte propõe uma aplicação empírica do modelo teórico apresentado na 
primeira parte, usando para tal dados relativos ao conjunto dos países da União 
Europeia no período compreendido entre 1970 e 2001. Contrastando com alguns 
estudos que indicam que a ausência de ciclos político-económicos de natureza 
eleitoral nos países desenvolvidos, a aplicação empírica mostra que nos períodos pré 
eleitorais os governos centrais da União Europeia manipulam a composição do 
orçamento público.  
Usando uma técnica econométrica recentemente proposta denominada “Pooled 
Mean Group Estimator”, são demonstrados dois resultados. Primeiro, os governos 
centrais aumentam a percentagem do orçamento público afecto às despesas correntes 
em detrimento das despesas de capital na proximidade dos períodos eleitorais. 
Segundo, quanto maior a importância relativa dos eleitores efectivos relativamente à 
população maior é a manipulação da despesa pública em favor das categorias que vão 
ao encontro das preferências do eleitorado. 
A terceira parte descreve um modelo teórico que procura discutir em que 
condições terá viabilidade a passagem de um sistema centralizado para um sistema 
descentralizado de provisão de um governo. O processo de descentralização proposto 
no modelo pode assumir duas formas: a implementação de comunidades isoladas ou a 
definição de uma região. Introduzindo um dilema (trade-off) entre o benefício da 
partilha do custo da provisão do bem “governo” e a perda resultante da partilha de um 
governo com indivíduos com preferências diferentes, o modelo teórico permite 
concluir que, na ausência de transferências compensatórias entre comunidades e na 
presença de um sistema de votação por unanimidade, as condições de eficiência e de 
estabilidade só são garantidas com a total segregação das comunidades ou com a 
manutenção da centralização. Quando o modelo admite a existência de transferências 
entre comunidades, por forma a assegurar que nenhuma se encontra numa posição 
menos favorável em comparação com a centralização, o óptimo de Pareto pode ser 
obtido quer com a regionalização, quer com a total segregação. No entanto, a 
condição de estabilidade apenas pode ser assegurada no segundo caso. 
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POLITICO-ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
 
 
Ana Paula Catarino Barreira 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This PhD dissertation comprises three parts that approach the problem of public 
finance management from a politico-economic perspective. The first two parts 
address the way established governments handle budgetary management of public 
expenditure while the third part presents a model that analyses a way of efficiently 
providing the public good “government” for a nation. 
The first two parts demonstrate the opportunistic behaviour of governments 
through manipulation of public expenditure composition during tenure, giving rise to 
a budget cycle induced by the occurrence of election periods. 
The first part presents a theoretical model entailing complete information in the 
sense that the incumbent politician and the electorate have access, simultaneously, to 
the same information regarding budgetary choices during post-and pre-election 
periods. The model shows that during the pre-election period, the incumbent 
manipulates the composition of public expenditure towards categories that generate 
utility during the period referring to spending decisions. This manipulation results 
from the fact that re-election is an uncertain event, thus implying that only in the case 
where the incumbent remains in power is it possible to obtain utility of applied 
spending in categories generating benefits in the following period. Given that current 
expenditures correspond to the first category and investment expenditures are 
contemplated in the second category, the budget composition is biased in pre-election 
periods in favour of the former. The incumbent is presented as being ideologically 
neutral, but we discuss the implications of the electorate’s preferences for one of the 
categories of public expenditure. To begin with, it is shown that, if voters have no 
preference bias, then budget manipulation is not expected during post-election period. 
The other possibilities are examined subsequently. 
By means of a public expenditure partitioning between categories that are preferred 
by voters in particular and categories that favour society at large, the model also 
shows that when voters/society have a preference bias towards current expenditures, 
the incumbent manipulates public expenditure composition favouring this category 
during the two tenure periods. If the voters/society preferences are prone to 
investment expenditures, the model shows a political budget cycle with an ambiguous 
sign. 
The second part proposes an empirical application of the theoretical model 
proposed in the first part, using data of European Union countries from 1970 through 
2001. In contrast to some studies that indicate the absence of political budget cycles 
induced by electoral motives in developed countries, the empirical study shows that, 
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in pre-election periods, central EU governments manipulate the composition of public 
budget. 
Through the use of an econometric technique referred to as “Pooled Mean Group 
Estimator”, two findings can be shown. Firstly, central governments increase the 
share of current expenditures in the public budget by decreasing capital spending near 
election periods. Secondly, the greater the relative importance of effective voters in 
population, the greater the share of expenditure items that are particularly favoured by 
voters. 
The third part describes a theoretical model aiming to discuss the optimal degree of 
government centralisation. It studies the welfare implications of different institutional 
architectures, from complete centralisation to varying degrees of subnational 
autonomy. The decentralised process proposed in the model can assume two forms: 
the implementation of isolated communities or definition of a region. A trade-off 
between cost-sharing provision of “government” and the loss that result from sharing 
it with individuals holding different preferences, is widely pondered. This model 
allows us to conclude that in the absence of inter-community compensatory transfers 
and in the presence of a unanimity voting system, stability and efficiency conditions 
are only guaranteed when communities are completely segregated or when there is 
centralised administration. When transfers between communities are allowed for, to 
ensure that none are at a disadvantage compared to centralisation, Pareto’s optimality 
is feasible through either regionalisation or complete segregation. However, a stable 
condition can only be ensured in the latter case. 
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 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This doctoral dissertation in Economics falls within the research area: public 
economics, political economy and planning. 
This dissertation comprises three parts. Part One entitled “Elections and the public 
expenditure mix”, introduces the first theoretical model and Part Two presents an 
empirical application, “Cycles and composition of public expenditure within the 
European Union”. The second theoretical model is proposed in Part Three, entitled “A 
political economy analysis of jurisdiction formation”. 
The first two parts are related in what concerns their object of analysis while the 
third part is more independently driven in terms of content and applied methodology. 
The model introduced in the first part explains the opportunistic behaviour of a 
government prior to election periods, tending to manipulate the composition of public 
expenditure, thus generating a political budget cycle. Some of the theoretical 
predictions presented in the first part are empirically tested in the second one, using 
European Union countries as the application field. The latter part discusses the border 
configuration of territorial partitions from a political perspective, trading the benefits 
of public good provision cost sharing against the loss in influential power of 
individuals when partitions are enlarged. 
Although the doctoral research has been separated into distinct parts, there is a link 
between them, namely the importance of institution design and the conflict of 
interests between policy-makers, voters and the society at large. While the first two 
parts look at the exercise of political power based on a pre-configured institutional 
arrangement constrained by a budget that can be managed according to electoral 
interests, the third part questions established jurisdictional borders, proposing 
alternative institutional arrangements that may improve society’s welfare. 
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This dissertation is closely related to two areas of study: public choice theory and 
social choice theory. Bringing these two areas of study together, allows for a wider 
analysis of the possibilities conducive to obviating, on one hand, market “failure” and, 
on other, government “failure”. This twin perspective encompasses the three parts. 
In fact, relevant political players in the first two parts of the dissertation are not 
assumed to be benevolent dictators, as would be the case with the social choice 
theory. Alternatively, motivation of incumbent politicians is driven by personal 
interests rather than for “the common good”; discussed self-interests include re-
election quests and own income. This approach follows the tradition of the public 
choice theory, which developed in contra-position to social choice theory. 
The third part draws on the theory of social choice as it proposes an organisational 
structure for the provision of public governance based on a configuration choice by a 
group of individuals with specific preferences. However, in the government 
implementation stage, which goes beyond our analysis, individual preferences 
intercommunicate with preferences from elected policy-makers, whose behaviour are 
guide by selfish objectives. This determines that the level of satisfaction obtained by 
individuals will be different from that obtained in the absence of such behaviour, as 
described in the theoretical model in the first part. 
Criticisms of social choice approaches have centred on the ignorance or, at least, 
under representation of actual policy-making procedures. Yet, it is also true that 
political intervention can only reasonably exist if new social welfare outweighs 
expected social welfare before intervention. 
From this perspective, understanding how the two research areas relate to efficient 
economic policy decisions is the key issue addressed in the dissertation. 
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The impetus of this work is briefly discussed below according to each part, 
evidencing the driving motivation and briefly presents the main results. 
The first part of this dissertation develops as a result of two observations. Firstly, 
while the public economics literature widely explores budget composition in absolute 
terms, such as fiscal deficit problems, little analytical attention has been paid in 
relative terms. Secondly, an important avenue on the political budget cycle literature, 
relies on the assumption of temporary asymmetry of information between those in 
government and voters, where the former displays opportunistic behaviour in terms of 
electoral cycles. Recent developments suppress this assumption from the theoretical 
models, yet a political budget cycle is still found, though budget mix levels were not 
observed. The model presented in Part One looks, in this sense, to evaluate whether 
electorally-induced opportunistic behaviour of governments is sustained when the 
analysis considers the public expenditure composition. 
This model shows that when analysis focuses on the public expenditure mix, 
namely, consumption expenditure or investment expenditure, an electorally-induced 
cycle still occurs. Using a general intertemporal utility model in which both voters 
and incumbent are rational, have complete information and show no bias in favour of 
any category of public expenditure, a cycle towards consumption expenditure in pre-
election periods is to be expected. 
The model described in the first part incorporates also the scenario whereby voters 
and society at large do not share preferences for expenditure categories. The model 
shows that if voters or society prefer those categories that hold immediate satisfaction, 
then the expenditure cycle above emerges, both in post-election periods and in pre-
election periods. Alternatively, if voters or society evidence a marginal preference for 
investment expenditure, which carries satisfaction within a time lag, this category 
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exceeds current expenditure in post-election periods only. Under the second scenario, 
the cycle’s nature is ambiguous in pre-election periods. 
These two main theoretical results contain testable empirical implications. Thus, 
we decided to investigate the empirical relevance of the proposed framework, which 
constitutes Part Two of the dissertation. The application covers European Union 
Member States and the sample selection proceeds from two important aspects in the 
literature. On the one hand, there are some controversial findings concerning political 
budget manipulation near elections, when studies consider only a set of developed 
countries. On the other hand, there is a direct relationship between access voters have 
to information and the country’s degree of democratic consolidation. 
Previous studies on the political budget cycle mainly take public expenditures as 
an absolute value rather than a relative one. Designing an empirical model respecting 
the spirit of the theoretical framework of Part One as much as possible, we look at 
fiscal biases towards particular expenditure items. In particular, we model in Part Two 
the share of particular items on total public expense. 
The empirical application is based on a panel data of central government 
expenditure collected from 15 European Union Member States from 1970 to 2001. 
First, public expenditure is broken down into current and capital outlays, then 
expenditure is broken down into expenditure items favourable to voters in particular 
and society at large. 
The econometric approach uses a pooled-mean group estimation technique (PMG) 
recently proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This technique differs from some more 
widely used panel data models since estimates dynamic specifications imposing 
homogeneity restrictions on long-run coefficients while allowing for heterogeneity 
across countries on short-run coefficients. The homogeneity assumption widely used 
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by earlier studies imposes bias on the estimated coefficients yielding results of an 
electoral cycle statistically insignificant. These studies did not allow for panel 
heterogeneity beyond fixed effects.  
By relying on annual budget composition, the evolution of public expenditure 
shares across categories is systematically analysed.  
Firstly, the main goal is to support the theoretical expectations that governments do 
manipulate budget composition near elections, essentially prone to those categories 
with immediate visibility. In this sense the initial interest is to evaluate the impact of 
election terms on public finances in what concerns government’s manipulation prone 
to current expenditures. Secondly, the role of electoral participation on public 
expenditure biases is investigated, by distinguishing across pro-voter and pro-general 
society outlays. 
Findings support the theoretical model presented in the first part of this 
dissertation. Namely, elections still play a role in shaping public expenditure cycles in 
the European Union: central governments increase the share of current expenditure 
whenever they are closer to electoral contests. Also, budgetary bias towards voters’ 
preferred expenditure categories is positively and directly related to the weight of 
voters in the society at large. 
Besides the electoral cycle, variables like unemployment rate and senior population 
interests are statistically relevant to explain the budget bias prone to current 
expenditures. In contrast, however, inflation rate delay by one period evokes a 
contraction of current expenditures. Other variables such as government ideologies or 
the parliamentary weight of the largest party are not systematically influential in the 
composition of public expenditures.  
 6 
In contrast, when public expenditures are sorted out according to governmental 
functions, economic and ideological variables do not show statistical significance as 
far as the second theoretical prediction is concerned. Parliamentary fragmentation 
seems to favour the government’s manipulation of expenditures prone to voters’ 
preferences. 
The third part presents a theoretical model on the configuration of jurisdictions. It 
studies the segregation process, eventually leading to region formations, as opposed to 
the status quo defined by a centralised regime. A political economy perspective 
underlies the framework. 
The model looks into the circumstances under which a group dimension is large 
enough, based on preferences, to desire solitude or belonging to a region for the 
provision of a public good defined as “government”. In this sense the benefits and 
costs related to the size of groups in each situation are evaluated and compared with a 
centralised arrangement. In this model, citizens obtain benefits when the public good 
provision is shared with other groups, since the per capita financing effort for the 
public good provision decreases. At the same time, there is an associated cost as 
utility from the public good decreases when a group has to share access to the public 
good with other groups. This cost is related to a loss in influential power that will 
affect each group in determining the public good.  
In the model, groups are territorially sorted, each one occupying a different 
partition, thus assuming that individuals are homogeneous within the group but 
heterogeneous across groups. In contrast to previous works, the main goal is not to 
find how a nation can be partitioned into groups of identical size but rather to evaluate 
the feasibility of several decentralisation processes when communities differ in size.  
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The analysis also innovates with respect to decision rules. The literature mainly 
focuses on decision processes governed by majority voting mechanisms. The 
theoretical model described in Part Three of this dissertation explores the implications 
from the unanimity rule towards the decentralisation process. It assumes a 
constitutional prerequisite where any move away from the status quo must be precede 
by an unanimous vote across all communities. With this referendum framework, the 
only acceptable decentralisation outcome is one that makes at least one group better 
off without worsening any other group, a condition resembling very much the Pareto 
efficiency criterion. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the model. 
Firstly, when decentralisation does not contemplate mechanisms that redistribute 
the net gains of reform from winning to losing communities, the only Paretian 
efficient solutions are either full segregation or centralisation. Full segregation 
corresponds to the scenario in which all communities find themselves in isolation. 
Under these circumstances, it is also shown that the two institutional organisations are 
stable. 
Secondly, when transfers are allowed from communities that gain to communities 
that lose with decentralisation, the natural institutional arrangement is full 
segregation. A decentralisation process leading to total isolation of each community 
ensures, simultaneously, an efficient and stable outcome. 
Third, regionalisation appears as a second-best choice, which can only be expected 
if under the same national space there are, simultaneously, communities of large 
dimension and communities of very small dimension. Under this special case, 
regionalisation appears as feasible and is a Pareto movement. However, the 
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configuration of the region may be unstable, since each community generally prefers 
to stay in isolation with the possibility of compensatory transfers, if allowed. 
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In social welfare theory, elected incumbents through political performance are 
modelled following the exclusive interests of the public. The public choice theory 
questions this approach suggesting that incumbents may have their own personal 
motivations. 
A critique of the welfare theory taken by the public choice theory can be found in 
Mueller (1997) and Stiglitz (1988). 
The study in political decision models, such as the personal motivations of elected 
incumbents, is supported by Buchanan (1984) as an precautionary attitude given that 
there is no reason to believe that elected incumbents while in “market” political power 
behave differently to those in private markets, of selfish act. 
Under this framework, the issue Pereira and Pontes (1999, pp.4) rightly raises in 
their work is, 
“If selfishness drives political actors what is the point of normative public choice 
theory in advising changes in rules and/or institutions…?” 
The authors answer the question with the following argument. 
“Decision-makers have a great degree of uncertainty on their future positions in 
society so that they are not able to identify their self interests and therefore they 
can, more or less unanimously, agree on some principles that serve the general or 
public interest.” 
Pereira (1997) presents a historical retrospect of public choice theory as well as a 
description of the normative and positive implications of questions raised when 
compared to the theory of social welfare. 
The theory of public choice determines the rationale for the occurrence of 
politically-induced economic cycle events intended to satisfy the preferences of 
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involved agents in public choice; in specific, the presence of political cycles in the 
public expenditure budget, as those described in Part One of this dissertation. 
Macroeconomists use the term business cycle to describe repeated fluctuations of 
aggregated economic activity. Business cycles are of central concern in 
macroeconomics because fluctuations often lead to uncertainties (Chang (2001). 
The political business cycle literature holds two perspectives. One perspective 
considers the incumbent’s acts motivated by opportunistic incentives, that is, the 
desire to be re-elected causes the incumbent to manipulate economic variables, thus 
leading to a cycle, disassociated from the political party. The second perspective 
regards the incumbent as being affiliated to a political party, inducing a cycle, as a 
result of parties having different preferences regarding economic outcomes. The 
former perspective is identified as an “opportunistic” political business cycle model 
and the latter as a “partisan” political business cycle model. 
“Opportunistic” political business cycle models are introduced by Kalecki (1943) 
and further developed by Nordhaus (1975), with “partisan” model variations 
presented by Hibbs (1978) and Alesina (1987). 
The aim of the following Chapter is to briefly review the main contributions made 
to the study of political business cycles, by examining main assumptions and 
limitations. A descriptive focus is provided based on an incumbent’s opportunistic 
perspective according to the theoretical model proposed in the Chapter 2. In this 
sense, the developments in the field, relating to the incumbent’s manipulation on 
budget instruments, are simultaneously evidenced, and commonly referred as political 
budget cycles. 
Drazen (2000) presents a comprehensive historical overview of the political 
business cycle literature, and whose approach is closely followed. The following 
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literature review also contemplates an extension of subsequent developments in the 
field of political business cycles. 
The introduction of theoretical developments on political business cycle literature 
and in particular on political budget cycles constitutes a conceptual framework that 
helps us to identify the model introduced in Chapter 2 from theoretical models earlier 
presented. 
Part One of the dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 1 reviews recent 
works on political business cycles and respective empirical applications. Chapter 2 
introduces the theoretical model and describes the nature of the political expenditure 
cycle. Chapter 3 studies the differentiated preference pattern between voters and 
society and its impact on budget expenditure mix. Chapter 4 provides the main 
conclusions of this part. 
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1. Political business cycles – An overview 
 
1.1. Partisan political business cycles 
 
1.1.1. The adaptive expectations 
 
Hibbs (1977) introduced the partisan political business cycle model. The model 
proposed by Hibbs describes the incumbent as being purely oriented by partisan 
interests, with no opportunistic motives to manipulate economic outcomes. This type 
of models starts with the observation that there are two-types of parties, a left-wing 
party, denoted L, and a right-wing party, denoted R. The right-wing and left-wing 
parties have different positions on economic issues and hence different 
macroeconomic objectives. Those differences translate into different preferences over 
inflation and unemployment. 
The adaptive expectations regarding inflation are defined as follows: 
    t
e
t t
e
t= + −− − −1 1 1c h ,                  (1.1) 
where   is a coefficient between 0 and 1 representing the speed with which 
expectations in period t  ( )et adapt to past inflation  t−1b g .  
The formulation of the adaptive expectations to inflation -  t
e  does not depend on 
the expectations of future policies. This is why expectations are said not to be rational. 
The partisan difference in interests can be represented by the following partisan 
loss function: 
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for party j, where 
~ j
is party j’s target rate of inflation, x
j~
is party j’s target for 
economic activity, and  j  is the relative weight put on output relating to inflation 
fluctuations by party j.  
 
1.1.2. The rational expectations 
 
Alesina (1987, 1988) introduced the rational expectations in the partisan political 
business cycles, replacing the adaptive inflation expectations. In the rational partisan 
models it is assumed that the incumbents control the rate of inflation by monetary 
policy and that voters’ expectations regarding inflation are generated by a forward 
looking process. The rational version of the inflation expectations is then given by:  
 t
e
t tE= −1b g , 
where E .b g  is the expectation operator,  t  is the inflation rate and et  is the 
expected inflation rate. 
Given the rational inflation expectation reinterpretation of the partisan political 
business cycles, the expected inflation depends on the expectation of who will win the 
upcoming election. The existence of uncertainty about election outcomes induces then 
a cycle. Expected inflation for the half-term after the election is the weighted sum of 
the two parties’ policies, weighted by the probability that each will win the election, 
namely: 
  t
e L
t
L L
t
Rq q= + −1c h ,  
where q L  is the probability that the left-wing party win in the election, and where 
 t
L  and  t
R  are the optimal policies of the two parties in the first half of the term, 
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which depend not only on their policy preferences, but also on the election probability 
q L  itself, as optimal policy depends on  t
e . 
The left-wing parties have a reputation of wanting to lower unemployment. When 
such a party is in power, wage negotiators will sign nominal wage contracts, which 
have built into them a high-expected rate of inflation. When a right-wing party wins 
the election, the Alesina’s model predicts a recession in output growth and a rise in 
unemployment, as monetary policy becomes restrictive. 
Ideological differences also induce different budget management, since parties of 
the left, favouring distribution, increase public expenditure and, parties of the right, 
putting the market in evidence, reduce public expenditure. 
Lidbom (2000) finds empirically significant evidence that left-wing parties spend 
and tax more than right-wing parties. These effects are particularly large when the 
same party has had a long tenure in office. 
Following Alesina’s work, Cusack (1995) combines the “partisan” budget 
manipulation with the preferences of voters. In that perspective, although a party on 
government has an ideological stance, the governing party shapes its preferences for 
more or less public expenditure according to the distance that those preferences have 
from the position of the electorate. In this sense, the government is described as 
modifying its preferences with the intention of having a higher electoral support. In 
this new version of the partisan politics, society is split in two groups: poor groups 
and affluent groups. While poor groups tend to favour greater government 
intervention in the economy, more affluent groups have a distinct interest in 
restricting government intervention and holding down the budget manipulation. In this 
framework, parties on the left represent the interests of the former group while those 
on the right represent those of the latter. 
  16 
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) refer the parties that accommodate the same 
changes on ideological preferences prone to voters’ preferences near election times as 
“catchall parties”, concept introduced by Kirchheimer (1966). 
 
1.2. Opportunistic political business cycles 
 
1.2.1. The adaptive expectations 
 
The opportunistic political business cycle model introduced by Nordhaus (1975) is 
inspired on previous work presented by Kalecki (1943). In Kalecki’s work the full 
employment goal in the economy is described as being unattainable in democratic 
regimes given the different incentives of capitalists and working class. In this sense, 
incumbents induce recessions and unemployment in order to restore the power of 
business leaders and reduce the bargaining power of workers. In Kalecki’s model this 
power is acquired as a direct result of the prolonged full employment in economy. 
The model proposed by Nordhaus (1975) entails an opportunistic behaviour by the 
incumbents, predicting that the incumbents stimulate economic growth to reinforce 
their chances of re-election. In order to be re-appointed, the opportunistic incumbent 
increases the output growth in the year and a half before each election. The 
incumbent’s objective is then to maximise her probability of re-election. 
As systematised by Chang (2001) the basic Nordhaus’s assumptions are: 
1. The policy of incumbent is decided by the majority votes in the election;  
2. Incumbents are purely office-seeking; 
3. Incumbents can and will manipulate an exploitable Phillips curve in order to 
achieve their electoral goals; 
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4. Voters in general prefer economic growth and avoid inflation and 
unemployment. 
These assumptions are translated in the model proposed by Nordhaus on an 
adjusted Phillips curve that describes the structure of the economy, yielding an 
inflation-unemployment trade-off: 
xt t t
e= −  ,  
where xt  is the deviation of actual from potential output that is affected by an 
adaptive expected inflation - et  and where the monetary authority is assumed to 
control the inflation rate  t . 
In this sense, the model proposed by Nordhaus assumes that the voting behaviour 
is retrospective, i.e., the incumbents’ political evaluation by voters depends merely on 
its economic performance in the past. Once again, the adaptive expectations to 
inflation -  t
e  does not depend on the expectations of future policies, thus evidencing 
voters’ myopic look at the functioning of the economy. 
Nordhaus’s model also used the adaptive inflation expectations given by 
expression (1.1). 
The voters’ satisfaction in any period is given by a loss function similar to 
expression (1.2) of the form: 
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where 
~
 is the electorate’s target rate of inflation, x
~
 is the target rate of economic 
activity (relative to potential output) and   is the relative weight the electorate puts 
on output fluctuations relative to inflation fluctuations. 
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In this model the electorate votes on the basis of the performance of the economy 
right before elections. Incumbents stimulate aggregate demand near elections in order 
to reduce unemployment and the inflationary consequences of the policy are felt in the 
period after elections when an economy contraction is expected. This behaviour 
increases the incumbent’s popularity and consequently the chances of re-election. 
After elections the incumbent has to induce some austerity to control the inflation that 
translates into a loss of popularity. Given so, the incumbent’s tenure is spelt into two 
periods: a post-election and a pre-election one. 
The major limitations of this kind of model rely on the voters’ inability to 
recognise the systematic and synchronised electoral manipulation of the 
macroeconomic variables. 
A subsequent development of the Nordhaus’s model is presented by Tufte (1978). 
Using also a two-year model, Tufte concludes that real disposable income per capita 
in election years increases and that unemployment decreases. Simultaneously, Tufte 
found evidence in the United States that government before elections increases social 
security and federal grants, thus inducing a politic-economic cycle. 
 
1.2.2. The rational expectations  
 
The assumption that voters are only retrospective in their evaluations of the 
incumbent performance is questioned by the rational expectation theory. By this 
theory, being the voters rational, it will be impossible for incumbents to 
systematically mislead them. In this second wave of models relying on an 
opportunistic view, it is argued that, even when voters are assumed to be rational in 
the sense that they look afterwards and learn with the past, the political business cycle 
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still occurs. According to the rational expectation models the cycle remains as long as 
the incumbent has privileged information regarding her “competence”. Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) initially proposed this approach. 
Rogoff and Sibert introduced the idea that even when voters have a look to the 
future, temporary information asymmetries induce the driving forces for the existence 
of a cycle around elections. According to this mechanism, incumbents can get 
reputation by signalling their competence to voters, who do not have the entire 
relevant information to truly evaluate the incumbents’ competence. 
The authors defined that the more competent an incumbent is, the less revenue she 
needs to provide a given level of government services. Their article shows that with 
asymmetric information, the incumbent has an incentive to lower taxes, increase 
expenditures or create monetary growth in election years to try to exaggerate her 
competency, an incentive that is not found in off-election years. Pre-electoral 
manipulation on the budget mix is only entirely understood by voters with a lag, thus 
after the election. 
A major result from Rogoff and Sibert model is stated in Proposition 5, where the 
conventional notion that those more popular incumbents are less likely to engage in 
political business cycle is contradicted. 
Persson and Tabellini (1990) present a model that is an inflation-unemployment 
variant of the Rogoff and Sibert’s model. In this model the Nordhaus’s adaptive 
expectations of inflation are replaced by rational expectations, given as 

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e t
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where E .b g  is the expectation operator and It−1  is the information set of the voters 
at the time t −1b gwhen expectations are formed, which includes all the relevant 
information except the level of incumbent’s competence.  
The degree of incumbent’s competence is a result of the level of output achieved 
with less unexpected inflation. The incumbent remains opportunistic in the sense that 
she seeks to be re-elected and the model assumes that the incumbent has control over 
the inflation rate. In this model voters elect the candidate that is rationally expected to 
generate the highest utility to them. 
The Persson and Tabellini’s model narrows the political business cycle compared 
with the Nordhaus’s predictions given voter rationality and awareness of incumbents’ 
incentives. 
The political business cycles theory finds support in several empirical studies. 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) find evidence of an increase in the inflation rate around 
elections.  
 
1.2.2.1. The political budget cycle model 
 
Emphasising that incumbents have a direct control over the budget variables 
contrarily to other macroeconomic variables, Rogoff (1990) introduces the idea that 
incumbent’s budget manipulation generates a cycle around elections.  
In Rogoff’s model the incumbent is described as having two objectives: staying in 
office and improving social welfare. With that purpose the incumbent manipulates the 
budget composition, namely by increasing transfers that can be targeted to specific 
groups in order to get results on voting behaviour. Rogoff showed that by shifting 
public expenditures towards easily observed consumption expenditures and away 
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from investment expenditures the incumbent can signal her competence and increase 
her chance of re-election. The political business cycle translates into a political budget 
cycle, which arises due to temporary information asymmetries about the incumbent’s 
competence in administering public expenditures. Voters tend to reward incumbents 
who are competent. Competence, however, is described in this model as being private 
information, i.e., only the incumbent knows her own competence. Voters evaluate the 
incumbent’s competence merely based on consumption expenditures done in the 
previous period of elections and only will know the investment expenditures after 
elections. The incumbents’ competency as being not contemporaneously observable 
by voters, then generates the political budget cycle.  
Incumbents can have, in this sense, high or low competency. In Rogoff’s model 
cycles budget manipulation signals that an incumbent has high competency, while 
incompetent incumbents do not distort policy. Given so, opportunistic incumbents 
have a positive gain from being reelected, while non-opportunistic incumbents do not. 
Putting it in another way, it can be stated that the greatest budgetary distortions are 
induced by the competent incumbents, for which results a cost, i.e., a cost of 
identifying the most competent incumbent. 
The model presented by Rogoff also posits that voters maximise a utility function 
that includes the consumption of private and public goods. The public goods 
production function takes the following form: 
g kt t t t+ − ++1     
where g  is the public consumption good, k  is the public investment good,   is 
the lump-sum taxes and  is a stochastic “competence” shock.  
As can be seen, public investment decided at time t only becomes visible at time 
t +1. This visibility lag introduces the incentive for the incumbent to engage in 
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political budget cycles around elections, since voters in pre-election period observe gt  
and kt , but not kt+1  and hence voters only know  at time t +1, which correspond to 
the post-election period. 
Rogoff’s model introduces, through this way, an incentive for the incumbent to 
spend more on public consumption goods in order to more heavily sign her 
competence. The model is then described as being a signalling model. The signalling 
mechanism allows for an increase on incumbent’s utility by an ego-rent obtained 
when she gets re-appointed. 
 
1.2.2.2. The extensions of the political budget cycle model 
 
Gonzalez (1999) and Shi and Svensson (2000), who extend the Rogoff’s model 
evaluate explicitly the effect of the degree of democracy on the magnitude of the 
fiscal cycles. Gonzalez considers the fiscal model including two further variables 
beside Rogoff’s ones: the cost of removing a policymaker from office (the “degree of 
democracy”) and “transparency”, meaning the probability that voters learn the 
incumbent’s competence costlessly, that is, independent of signalling. If removing an 
incumbent from office is not too costly, then an electoral budget cycle emerges.  
Besides the new measures, the model proposed by Gonzalez defines the incumbent 
as inducing asymmetric information regarding the budget composition. In every 
period t, she must decide on the allocation between a “consumption” good gt  and a 
“capital” good, kt , where the production of public capital has a one-period delay, 
while the consumption good can be quickly produced and distributed to the citizens in 
every period. Voters evaluate the incumbent’s competence through the following 
expression:
1t t tg k ++ = . Given that, the capital good takes one period to mature, 
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voters cannot observe it until it is in place and rendering its service. This implies that 
voters do not observe the value of kt+1  and consequently, do not know the 
incumbent’s skill − before casting their vote, as in Rogoff’s model. The only signal 
on the incumbent’s competence available to the public is given by the amount of the 
consumption good gt . 
As in Rogoff’s model, the incumbent receives an exogenous rent from being in 
office, meaning that she prefers to remain in office if it was allowed. 
Through the inclusion of the two new variables in Rogoff’s model, Gonzalez found 
that when there is a positive correlation between the degree of democracy and 
transparency, political budget cycles arise only at intermediate levels of democracy, 
where both measures are at intermediate levels. 
The Gonzalez’s model also points out that the less competent incumbent may be 
willing to mimic the decisions of her skilled counterpart, aiming to take advantage of 
the information asymmetry if by doing so she can get re-appointment. That behaviour 
will imply that the competent incumbent in order to distinguish himself from the 
incompetent type will select a level of gt  that the incompetent incumbent would 
never wish to mimic. At the end, the two types of incumbents select a budget bias 
towards consumption goods. 
Shi and Svensson (2000) present a model in which a higher deficit in election years 
is expected. The main incentives for having an increase on public expenditures were 
the rents that incumbent retrieves by remaining in power and the number of informed 
voters in society. The higher the rent obtained by the incumbent when in office, the 
higher will be her incentive to remain in power, and, in this sense, the stronger will be 
the inherent incentives to influence the voters’ perceptions prior to the election. The 
signalling mechanism is captured in Shi and Svensson’s model by the share of 
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informed voters. The more voters fail to distinguish pre-electoral manipulations from 
incumbent competency, which is a result of a high number of uninformed voters, the 
higher will be the incumbent’s expected benefit from the public expenditure 
manipulation in pre-election periods. 
As in Rogoff’s model, pre-electoral budget manipulation is driven by asymmetric 
information, resulting in strategic signalling. The incumbent’s ability to manipulate 
the budget only can be observed with a lag, which biases in her favour the voter’s 
appreciation of competence. Competence is not an observable characteristic of the 
incumbent, so the voters must extract information about the incumbent’s type of 
competence from observed economic outcomes, in this case through the budget use to 
produce public goods. The information is made available only to some voters before 
casting their votes. The informed voters have information regarding public 
expenditures, taxes and the amount of borrowing for the time in which incumbent is in 
power. As in previous models, when in power, incumbents retrieve an ego-rent from 
being in office. This means that in Shi and Svensson’s model, voters compensate 
incumbents for the existence of a cycle, given their incomplete information.  
Schultz (1995) notes that opportunistic manipulation of the public expenditures can 
be very costly and the incumbent’s incentives to manipulate the economy can vary 
from elections to elections depending on their political needs. Specifically, he argues 
that the incumbent will not necessarily manipulate the economy if her expected 
probability of winning next election is relatively high, thus reducing the opportunistic 
incentive.  
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) already pointed out 
the argument that incumbents who expect to be replaced manipulate the budget more. 
In their models, an incumbent that might lose elections for other incumbent with 
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different preferences may end up choosing a level of public expenditures that is too 
high in order to prevent less preferable expenditures by the opposing party in the next 
period. At the end of the process, the economy finds an accumulation of debt. 
In a very recent contribution, Persson and Tabellini (2000) propose a model to 
investigate how elections affect incumbents’ career concerns and shape their 
behaviours during elections. In their model, elections are regarded as a mechanism 
device through which the most competent policy maker is selected. Since the election 
functions as a means of selection, incumbents have incentives to “perform well” when 
elections approach so that they can get recognised by their good work. This new 
approach complement Rogoff’s one, since the incumbent’s signalling incentive is 
balanced with a career concern that refrains the incumbent’s excessive tendency to 
manipulate the budget composition. 
 
1.2.3. Reconciliation of political influences upon policy outcomes and policy 
instruments 
 
Drazen (2000) presents a model that reconciles the two opportunistic views of the 
electoral cycle incorporating in the same model the components related with the 
output of the economy (political business cycle), and the fiscal components (political 
budget cycle). 
 In Drazen’s model the utility of a voter i  is given as: 
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where g is a public consumption good and k  is a public investment good. The 
remaining variables retain the meaning of expression (1.3). 
The model considers two periods, so that expected utility of voter i  is: 
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where  1 is the voter’s discount rate. 
The supply of public consumption goods is given by: g kt t=− +1 , where is the 
“competence” of the incumbent currently in office. Competence is a given 
characteristic of an incumbent. The incumbents can be of two types: high competence 
H  and low competence  L H . Competence  is not observed by the voters. A 
more competent incumbent is a better economic manager, able to increase a country’s 
level of output. In the absence of any information, voters assign a probability 
0 1   to an incumbent being high competence, where =  + − 
−
 H L1b g . 
The incumbent’s expected utility is given by: 
  P V t t
t
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b g ,  
where qt  is the probability of being in office in period t. An incumbent places a 
value on being in office, denoted by , and she has an opportunistic behaviour by 
manipulating the economy to improve her re-election chances. 
The manipulation takes two forms. First, and most importantly, there is direct 
manipulation via fiscal policy (choice of g ), where concern for social welfare puts a 
limit on how far she is willing to go. Second, she may put pressure on the central bank 
to lower interest rates, but there are costs of doing so. Those costs are summarised by 
  that reflects the cost the incumbent has to support in the future, finding less 
cooperation from the monetary authority.  
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The Drazen’s model considers two periods, with an election at the end of the first 
period. In the first period the incumbent observes  and chooses g1  and k2 . Voters 
observe g1  and 1k  (but not  or k2 ) and use this observation to form an inference 
about competence. Then, based on their beliefs about competence, they then vote 
whether to retain the incumbent or replace him with a challenger of unknown 
competence, so that the expected competence of the challenger is 
−
.  
Actual incumbent is retained if voters’ expected utility with the current incumbent 
is higher than expected utility under the challenger. In the second period, after 
elections, the elected incumbent chooses his first-best policy, as there is no election. 
When  is observed, pre-electoral fiscal policy can have no effect on the election 
outcome. On the contrary, when the incumbent competence is not observed, voters’ 
beliefs about competence are a function of observed fiscal policy. These beliefs in 
turn determine the probability that an incumbent is re-elected. Beliefs about 
competence before an election rely then on signals.  A high spending level signals an 
incumbent with high competence, leading to her re-election. 
Under these circumstances, voters will always re-elect an incumbent they believe 
to be of high competence and vote to remove an incumbent whom they believe is of 
low competence. 
 
1.2.4. Comparison between the adaptive and the rational opportunistic 
political business cycle models 
 
The manipulation of budgets is much easier than the induction of macroeconomic 
outcomes such as inflation or unemployment. The basic difference is that 
governments control their budgets whereas they can only hope to have more indirect 
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impact on the economy. Surely, increasing expenditures just before the election must 
appear a much simpler and rewarding strategy than trying to produce a business cycle 
through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. 
As a synthesis, it can be stated that a major innovation introduced with the rational 
voter models is that they rely on policies rather than on outcomes. Moreover, the 
rational perspective allowed to predict a shorter political business cycle compared 
with the myopic counterpart, given that voters’ rationality will constrain the 
incumbents’ incentive to manipulate excessively the policies tools, thus lowering the 
cycle width. 
Given this difference on the governments’ capability to manipulate directly and 
exclusively the macroeconomic variables, some of the main results of the rational 
political business literature have been recently re-equated, since there is not 
exclusively the incumbents’ political manipulations of the economy that influence the 
macroeconomic variables evolution. 
 Wolfers (2000) questions the rational behaviour of the electorate in the sense that 
voters are unable to distinguish between competency and luck, thus re-electing 
incumbents after national booms and dump them during national recessions. Since 
voters do not have information regarding the part of the economics expansion not 
induced by the incumbents’ action, voters irrationally can be rewarding luck instead 
of competency. 
 
1.2.5. Rational expectations with full informed voters 
 
As previously described, the incumbents’ opportunistic behaviour has been 
explained mainly through the Rogoff’s perspective that incumbents have a temporary 
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information advantage and, in that sense, mistake the electorate by signalling their 
competence. Pétry and Imbeau (1999) question this approach arguing that when the 
electorate becomes fully responsive no longer support budget manipulation. As a 
consequence, voters tend to punish, rather than to reward, governments that 
opportunistically manipulate the budget mix. 
However, a cycle can still be expected with an ultra-rational set-up where voters 
are fully informed, as Baleiras (1997-a, 1997-b) and Baleiras e Vasco (2000) showed. 
The driven force for the budget manipulation prior pre-electoral periods is introduced 
in the model by the re-election probability that does not guarantee to the incumbent 
that she will remain in power another tenure. This means that the incumbent’s re-
appointment, as being an uncertain event, induces the increase of expenditures in the 
pre-election periods given that she has a discounted utility in the post-election periods, 
even when incumbents are presented as being ideologically neutral. Only when the 
incumbent is re-appointed again benefits from the remaining budget left to spend in 
the post-election periods. The constraining force for the incumbents’ natural incentive 
to use the entire budget in the pre-electoral period is introduced by the voters’ 
preferences even when they are defined as being neutral regarding budget 
manipulation. Those models also contemplate another constraint to the incumbent’s 
incentive to spend entirely the two-periods budget in the pre-election period, 
represented by the incumbent’s interest in a job outside politics in case of defeat in 
elections. 
Gonzalez (2001-b) also introduces full information hypothesis. In that model it is 
assumed that the incumbent will obtain utility from capital good that she chooses in 
post-election period, even if not re-elected. In this sense, the model aparts from 
Baleiras’ and Baleiras and Vasco’s works since in the latter papers the incumbent only 
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retrieves utility, from her investment expenditure decisions, after elections and only if 
she was re-appointed. If the opposite occurs, the incumbent only can expect utility 
from income achieved through outside incumbency activity. 
 
1.2.6. Empirical evidences 
 
Studies that have empirically proven the existence of political budget cycles on 
national or local public accounts are reviewed in this sub-section. The empirical 
confirmation that political budget cycles do occur in several contexts, gave the 
necessary incentive to develop the model described in Chapter 2.  
Schucknecht (1996) using a panel of 35 developing countries over the period 1970-
92 found that incumbents in developing countries have more space to engage into 
political business cycles given that in those countries incumbents retain more power 
over monetary and fiscal policy compared with consolidated democracies. The author 
found an electoral cycle manipulation on the fiscal variables but no significant sign of 
manipulation on output. In his 1998’s work Schucknecht uses a sample of 24 
developing countries for the 1973-1992 period and finds that the electoral cycle effect 
in those countries are essentially felt on public expenditure rather than on taxes. The 
public investment manipulation around elections is identified as being frequent. 
Gonzalez (2000-b) as well as Shi and Svensson (2000) find an evidence of political 
budget cycles related to elections proximity. 
The first author finds that electoral budget cycle arises when removing an 
incumbent from office is not too costly. Gonzalez introduces two variables in her 
model: one evaluates the effect of removing an incumbent from office and the other, 
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designed as transparency is the probability that voters learn incumbent’s competence 
costlessly.  
Gonzalez concludes that in more democratic countries, opportunistic budget cycles 
are of small magnitude and highly irregular over time1. 
Gonzalez shows that if citizens do not have full information, incumbents have a 
greater incentive to distort the budget composition from capital goods to consumption 
goods, amplifying the cycle width. 
Shi and Svensson (2000) also find the existence of a political budget cycle, 
especially in developing countries. 
These authors use a panel of 123 developed and developing countries over a 21 
year period and show that expenditures increase and revenues decrease before 
elections, which lead to a larger deficit in election years. The induced deficit by 
elections is twice more as large in developing countries when compared to developed 
ones. This difference is explained by the authors through two reasons: the higher the 
rents of remaining in power and the lower the share of informed voters, the stronger 
the incentives to attempt to manipulate fiscal policy prior election periods. The sample 
of developed and developing countries presents remarkable differences on these two 
variables, which explains the differences found on the political budget cycle width. 
At local level, Baleiras and Costa (2004) provide an empirical test on public 
expenditure manipulation based on a panel data sample of Portuguese municipalities. 
Empirical evidence supports the existence of public investment cycles induced by 
political leaders. 
Khemani (2000) also analyses electoral cycles in India but find a different result. 
Using a three-period model: the pre-election period, the election period and the post 
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election period as well as sub-national government’s data, he shows that governments 
increase expenditures on the capital account and at the same time reduce expenditures 
on the current account in pre-election period. This difference relies on the fact that in 
pre-election year a set of constructions are initiated, namely roads, that gives to the 
incumbent immediate political reward. In this particular case, investment expenditures 
generate satisfaction both to voters and to incumbent in pre-election period. The 
author states that this behaviour is according to incumbents’ career concern, which 
make an effort to provide public services that voters can usufruct in the election year. 
However, investment on roads is only one of the several areas where public entities 
have responsibilities. In fact, it is a particular investment expenditure case, since its 
visibility is quite fast. 
Pétry and Imbeau (1999) also find electoral manipulation in the Canadian 
provinces but on social services expenditures. 
Focusing on electoral policy cycle and using two types of government’s 
expenditures: general public goods and geographically concentrated goods, Chang 
(2001) evaluates the incumbents’ incentive to spend more in one of these goods under 
majoritarian systems and proportional systems. He finds that the expenditures on 
public goods are higher in proportional systems, and the level of the geographically 
concentrated expenditures has preponderancy in majoritarian systems. In his study, 
Chang covers data of government’s budget spending for 17 OECD countries from 
1973 to 1995. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Gonzalez (2000-a) also tested empirically her predictions using data from Mexico. The author found 
strong systematic use of public spending in infrastructures as a means to achieve votes. 
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2.  Cycles on public expenditure mix 
 
The focus of the present Chapter is on the incumbent’s budget manipulation, 
namely of the consumption expenditures and the investment expenditures, with an 
electoral goal. More precisely, the Chapter intends to analyse the existence of political 
cycles in the expenditure mix. The prior expectation is that consumption expenditures 
increase and investment expenditures decrease before elections. This expectation 
derives from the differentiated time visibility associated to these two types of 
expenditure. 
While consumption expenditure occurs and generates utility in the year of 
incumbent’s decision, investment expenditure becomes visible to voters and gives 
utility to the incumbent with at least a one-year delay. This lag difference between 
these expenditure categories derives from the fact that, despite the investment 
expenditures being contracted at a certain year, they take time to be implemented. 
Thus, the investment expenditures benefits are only attainable in subsequent year(s). 
Political budget cycle models usually present the budget manipulation as a result of 
incumbents’ need to signal their competence to voters (this is why these models are 
also referred to as signalling models). By increasing consumption expenditures in pre-
election periods, the incumbent expects to improve her re-election chances, which 
leads to a cycle. In these models voters do not know a priori the investment 
expenditures to be made after elections take place. 
In this sense, such models assume information asymmetry. The incumbent has all 
the knowledge and voters do not have a prospective view. Chapter 1 reviewed some 
examples of this type of models. 
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This information asymmetry is usually related to voters’ myopic view, since they 
cannot predict future. Even when voters are modelled as having a rational forward-
looking behaviour, an opportunistic political expenditure cycle is also expected 
because there are some incumbents’ characteristics, namely competence, that voters 
cannot directly observe. 
However, even when voters have complete information regarding the incumbent’s 
opportunistic behaviour a cycle can still be expected as Baleiras (1997-a, 1997-b) and 
Baleiras e Vasco (2000) have proven.  
The present theoretical model proposes an extension of those authors’ works. Their 
works present a political expenditure cycle as an outcome of budgetary resources 
manipulation during an incumbent’s tenure. Splitting the tenure time into two periods, 
the incumbent spends more on the pre-election period than on the post-election 
period. They ignore the expenditure composition at any given period. 
In the model that is presented here, the incumbent has two budgets to manage 
during her tenure time: one in the pre-election periods and other in the post-election 
periods. The goal is to evaluate the expenditure mix of both budgets, i.e. how 
consumption and investment outlays are set in each period taking voters and 
incumbent’s preferences into consideration. It is shown that the incumbent has no 
incentive to distort voters’ preferences in the post-election period. This incentive 
appears in the pre-election periods only as shown in Proposition 1. 
 
2.1. Theoretical model 
 
In contrast to previous works described in Chapter 1, Baleiras (1997-a, 1997-b) as 
well as Baleiras and Vasco (2000) developed a model that eliminates the usual 
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assumption underlying political budget cycles. That assumption is the signaling 
mechanism in order to influence voters about the incumbent’s competency. Despite 
this motive those authors have surprisingly proven its existence. 
The model presented by those authors relies on a two-period budget, which must 
be managed in order to maximise the incumbent’s inter-temporal utility. In this 
framework, the incumbent has an incentive to be re-elected which gives her a reason 
to consider voters’ welfare, but simultaneously, she is concerned about the other state 
of nature, the case of defeat. In this last scenario, the income available in case of non 
re-election becomes of her concern too. 
In contrast to most studies previously referred to, Baleiras’ and Baleiras and 
Vasco’s models assume that voters and the incumbent are fully informed. In other 
words, voters know the budget available after the pre-electoral fiscal decision and the 
incumbent foresees entirely her re-election chances. 
Here, a theoretical model that considers a reinterpretation of Baleiras’ and Baleiras 
and Vasco’s articles is proposed. In this extension, the basic assumptions are 
maintained. However, budget decision is not exclusively a choice between pre-
election and after-election period expenditures, but it is also a choice about its 
composition. In this sense, in each period, the incumbent must decide how much to 
spend on consumption goods as well as on capital goods. 
It is well known, as already mentioned, that consumption expenditures have a 
much closer visibility to voters. In contrast, investment expenditures usually pay 
political dividends with some lag. The basic purpose is to evaluate if this expenditure 
behaviour gives rise to an inter-temporal cycle on budget composition. 
More precisely, the intention is to verify if, even under the full information 
assumption, and given the investment expenditures visibility delay, the incumbent still 
  36 
has an incentive to engage into an asymmetric expenditure management, increasing 
consumption expenditures before elections and decreasing it right afterwards. This 
incentive arises since the incumbent will only get satisfaction from investment 
expenditure after elections and only if she will be re-elected. 
Formally, each electoral tenure is made of two periods (1 and 2)2 and the 
incumbent must decide, in each period, the budgetary shares of consumption ( gA ) and 
investment expenditures ( gB ), with g gA B+ =1, for simplicity. 
Any decision an incumbent makes on consumption expenditure pays back political 
dividends immediately, i.e., during the same period the expenditure is incurred.  
In contrast, any investment expenditure, decided in one period, becomes visible to 
voters only in the following period. Putting it another way, investment expenditures 
only give utility to the incumbent with a one-period delay. 
Consider the budgetary choices of period 2 (the pre-electoral period). Any euro 
spent in consumption gives the incumbent for sure some utility in the very same 
period. However, any euro spent on investment during period 2 will only give the 
incumbent some utility in the following period if she is re-elected—an uncertain 
event. This delay phenomenon occurs also in period 1. However, as the investment 
expenditure decided in period 1 will become visible in period 2, the incumbent’s 
utility from that expenditure is certain. 
The incumbent decides expenditure composition at the beginning of each period 
and her utility is represented by v gib gwhich is twice continuously differentiable, with 
                                                          
2 Several PBC models, essentially those where asymmetric information prevails, include a positive 
discount rate. Since the theoretical model relies on full information assumption and seeking for 
simplicity, the insertion of a positive discount rate was set aside. However, it could be also considered 
in the model without changing results qualitatively.  
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v v' , ' ' 0 0  for i A B= , . This satisfaction can only be enjoyed while the incumbent 
is in office. 
Voters’ assessment of the incumbent’s performance is explained by the following 
expression: s a w g w g a w g w gA A B B= + + − +
1 2 1 21c h c h b g c h c h , with w w' , ' ' 0 0 . 
Parameter a  ( a 01, ) captures the voters’ preferences for budget composition 
between consumption and investment expenditures. When a a 05 05.  < .b g  it 
represents a bias for consumption (investment) expenditures. 
Re-election probability,  , is a function of voters’ satisfaction level:  = sb g , 
  0 1,  and  ' 0 . 
If it is assumed that voters prefer no budget distortion or, equivalently, that no 
cycle should occur during the two-tenure period, the wider the cycle (i.e. the 
difference between gA  and gB  choices) in each period, the smaller is s  and thus the 
lower will be the incumbent’s re-election chances. In contrast, the more likely the 
defeat scenario [probability 1− sb g ], the wider the cycle becomes. 
In this context, the best income an incumbent may achieve in case of electoral 
defeat (outside income) becomes increasingly important. 
Outside income is denoted by y  in which y y s= b g , with y' 0 . This income is 
endogenous and depends on the entrepreneurial community’s evaluation of the 
incumbent’s performance while in office. The entrepreneurial community reward the 
incumbent’s performance by ensuring her an outside office job. That community is 
part of the electorate, thus sharing voters’ preferences. The greater the assessment 
prospective employers (that is to say voters) retrieve from the incumbent’s budgetary 
decisions, the higher will be the reward an incumbent could expect in case of election 
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defeat through outside income. In synthesis, outside income is an increasing function 
of the voters’ satisfaction level. 
As s  decreases,   and y  decrease as well. These are the two disciplinary 
pressures against the incumbent’s self-interest to overspend in public consumption 
gA  05.b g.  
While in office, the incumbent chooses twice the budget composition, one in 
period 1 and another in period 2. Given the visibility lag of investment expenditure, 
the utility from these choices spans for three periods: periods 1 and 2 of the current 
tenure and the post-electoral future (period 3). Naturally, the latter utility is contingent 
upon the electoral outcome. 
Formally, the fiscal choice of period 1 generates an ego-return v gA
1c h in period 1 
and an ego-return v gB
1c h  in period 2; the fiscal choice of period 2 induces ego-return 
v gA
2c h in period 2 and an expected ego-return v gB2c h in period 3. Moreover, period 3 
utility in case of electoral defeat is given by 1−b g b gx y . So, the incumbent’s inter-
temporal utility function is: 
U v g v g v g v g x yA B A B= + + + + −
1 1 2 2 1c h c h c h c h b g b g  . 
Knowing that g gB A= −1 , in each period, the above expression can be rewritten 
as: 
U v g v g v g v g x yA A A A= + − + + − + −
1 1 2 21 1 1c h c h c h c h b g b g   
 
The incumbent’s problem becomes an optimisation problem with just two choice 
variables, gA
1  and gA
2 . In this sense, the incumbent will have to find the utility 
maximising levels of consumption expenditures in each period. 
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Equivalently, 
MaxU v g v g v g s v g s x y s
s t s a w g w g a w g w g
g g
A A A A
A A A A
A A
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
. .
= + − + + − + −
= + + − − + −
c h c h c h b g c h b gc h b gc h
c h c h b g c h c h
 
         
                 (2.1) 
 
It is further assumed that v g x yA1
2− c h b g  which means the incumbent prefers the 
ego-rent from investment expenditure to the outside income. Although a technical 
necessity, this assumption squares well with the informal perception that most 
politicians prefer re-election runs to retreats if allowed to do so.  
 
2.2. Political budget cycle 
 
Given the incumbent’s budgetary decision and the manner how it gives her utility, 
in each period, as described above, it is reasonable to ask if under these conditions 
there is an incentive for the incumbent to engage into budget composition 
manipulation and how. 
The intuition tells that, given the voters’ full information and unbiased preferences, 
the incumbent gains nothing from budget manipulation in period 1. This is so since 
the incumbent neither improves her reputation near voters nor faces any uncertainty 
on investment expenditure utility in period 2. 
However, in period 2, the incumbent has an incentive to incur into a political 
budget cycle. This results from the fact that investment expenditures, in period 2, flow 
probabilistically into the next period utility. In this framework, the incumbent has thus 
an incentive to spend on consumption expenditures rather than on investment 
expenditures. Despite the loss on re-election chances that this behaviour generates, the 
incumbent still has a motive to prefer to spend more on consumption goods. 
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The following Proposition shows formally these results: 
 
Proposition 1—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle: Even when the 
electorate shows no preference for a cycle a = 05.b g ,  
i) a political budget cycle is found in the pre-election period, given by 
gA
2 05 . , and 
ii)  there is no cycle in the post-election period, gA
1 05= . . 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 1. 
 
Interpreting the result, it can be said that the incumbent has a total opportunistic 
behaviour, which means that she has no ideological bias for gA  or gB . Any eventual 
composition cycle follows only from the differences in political visibility of gA  and 
gB  during her legislature period. Moreover, this visibility differential matters in 
period 2 only, since she is uncertain about being re-elected and thus cannot guarantee 
a satisfaction from her investment expenditures choices in this period. In other words, 
one unit of consumption expenditure in period 2 generates higher utility than one unit 
attached to investment expenditure in the same period, because the latter is 
probabilistically discounted to the ensuing period 3.  
The voters, in contrast, have an ideology in the model represented by parameter a , 
as already stated, which reveals a definite preference between consumption 
expenditure and investment expenditure. The higher is a , the more biased are voters’ 
preferences towards consumption expenditures. 
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Contrary to signalling models in which the incumbent has an incentive to sign her 
competence, as referred in Chapter 1, in the model voters foresee perfectly the 
incumbent’s performance. In this perspective, the incumbent, given her ideological 
neutrality, does not have an idiosyncratic incentive to increase investment 
expenditures in period 1. However, given the investment expenditure delay on utility, 
the incumbent cannot retrieve satisfaction from investment expenditure decided in 
period 2 (pre-election period), unless she gets re-elected. This induces the incumbent 
to spend more of her last period budget on consumption expenditures, thus leading to 
a budget cycle g gA B
2 2 . 
In this framework a cycle is only observed in the second half of legislature, since 
voters prefer no cycle, which gives the incumbent no reason to distort budget 
composition at the first period in office. In fact, any deviation away from a half 
budgetary partition, in period 1, reduces voters’ satisfaction, thus decreasing the 
incumbent’s re-election probability as well as her outside income. 
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3. Preference differences between the electorate and society at large 
 
Now the following question is introduced: Is it reasonable that the entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to pay for the (ex-) incumbent still reflects the electorate’s assessment of 
her performance when non-voters show a significant weight in population? Probably 
not, because voters are not representative of society’s preferences, under these 
circumstances.  
This analysis becomes more interesting if it were taken in consideration that the 
preferences of voters and non-voters are usually misaligned in the sense that they do 
not evidence the same priorities. 
Following this perspective, the polar cases will be in contrast where: 
i) society at large prefer no cycle at all and voters prefer a cycle and  
ii) society prefer a cycle and voters prefer no cycle at all. 
It is plausible to ask what circumstances may lead the electorate to prefer one type 
of expenditure and society to prefer an equal partition between the two types of 
expenditures or vice-versa. 
In fact some kind of expenditure satisfies more directly voters and other types of 
expenditure give more direct satisfaction to non-voters. For the first type of 
expenditures it can be referred the defence expenditures or economic services like 
transportation and communication expenditures. Examples of the second type contain 
expenditures on health, education and social housing construction, where beneficiary 
groups include much larger fractions of youth and migrant population who typically 
do not vote. 
In this sense, gB  and gA  are re-interpreted respectively, as the first and second 
type of these expenditures. 
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Under the existence of preference misalignment between voters and non-voters, an 
incumbent wishing to please the former exclusively will bring a negative spillover 
effect on non-voters, since the last ones will find a budget composition different from 
their most desired partition. 
O’Toole and Strobl (1994-pp.11) argued that “government expenditure, both in 
size and composition, will more accurately reflect the tastes of the entire eligible-to-
vote population under compulsory voting rules. In contrast, under voluntary voting 
rules the composition of government spending is biased towards the preferences of the 
voting population”. 
Gaviria and al. (2000) created an index of particularism for a large cross-section of 
countries using data on electoral rules, through which they attempted to capture the 
extent to which politicians and policymakers have incentives to follow specific 
interests rather than pursue broader national goals. In this sense they explored the 
effects of the degree of particularism on the size and composition of public spending. 
They found that easily targeted expenditures such as subsidies or capital expenditures 
are likely to play a larger role in the government budget since it favours special 
constituencies. 
Kwon (2001-pp.6) using spending in South Korea, during the 1987-97 period, also 
found that “incumbents favour their core electoral support groups and it implies that 
politicians are risk-averse. Instead of targeting transfers to voters whose affinity is 
less likely to be close to the incumbent, office-seeking politicians always choose to 
strengthen the electoral basis they have cultivated over time. This type of policy 
choices reflects the ‘machine politics’.”  
This gives some insights that those countries where a great number of voters do not 
actually exercise their right to vote, it is expected that incumbents distort budget 
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composition in order to favour effective electors. As O’Toole and Strobl (1994) 
referred, it is the voters with lower income as well as reduced instruction level who, 
usually, having less information about politics, do not vote.  
In this sense, it is introduced in the model, at this point, a contra-incentive 
reproduced by an outside income related to society’s assessment of the incumbent’s 
performance. 
The outside income will appear here as a recognition measure of the incumbent’s 
merit or reputation by society. The prospective employers’ evaluation of the 
incumbent’s performance is now more enlarged.3 Instead of focusing exclusively on 
strict economic results, the entrepreneurial community will correlate outside income 
to the incumbent’s social goals achievement. 
In this perspective, the two following propositions discuss how the political 
expenditure cycle evolves when society and voters exhibit different preferences. It is 
shown in Proposition 2 and in Corollary 1 that when either voters or society evidence 
a marginal preference for consumption expenditures, the incumbent distorts the 
budget composition, increasing the later share in both post-election and pre-election 
periods. 
An alternative case is also discussed here where either voters or society prefer a 
budget mix biased towards investment expenditure. Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 
show that in this particular case, investment expenditure exceeds current expenditure 
in the post-election period. 
 
                                                          
3 Wolfers (2000-pp.1) evidenced that if voters are not rational they will reward incumbents that achieve 
good economic results unrelated to gubernatorial actions. He says that: “Voters in pro-cyclical states 
are consistently fooled into re-electing incumbents during national booms, only to dump them during 
national recessions”. This is not the considered understanding of voters’ behaviour here. 
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3.1. The model redefinition 
 
The society’s assessment of the incumbent’s policy is evaluated by the following 
expression: W c w g w g c w g w gA A B B= + + − +
1 2 1 21c h c h b g c h c h , with w w' , ' ' 0 0 . 
Parameter c  ( c 0 1, ) indicates the budget composition between gA  and gB  
expenditures as desired by society. When c c 05 05.  < .b g  it represents a bias in 
favour of the first type (second type) expenditures. 
As referred, outside income is a measure of the incumbent’s social reputation. In 
this sense, y Wb g  is a result of the assessment W and not a strictly outcome of voters’ 
satisfaction. By now it is assumed that the entrepreneurial community is willing to 
pay the incumbent at least the same or an higher income than the one she would 
achieve if outside income was related to economic performance alone. If it is not the 
case, then the incumbent will have no incentive to care about society’s preferences. In 
fact, if outside income is higher when it is just a function of voters’ satisfaction, then 
there is a return to the basic model presented in (2.1). 
In this framework, the incumbent’s problem becomes: 
MaxU v g v g v g s v g s x y W
s t s a w g w g a w g w g
W c w g w g c w g w g
g g
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
~
. .
= + − + + − + −
= + + − − + −
= + + − − + −
c h c h c h b g c h b gc h b gc h
c h c h b g c h c h
c h c h b g c h c h
 
  
       
           (3.1) 
As a first case, assume voters and society have different preferences, such that the 
former prefer no cycle ( a = 05. ) and the latter have a bias towards consumption 
expenditures ( c  05. ). 
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Proposition 2—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when society 
prefers a cycle in favour of consumption expenditure and voters prefer the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, voters prefer no cycle ( a = 05. ) and society favours consumption 
expenditure ( c  05. ), then a political budget cycle emerges in both periods, such 
that current expenditure exceeds capital expenditure in the optimum 
g t
A
t~
. , , =
L
NM
O
QP05 1 2 . 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 2. 
 
A similar result to Proposition 2 is found if voters rather than society evidence a 
preference bias towards gA  expenditure type ( a  05. ) and society prefer an absence 
of a cycle ( c = 05. ). 
 
Corollary 1—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when voters 
prefer a cycle in favour of consumption expenditure and society prefers the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, society prefers no cycle ( c = 05. ) and voters favour consumption 
expenditure ( a  05. ), then a political budget cycle emerges in both periods, such 
that current expenditure exceeds capital expenditure in the optimum 
g t
A
t~
. , , =
L
NM
O
QP05 1 2 . 
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Proof:  
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of cycle emerges.    ◼ 
 
The other case in which voters prefer a concentration on gB  expenditures ( a  05. ) 
and society prefer no cycle ( c = 05. ) is presented now. 
 
Proposition 3—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when voters 
prefer a cycle in favour of investment expenditure and society prefers the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, society prefers no cycle ( c = 05. ) and voters favour investment 
expenditure ( a  05. ), then  
i) the political budget cycle emerges in period 1 and, 
ii) the cycle type in period 2 is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 3. 
 
The cycle type in period 2, under the conditions described in Proposition 3, 
remains an empirical question. Putting it another way, it will be possible to evaluate 
empirically if in a country with a representative weight of non-voters, the cycle type 
has the same nature as common preferences gA
2 0 5 .c h  or, in opposition, if it occurs 
either an absence of a cycle or a bias to gB  expenditures. 
 
The nature of the cycle described in Proposition 3 stands if society rather than 
voters prefer gB  expenditures ( c  05. ) and voters prefer no cycle ( a = 05. ).  
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Corollary 2—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when society 
prefers a cycle in favour of investment expenditure and voters prefer the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, voters prefer no cycle ( a = 05. ) and society favours investment 
expenditure ( c  05. ), then 
i) the political budget cycle emerges in period 1 and, 
ii) the cycle type in period 2 is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: 
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of cycle emerges.    ◼ 
 
3.2. Interpretation of the results 
  
The intuition of the two last results can be explained as follows. If society’s 
preferences differ from voters’ ones, the incumbent will face a trade-off effect: 
pleasing voters improves her re-election chances but decreases her outside income, 
since incumbent has made options that are far away from the ones most preferred by 
society. It is useful to recall here that, in this case, incumbent’s reputation is evaluated 
according to the society’s assessment of the incumbent’s performance. 
This means that when incumbent pegs social preferences to her utility function 
(Proposition 2 and 3), the political expenditure cycles are no longer as predicted when 
she looks only into the voters’ interest and her own (Proposition 1).  
Under the case in Proposition 2 ( c a = 05. ), given the incumbent’s ideology 
absence, in period 1 she will follow society’s preferences. In this case, the budget 
composition is distorted in favour of gA  expenditures, thus improving the 
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incumbent’s outside reward. In period 2, both society and the incumbent’s self-
interest on gA  expenditures push for a gA  05.  cycle.  In this case, the incumbent 
supports some cost on votes but increases its outside income in case of defeat. 
Besides, a bias is expected to gA  expenditures in period 1 and period 2.  
The previous argument is also valid for the case in which voters’ preferences are 
biased to gB  expenditures ( a c = 05. ), presented in Proposition 3. Given the 
incumbent’s preference absence for any type of expenditure, in period 1 a PBC is 
found, which increases gB  expenditures, thus favouring voters and improving the 
incumbent’s re-election probability. Given the incumbent’s re-appointment concern, 
she has an incentive to spend more on gB  expenditures also in period 2, compared to 
common preferences. However, the incumbent’s self-interest is opposite to voters’. 
Thus, these two effects can lead to an absence of a cycle (the two-effect balance) or a 
bias in favour of any type of expenditure. A budget composition option where gB  
expenditures are privileged seems also very plausible to the incumbent. Although 
imposing some dissatisfaction on all society, it pleases voters, first constituencies that 
give an immediate reward to the incumbent: the vote.  
This analysis converges to other authors’ results mentioned above in which the 
incumbents tend to satisfy particular constituencies, specifically those who vote. 
The conclusion is that, in both cases, when outside income depends on society’s 
preferences, which are not aligned with voters ones, a cycle will emerge in period 1. 
The larger the number of non-voters in total population, the higher the impact of a 
given preference differential between society and voters. The society’s behaviour is 
more differentiated from the voters’ one as the weight of non-voters in society 
increases. Only in this case, different preferences are expected since non-voters 
influence society’s assessment of the incumbent’s policy. If non-voters are not a 
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significant fraction of population, an incumbent who chooses a budget composition 
that satisfies voters’ preferences guarantees re-election and outside income is not 
penalised, since voters reflect society’s preferences. However, when voters and non-
voters are not aligned in preferences, and simultaneously non-voters have weight in 
the total population, this is an incentive for the incumbent to change budget 
composition in order to accommodate the preferences of both types of population.  
The Propositions 2 and 3 presented two results that can be tested empirically.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
Is it necessary to have asymmetric information to find a government’s expenditures 
manipulation?  
The theoretical model has proven that even when 
1) voters know the budget availability after the pre-electoral decision for 
investment expenditures as well as 
2) the incumbent previously know her re-election chances – full information 
model, 
an intertemporal political budget expenditure cycle emerges with implications on 
expenditure mix. In this case, an expenditure cycle prone to consumption expenditures 
is expected in the pre-election period. 
When the incumbent’s performance as perceived by the other players is brought 
into question, the incumbent faces two opposing incentives in the pre-election period. 
In fact, under this scenario, the incumbent finds herself into a dilemma, if voters or 
society preferences are in favour of investment expenditures. If she favours 
consumption expenditures she displeases either voters or society, thus decreasing her 
re-election chances, in the first case, or her outside income if she is defeated in the 
next election contest, in the second case. Given this opposing incentives faced by the 
incumbent in the pre-election period, it is not possible to know a priori the budget 
mix in that period.  
If either voters or society preferences are biased towards consumption 
expenditures, then the political budget cycle above emerges in both post-election 
periods and in pre-election periods. 
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In contrast with some usual findings that a political budget cycle is more easily 
expected in developing countries, where the asymmetry information phenomenon is 
common, an empirical test of the main results on European Community countries, 
where voters have large access to information, will be performed. The second part of 
this dissertation shows the empirical application.  
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Appendix 1: 
The incumbent’s problem is given by expression (2.1): 
MaxU v g v g v g s v g s x y s
s t s a w g w g a w g w g
g g
A A A A
A A A A
A A
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
. .
= + − + + − + −
= + + − − + −
c h c h c h b g c h b gc h b gc h
c h c h b g c h c h
 
         
 
The objective function is twice differentiable and assumed to be strictly concave in 
order to ensure the existence of a unique and global maximum. Under this condition 
the first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterise the global 
extreme value, thus obviating the need for checking the second-order condition. 
The first order-conditions are:  


= + − − − − −
− − +
+ − − − − − − − −
− − − − =
U
g
v g s aw g a w g v g
v g
x y s aw g a w g s aw g a w g x y s
s x y s aw g a w g
A
A A A A
A
A A A A
A A
1
1 1 1 2
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0
' ' ' '
'
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
c h b g c h b g c he j c h
c h
b g c h b g c he j b g c h b g c he j b gc h
b g b g c h b g c he j



         
          
          
 


= + − − − − −
− − +
+ − − − − − − − −
− − − − =
U
g
v g s aw g a w g v g
s v g
x y s aw g a w g s aw g a w g x y s
s x y s aw g a w g
A
A A A A
A
A A A A
A A
2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0
' ' ' '
'
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
c h b g c h b g c he j c h
b g c h
b g c h b g c he j b g c h b g c he j b gc h
b g b g c h b g c he j




         
          
          
 
The two equations can be simplified to expressions (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) below, 
respectively: 
v g v g
s x y s v g s x y s aw g a w g
A A
A A A
' '
' ' ' ' '
1 1
2 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
c h c h
b g b gc h c h b gc h b g{ } c h b g c he j
− − =
− − − − − − − =  
(A.1.1) 
v g s v g
s x y s v g s x y s aw g a w g
A A
A A A
' '
' ' ' ' '
2 2
2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1
c h b g c h
b g b gc h c h b gc h b g{ } c h b g c he j
− − =
− − − − − − −

   =
 (A.1.2) 
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Let g A
1 *  and g A
2 *  denote the optimal solution to problem (2.1). 
 
Step i— Firstly, the focus is on period 1 expenditure composition, given by (A.1.1) 
above. 
As previously referred, it is expected that g gA B
1 1 0− = . The following proof is 
made by contradiction. In this sense, suppose not. Under this scenario it could be 
found that g gA B
1 1 0−   or g gA B
1 1 0−  . 
Define   − − ' s x y s v gAb g b gc h c he j1 2  as well as 
^
' ' −1  s x y sb gc h b g . Given the 
assumption x y v gBb g c h− 2 0  and the signs of the primitive functions, then it implies 
  0  and 
^
 0 . 
This allows to rewrite expression (A.1.1) as: 
v g v g aw g a w gA A A A' ' ' '
1 1 1 11 1 1c h c h c h b g c he j− − = FH
I
K − − − -
^
. 
Assuming that g gA B
1 1 0−   could be observed, this means that gA
1 05 . , given 
budget constraint. 
Thus, under this scenario a strictly negative left-hand side will be found or 
equivalently v g v gA A' '
1 11c h c h − . By the same token, w g w gA A' '1 11c h c h − , which leads 
to aw g a w gA A' '
1 11 1 0c h b g c he j− − −  , given the basic assumption that a = 05. . 
Jointly with  -
^F
H
I
K  0 , this gives a strictly positive right-hand side, which is a 
contradiction. 
Thus, the conclusion is that gA
1  cannot be strictly larger than gB
1 . 
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The other scenario is g gA B
1 1 0−   or, equivalently, gA
1 05 . . In this situation it will 
be found v g v gA A' '
1 11c h c h −  as well as w g w gA A' '1 11c h c h − . Here the left-hand side is 
strictly positive. Knowing that  -
^F
H
I
K  0  as well that 
aw g a w gA A' '
1 11 1 0c h b g c he j− − −  , in this case a strictly negative right-hand side is 
found. Thus, a contradiction is found again, which means that gA
1  cannot also be 
strictly smaller than gB
1 . 
Summarizing, if gA
1  is neither strictly bigger nor strictly smaller than gB
1 , well then 
this means that the equilibrium solution in period 1 can only be g gA B
1 1= . 
 
Step ii— At this point there is a turn into the period 2 expenditure shares, given by 
expression (A.1.2): 
v g s v g
s x y s v g s x y s aw g a w g
A A
A A A
' '
' ' ' ' '
2 2
2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1
c h b g c h
b g b gc h c h b gc h b g{ } c h b g c he j
− − =
− − − − − − −

      =
  
The rest of this proof replicates Baleiras and Vasco (2000). The following 
exposition proceeds by contradiction. Suppose, therefore, that the inequality 
g gA B
2 2 0−   is not fulfilled. Then, g gA B
2 2 0−   or gA
2 05 . , given the budget 
constraint in period 2. 
The left-hand side of the expression is strictly positive, because gA
2 05 . , which 
implies that v g v g s v gA A A' ' '
2 2 21 1c h c h b g c h −  − . 
Let us return to the definition of   − − ' s x y s v gAb g b gc h c he j1 2  as well as 

^
' ' −1  s x y sb gc h b g , which are common in the two period first-order conditions. 
  56 
Given also the assumption x y v gBb g c h− 2 0  and the signs of the primitive functions, 
then it is found   0  and 
^
 0 , as previously stated.  
In this case, the right-hand side can now be written as 
 −
F
H
I
K − − −
^
' 'aw g a w gA A
2 21 1c h b g c he j  
From gA
2 05 . , w g w gA A' '
2 21c h c h − , implying for a = 05.  that 
aw g a w gA A' '
2 21 1 0c h b g c he j− − −  . Therefore, the right-hand side of the expression 
becomes non-positive, which establishes a contradiction. 
Concluding, it can be said that gA
2  is strictly larger than gB
2  in the optimum. ◼ 
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Appendix 2: 
Step i—First-order conditions of problem (3.1) 


= + − − − − −
− − +
+ − − − − − − − −
− − − − =
U
g
v g s aw g a w g v g
v g
x y W cw g c w g s aw g a w g x y W
s x y W cw g c w g
A
A A A A
A
A A A A
A A
~
' ' ' '
'
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
1
1 1 1 2
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0
c h b g c h b g c he j c h
c h
b g c h b g c he j b g c h b g c he j b gc h
b g b g c h b g c he j



         
          
          
 


= + − − − − −
− − +
+ − − − − − − − −
− − − − =
U
g
v g s aw g a w g v g
s v g
x y W cw g c w g s aw g a w g x y W
s x y W cw g c w g
A
A A A A
A
A A A A
A A
~
' ' ' '
'
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
c h b g c h b g c he j c h
b g c h
b g c h b g c he j b g c h b g c he j b gc h
b g b g c h b g c he j




         
          
          0
 
Rearranging, it becomes: 
v g v g s x y W v g aw g a w g
s x y W cw g c w g
A A A A A
A A
' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
1 1 2 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
c h c h b g b gc h c he j c h b g c he j
b gc h b g c h b g c he j
− − = − − − − − −
− − − − −

                                    
       (A.2.1) 
v g s v g s x y W v g aw g a w g
s x y W cw g c w g
A A A A A
A A
' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
c h b g c h b g b gc h c he j c h b g c he j
b gc h b g c h b g c he j
− − = − − − − − −
− − − − −
 
                                    
      (A.2.2) 
Denote the optimal quantities of the first-order conditions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) as 
g A
1
~
 and g A
2
~
, respectively. 
 
Step ii—Cycle in period 1 
At first it is paid attention to period 1’s budget composition or equivalently to 
equation (A.2.1). 
Evaluating the g A
1
~
 solution, it could be g gA B
1 1
~ ~
= , or g gA B
1 1
~ ~
  as well as g gA B
1 1
~ ~
 . 
  58 
If the solution were gA
1 05
~
. , given the signs of the primitive functions, 
v g v gA A' '
~ ~
1 11
F
HG
I
KJ  −
F
HG
I
KJ , then the left-hand side is non-negative. Knowing that with 
a = 05.  and gA
1 05
~
. , the following inequality holds 
aw g a w gA A' '
~ ~
1 11 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g , this leads to a non-positive right-hand first term, 
given  ' 0  as well as x y W v gAb gc h− −FHG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ 1 0
2
~
, by assumption. With c  05.  and 
gA
1 05
~
. , the inequality is given as cw g c w gA A' '
~ ~
1 11 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g , jointly with 
w' 0 , x' 0  and y' 0 , a negative right-hand second term will be found. 
Consequently, a negative right-hand side is found when gA
1 05
~
. , which 
establishes a contradiction. 
Therefore, if gA
1
~
 is neither equal nor strictly smaller than gB
1
~
, this means that, in 
this case, it will be found gA
1 0 5
*
~
. , thus leading to a political expenditure cycle in 
period 1.  
           
Step iii—Cycle in period 2: g A
~
.
2
0 5  
Analysing now period 2, with y y W= b g  and returning to expression (A.2.2), here 
recalled for convenience: 
v g s v g s x y W v g aw g a w g
s x y W cw g c w g
A A A A A
A A
' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
c h b g c h b g b gc h c he j c h b g c he j
b gc h b g c h b g c he j
− − = − − − − − −
− − − − −
 
                                    
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The subsequent exposition follows by contradiction once again. Suppose now that 
~ ~
2 2 0A Bg g−  , then gA
2 05
~
. . More precisely, under gA
2 05
~
. , expression (A.2.2) has a 
strictly positive left-hand side, given v' 0  and   1 . When gA
2 05
~
.  as well as 
a = 05. , then aw g a w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g . Thus, a non-positive first term of the 
right-hand side of expression (A.2.2) is found. Given c  05.  and gA
2 05
~
. , a strictly 
negative right-hand side second term is found, since 
cw g c w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g . 
 This leads to a contradiction. Thus, gA
2 05
~
.  is not a solution for problem (3.1).  ◼ 
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Appendix 3: 
Step i—Cycle nature in period 1 
For period 1 the expression is again given by (A.2.1):  
v g v g s x y W v g aw g a w g
s x y W cw g c w g
A A A A A
A A
' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
1 1 2 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
c h c h b g b gc h c he j c h b g c he j
b gc h b g c h b g c he j
− − = − − − − − −
− − − − −

                                    
. 
As previously, it is followed an exposition by contradiction. It is denoted 
 = −
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ1 1 1
1 1 s x y W cw g c w gA Ab gc h b g b g' ' ' '
~ ~
. 
Seeing now the hypothesis that gA
1 05
~
. , then, given the signs of the primitive 
functions, v g v gA A' '
~ ~
1 11
F
HG
I
KJ  −
F
HG
I
KJ  and   0 . Given  ' 0  
and x y W v gAb gc h c he j− − 1 02 , by assumption, as well as 
aw g a w gA A' '
~ ~
1 11 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g , this leads to a positive first term. Thus a right-
hand side with a positive sign is found, which establishes a contradiction. 
Therefore, if gA
1
~
 is neither equal nor larger than gB
1
~
, this means that in this case it 
will be found gA
1 05
*
~
. , thus leading to a political expenditure cycle in period 1 as in 
Proposition 2. 
  
Step ii—Cycle nature in period 2 
The first-order conditions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) still apply. 
Returning to expression (A.2.2) in order to evaluate if there is a political budget 
cycle in period 2 when there are voters’ bias in preferences towards gB  expenditures.  
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At this point it is tested if when a  05.  as well as c = 05. , the equilibrium solution 
continues to be gA
2 0 5
*
~
. , or equivalently, if it must be inquired whether gA
2 0 5
*
~
.  can 
solve problem (3.1). 
When gA
2 05
~
.  as well as a  05. , then aw g a w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g . Thus a 
first term of right-hand side of expression (A.2.2) strictly positive is found. Given 
c = 05.  and gA
2 05
~
. , a second term also strictly positive is found, since 
cw g c w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g . This implies a right-hand side strictly positive. 
For gA
2 05
~
.  to be a solution to problem (3.1), it must also have a left-hand side 
strictly positive, i.e., v g s v gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 0
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ b g . However, it cannot be ensured, 
given v' 0 , v' ' 0  and   1. Thus, the left-hand side has an ambiguous sign. 
Hence, g gA B
2 2
~ ~
  is (is not) a possible solution in case   is enough low (high) to make 
the left-hand side strictly positive (non-negative). 
Using gA
2 05
~
. , a strictly positive left-hand side of expression (A.2.2) is found. 
The first term on the right-hand side has an ambiguous sign, which depends on 
aw g a w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJb g  being positive or negative, given a  05. , w' 0 , 
w' ' 0 ,  ' 0  and x y W v gAb gc h− −FHG
I
KJ 1 0
2
~
. Given c = 05.  and gA
2 05
~
. , a right-hand 
second term strictly negative is found, since cw g c w gA A' '
~ ~
2 21 1 0
F
HG
I
KJ − − −
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ b g . This 
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leads to a right-hand side taking any value, which leads to an ambiguous result. Once 
again it cannot be ensured that g A
2
~
 is strictly smaller than gB
2
~
. 
If it is considered gA
2 05
~
.= , then the left-hand side of expression (A.2.2) is strictly 
positive. On the right-hand side there is a first term strictly positive, given a  05. , 
w' 0 ,  ' 0  and x y W v gAb gc h− −FHG
I
KJ 1 0
2
~
. The second term is null given c = 05.  and 
gA
2 05
~
.= . Thus, it can be said that gA
2 05
~
.=  is definitively a solution to problem 
(A.2.2) when voters have a preference bias to gB  expenditures. However, it cannot be 
guaranteed that this will be the only solution.  
Given the results it can be said that g A
2
~
 can take any value, i.e. g A
2
~
 can be equal, 
strictly bigger or strictly smaller than gB
2
~
.      ◼ 
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The main purpose of the current part is to investigate empirically the existence of 
politically induced cycles on public expenditure composition. The results provide 
support to the theoretical predictions that are elaborated in Part One of this 
dissertation. 
Two feasible expenditure compositions are considered. First, total expenditure is 
broken down into current and capital outlays and, second, total expenditure is broken 
down into expenditure items specifically favourable to voters and expenditure items 
benefiting the society at large. 
Using information regarding European Union member states, the empirical 
research focus primarily on the public expenditure cycle related with election terms 
and secondly on the influence that the weight of effective voters in society has on 
budget manipulation prone to a specific type of public expenditures. 
A large empirical literature has developed on public finance in industrialised 
countries in recent years with a special attention to fiscal policy in Europe. The 
orientation of diverse strands of literature has been at the level of public spending or 
to deficit. Surprisingly little relevance has been given to the expenditure composition, 
namely to the budget partition between current and capital expenditures, which is the 
aim of this part. 
In this sense, the empirical application intends to be a contribution to the growing 
political economy literature on the field. 
Although the nuclear concern of the empirical estimations is to evaluate how 
elections and poll participation determine the manipulation of public expenditures by 
governments, the models specified in the estimation procedure invoke also other 
variables referred to in the literature. That reference is to the variables related to the 
partisan explanation for the budget cycles. In the empirical application the existence 
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of partisan budget cycles is evaluated through the introduction of a variable that 
measures party ideology and through a variable that measures differences in 
institutional arrangements, captured by the weight that the major party has in 
parliament. 
The study is based on central government expenditure data collected for 15 
European Union member states from 1970 to 2001, on annual base. Some studies in 
the same field use data regarding general government expenditures. Data addressed by 
those studies are inappropriate in this framework. More precisely, as general 
government data includes information on sub-national governments, whose election 
dates differ from the central governments, a mistaken empirical result is potentially 
found.  
The estimation procedure uses panel data which relates a time dimension T with a 
cross-section dimension N. The use of a country panel of the type used in this part 
raises some important econometric methodological issues that are not always fully 
appreciated. There is an increasing use of panel data samples in macroeconomics, 
inspired in the micro areas in which panels have traditionally been used. Dynamic 
models are commonly adequate for typical time series rather than static models. When 
the cross-section dimension is added and the lagged dependent variable is introduced, 
some significant problems emerge, resulting from heterogeneity in the model 
parameters. Some earlier studies employing panel data techniques did not allow for 
the possibility of panel heterogeneity beyond fixed effects. Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
observe that while it is implausible for the dynamic specification to be common to all 
countries, it is at least conceivable that the long-run parameters of the model may be 
common.  
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In this sense, the pooled mean group estimation method (PMG) recently proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (1999) is applied to estimate dynamic specifications that impose 
homogeneity restrictions on long-run coefficients when such restrictions are not 
statistically rejected. However, the empirical application goes one step further by 
introducing a PMG correction proposed by Calderón et al. (1999), which is necessary 
under the existence of contemporaneous correlation across variables. 
The plan of this second part is as follows. Chapter 1 describes the motivation for 
this empirical application and makes the bridge with the theoretical model. The 
econometric methodology that includes the performance of unit root tests on panel 
data and the estimation procedure followed in the empirical application is 
systematised in Chapters 2 and 3. The dataset sources and the description of the 
variables to test Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, are introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 6 presents the unit root tests results performed on the data. Chapter 7 shows 
the electoral budget cycle nature and validates the theoretical Proposition 1. The 
empirical relevance of Proposition 2 is evaluated in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 concludes. 
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1. Relation between the theoretical and the empirical models 
 
1.1. Empirical motivations introduced by the theoretical model 
 
The theoretical framework has shown why a political budget manipulation is 
expected to occur across election dates. In the pre-election period, the model 
evidences a bias towards current expenditures in detriment of capital expenditures, 
evidencing a government’s privilege of the former type of public expenditures. This 
government’s behaviour is the outcome of two factors: capital expenditures give 
utility to government with a one period lag and re-election is an uncertain event.  
The conjunction of these two factors leads to an inter-temporal public expenditure 
cycle, even when voters do not have a preference bias for any of the two types of 
public expenditure. 
The absence of the two factors in the post-election years brings no public 
expenditure manipulation interest to those in power since government is modelled as 
being ideologically neutral. In fact, decisions regarding public expenditure made in 
the post-election periods gives the government a certain utility, even with capital 
expenditures still retrieving utility with a one period lag. As there is no election in the 
following budgetary period, the utility achieved with both types of public expenditure 
is a certain event for the government. 
In this perspective, any budget cycle that may emerge in the post-election period 
occurs to please voters’ preference for any one of the two types of public expenditure. 
If simultaneously government and voters have no preference bias, then no public 
expenditure cycle is found in the post-election periods. 
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These results are stated in Proposition 1 of the theoretical model and translate into 
a higher weight of current expenditures relative to capital expenditures in the pre-
election years and an absence of any of these expenditures type preponderance in the 
post-election periods. 
The main purpose of Chapters 7 and 8 of this Part is to test empirically the 
legitimacy of this statement. It is useful to remind here that the theoretical 
propositions for a political budget cycle depart from a symmetric information model, 
rather than from an asymmetric information model, as typically literature fundaments 
the appearance of an electoral budget cycle. Under symmetric information, the 
government does not have an informational advantage through voters since 
government and voters have full information regarding public expenditure 
composition in the pre-election and in the post-election periods. Given voters’ 
complete information, the common incentive that justifies, under asymmetric 
information models, the incumbent’s manipulation of public expenditures with the 
intent of mistaken her electorate base, is suppressed. Although, even without this 
incentive, a political budget cycle still emerges as stated in the theoretical framework. 
The theoretical model introduces in the second Proposition and in the first 
Corollary an enlargement of the political expenditure cycle comparatively with 
statements of Proposition 1. While Proposition 1 states that the political budget 
manipulation is an ultimate outcome of the proximity of an election time, Proposition 
2 and subsequent theoretical developments show that a political budget manipulation 
occurs despite of electoral period be post or pre-election. At that point the possibility 
that governments care about society’s preferences and not only about voters’ 
preferences is introduced. 
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Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 states that if voters (society) evidence a bias towards 
a certain type of public expenditures when society (voters) have no public expenditure 
preference, then a cycle prone to that type of expenditures will be found during 
government’s tenure.  
The empirical application intend to evaluate if a less participating society in 
elections gives an incentive to the government’s bias of the budget mix prone to 
expenditures that favours more voters than society in general.  
 
1.2. Empirical testing of theoretical predictions 
 
The choice of a European framework for the empirical application elapses from the 
theoretical model assumptions regarding voters’ information. 1 Knowing that voters’ 
degree of information is a direct function of the democratic regimes consolidation, 
appears as being a reasonable choice to test empirically the theoretical model on a set 
of stabilised democracies. 2 An application on EU countries seems to be a set of 
countries with such characteristics. 
                                                          
1 A contra argument can be stated since who provides information has a strong influence on what 
information is transmitted. Given that in many circumstances governments are the main sources of 
information it would not be obvious that in European countries voters have more reliable information 
than in other countries in the world. If this statement were correct it is not expected a less asymmetric 
information in Europe than in the rest of the world.  
The argument is based in Islam (2003) findings that the European countries is the set of countries that 
present a better position regarding information transparency. The author constructs a “transparency” 
index that measures the frequency with which economic data are published in countries around the 
world. Nine of the fifteen European Union countries present the highest position in that transparency 
indicator, in parallel with countries like United States, Canada and Australia. Apart from some oil 
producers, the author finds that countries with high-income levels are more than twice as “transparent”. 
 
2 OECD countries for example include countries with much differentiated democracy maturation, 
contemplating European consolidated democracies and relatively recent democracies like Slovak 
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This test assumes even more interest, since there are some studies which report that 
political budget cycles have a reduced meaning in European countries. In that set of 
studies are included Schuknecht (1998) and Shi and Svensson (2000). 
Controversially, more recently, Hallerberg and Strauch (2002), Mulas-Granados 
(2002) and Buti and Noord (2003) found evidence of electoral budget manipulation in 
the pre-election years in Europe3, leading to high deficits.  
The theoretical model focuses in Proposition 1 on the weight governments attach to 
current and capital expenditures and how it relates to election periods.  The aim of the 
theoretical model is to identify an opportunistic behaviour by those that rule a 
country, which lead to a political budget cycle. The difference between current and 
capital expenditures weights is the dependent variable in the estimated functions. 
Thus, the composition of the public expenditures links the theoretical model with the 
empirical application.  
Another literature branch explains the budget manipulation through partisan 
motivations since parties compose the governments and parties are embodied of 
different ideologies. The theoretical model describes the government as being 
ideological neutral, thus excluding the partisan budget cycle explanation for the 
arrival of the electoral budget cycle. Empirically the introduction of variables that 
measure ideology should not be statistically significant showing that is the 
opportunistic behaviour of governments rather than the partisan affiliation that 
explains the budget manipulation in the pre-election periods. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Republic, Poland or Hungary. In this sense, it is expected a much more heterogeneous voters’ degree of 
political information access on OECE countries rather than on EU countries. 
 
3 Franzese (2001) confirmed an electoral budget cycle on public debt accumulation, in OECD 
countries. Huber et al. (2002) also found to OECD countries higher budget deficits accumulation in 
election years.  
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The theoretical model explains in Proposition 2 the governments’ concern with 
society’s preferences through an incumbent’s view as a way to get reputation near 
society. That concern will bring her into a better position, in case of defeat in 
elections, to get a job outside politics.  
In the empirical model governments’ behaviour that might be composed by several 
parties with different motivations are tested. Cumulatively, parties are a collective of 
persons and do not evaluate the defeat scenario as an incumbent, as being an 
individual person, does. Thus, in this case why parties when in government should 
care about society’s preferences, specially when society and voters have no aligned 
preferences for public expenditures? 
This implies a re-interpretation of the theoretical model to accomplish this 
difference. Rather than be outside politics as in the incumbent case, commonly parties 
remain politically active when are defeated electorally, namely with parliamentary 
representation, although in an opposition position. 
The ruling party although trying to remain in power knows that re-election is an 
uncertain event and, as expected, also cares about the second stage of nature: the 
defeat. 
In this sense, and given that the theoretical model contemplates the two states of 
nature, party re-election and party defeat, even when in power, a ruling party tries to 
ensure some future dividends by pleasing total society. Even displeasing some voters 
today, party will be rewarded later by society, bringing more typical non-voters to 
vote thus improving the party re-election chances.  
This party’s concern with society’s preferences when in government is higher the 
lower the probability the party has to be re-elected, thus increasing expenditures more 
prone to non-voters.  
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In case of defeat, the utility of the ruling party increases with the degree of 
satisfaction of total society. That satisfaction is more important if the number of non-
voters in society is high and if voters and non-voters present different preferences 
regarding public expenditures.  
As the incumbent, the ruling party also tries to improve reputation near society, in 
the case of defeat. This is the main reason why those in power do care about society’s 
preferences.  
In fact, when in the opposition position the party will compare social expenditures 
made during the previous tenure (when the party was in power) with the level of 
social expenditures made by the ruling government. The goal of this behaviour is to 
bring some common non-voters that favour more social expenditures to voter and 
invert the actual position, returning to power in subsequent periods. 4 When in 
opposition, parties want to appeal to population participation, especially to those 
individuals less active politically. This population fringe is commonly referred to as 
being composed by individuals with both a lower income and education level, who 
commonly need more public welfare expenditures, translated in more transfers to their 
own and to their families.5  
The opposing parties in parliaments currently observe this behaviour. Opposition 
parties constitute a refraining force to natural pro-voters government’s expenditures. 
This is what is expected to be the opposition role. When in opposition it is easier for a 
party to claim more social expenditures, namely those oriented to less privileged 
                                                          
4 Reinforcing this idea, Carlson (1999-pp.4) can be quote:  
“People dissatisfied with government are more likely to vote:” 
 
5 Carlson (1999) shows that turnout increases with education, family income, interest in politics and 
party contact and decreases with the number of poor, unemployed and black registered people. 
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population stratum, then when the same party belongs to a government that has to 
sustain its electorate base. 
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2. Survey of unit root tests for panel data 
 
The Chapter presents a survey of the panel unit root tests, evidencing the most 
recent developments. Those tests are performed on the panel data which results are 
presented in Chapter 6. The importance of a priori check of the existence of unit roots 
in the panel data comes from the already known effect that the presence of unit roots 
in time series causes a misinterpretation of the estimated results. 
Testing for unit roots in time series is now common practice among empirical 
studies.6 However, testing for unit roots in panels is quite recent, having the major 
developments in nonstationary panel models occurred since the middle of the 1990s. 
The recent attention given to the problem in the econometrics of panel data emerges 
from numerous applications of time series procedures to panels, for which issues such 
as nonstationarity, spurious regressions7 and cointegration have becoming important.  
Panel data applications have shifted from micro panels with large N (number of 
cross sections) and small T (length of the time series) to macro panels with large N 
and large T. 8 
                                                          
6 For a literature review of unit root tests in the time series framework see Stock (1994), Maddala and 
Kim (1998) and Phillips and Xiao (1998).  
 
7 Considering two independent random vectors Yit  and X it that are ( )1I , or equivalently, 
nonstationary, and without cointegration between them, then if a time series regression for a certain i  
is performed, the regression coefficient will have a nondegenerative limit distribution and the 
regression is characterized as spurious. The problem is only attenuated when the panel has large cross 
sectional and time series dimensions. 
 
8 Hall and Urga (2001) propose an introduction to the traditional and most recent developments of 
econometrics of panel data. 
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Adding the cross-section dimension to the time series dimension offers an 
advantage in testing for nonstationarity and cointegration since cross-section increases 
the data used in those tests, thus improving their power. 
In what follows, some commonly used unit root panel data tests which rely on 
cross-section independence are briefly reviewed and their recent developments, where 
the assumption of cross-section independence is relaxed, are also described.9 
 
2.1. Panel data unit root tests with the assumption of cross-section 
independence 
 
The assumption of independence across i  is rather strong and relies on the 
argument by Quah (1994)10 that modelling cross-sectional dependence is involved 
given that there is no natural ordering of the individual observations in a cross-
section. 
Levin and Lin (1992, 1993)-henceforth referred to as LL, Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003)-hereafter referred as IPS and Maddala and Wu (1999)-identified by MW are 
the most important references of panel unit root tests that rely on cross sectional 
independence. 
 
                                                          
9 Baltagi and Kao (2000) and Cerrato (2002) provide some surveys on panel unit root tests. The former 
review panel unit root tests that assume cross section independence and the latter summarizes the main 
developments in panel unit root tests allowing cross section dependence. 
 
10 The test proposed by Quah (1994) is based on pooled OLS and considers the following simple 
dynamic panel y y uit i t it= +− , 1 , with i N=1,..., , t T=1,...,  and uit  are independently and 
identically distributed across i  and t , with finite variance  2 . 
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2.1.1. Panel data unit root test to homogeneous cross sections 
 
The LL test treats panel data as being composed by homogeneous cross-sections, 
thus performing a test on a pooled data series. The LL test for unit roots in panel data 
is applied based on the following model: 
y y z uit i i t it it= + +− ,
'
1 ,                  (2.1) 
where i N=1,...,  and t T=1,..., , zit is the deterministic component and uit  is a 
stationary process. zit  can be zero, one, fixed effects - i , and fixed effects and a time 
trend. 
Under the homogeneity assumption, the LL test assumes that  i =  for all i  and 
that u iidit u~ ,0
2c h . 
In this sense, the LL test is defined as H0 1: =  against the alternative hypothesis 
that : 1aH   . The test procedure is then designed to evaluate the null hypothesis 
that each individual in the panel has unit root properties versus the alternative 
hypothesis that all cross section series in panel are stationary. 
Levin, Lin and Chu’s (2002), referred as LLC hereafter, suggest some adjustments 
to the unit root test described above.11 
Using also a pooling approach, the unit root test is implemented by a three-step 
procedure. In step 1 Augmented Dickey-Fulley (ADF) regressions are estimated on 
each cross-section in the panel and residuals are computed. 
Using an ADF type regression as  
 y y y zit i i t ij it j
j
p
it it
i
= + + +− −
=
   , '1
1
,                (2.2) 
                                                          
11 Bayoumi and MacDonald (1999) present some applications of the LLC unit root tests. 
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the residuals are obtained from the two following auxiliary regressions: 
e y y zit it ij it j
j
p
it
i^ ^ ^ '
= − −−
=
  
1
 and v y y zi t i t ij it j
j
p
it
i^
, ,
~ ~ '
− − −
=
= − −1 1
1
  . 
The residuals are then weighted by the regression standard error of expression (2.2) 
to control for heterogeneity across cross sections, becoming eit
−
and v i t
−
−, 1 . 
In step 2, the ratio of long-run to short-run standard deviations is estimated, for 
each cross section, which is then used to adjust the mean of the t -bar statistic found 
in step 3, when the model includes either fixed effects or both fixed and time effects. 
The LLC test is the outcome of pooling all cross sectional and time series to estimate 
e vit i t it
_
,= +
−
−
−
 1 . The null hypothesis is now described as H0 0: = , and the t-statistic 
defined as usual. 
Given the small time dimension of most panels, the emphasis has been put on 
models with homogeneous dynamics. However, Pesaran and Shin (1995) and 
subsequent developments have shown the inconsistency of pooled estimators under 
dynamic heterogeneous panels. This argument, in some detail, is discussed in Chapter 
3. 
 
2.1.2. Panel data unit root test for heterogeneous cross sections 
 
The homogeneity hypothesis can be considered too restrictive since panel data can 
be composed by several cross-sections with different autoregressive coefficients. The 
main argument is that under the alternative hypothesis the same convergence rate 
across countries can bias the panel data unit root tests. Imposing homogeneity when 
coefficient heterogeneity is present in cross-sections data can lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
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The IPS panel data unit root test presents an alternative to overcome this 
restriction.  
An average of the ADF tests to contemplate the case when uit  is serially correlated 
and the correlation properties vary across cross sections is suggested by IPS. 
Analogously, u uit ij it j
j
p
it
i
= +−
=
 
1
. 
Under this case and substituting the above equality in expression (2.1), the 
following regression model is used to test for the existence of unit roots in panel data: 
y y y zit i i t ij it j
j
p
it it
i
= + + +− −
=
   , '1
1
 .               (2.3) 
The null hypothesis is defined as H i0 1: =  for all i , whereas now the alternative 
hypothesis is given as : 1a iH   , for at least one i . 
This test relies on the autoregressive properties of each cross section, being the 
final result of the IPS test based on an average of the individual ADF statistics. 
The IPS t-bar statistic is the average of the individual ADF statistics, i.e. 
t
N
t
i
i
N−
=
= 
1
1
 , where t i is the individual t-statistic for testing H0  in (2.3). 
The order of augmentation used for the ADF test in each cross-section can be 
chosen based on a information criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
or the Schwarz Information Criterion (BIC).12 
                                                          
12 Ng and Perron (2001-a) emphasize the importance of choosing a correct lag specification for the 
ADF regressions in finite samples and provide a guide to robust model selection. In Ng and Perron’s 
(2001-b) article, the authors propose a Modified Information Criteria that seems to perform better than 
usual information criteria such as the AIC and the BIC, for samples with 100T  . 
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The IPS test as T →  followed by N → ,13 sequentially, is given as 
t
N t E t
Var t
NIPS
iT i
iT i
=
− =
F
H
I
K
=

−


1
1
0 1,b g . 
IPS assume that tiT  are iid  and have finite mean as well as finite heterogeneous 
variances,  i
2 . The values of E tiT i =1 and Var tiT i = 1  have been computed by 
IPS via simulations for different values of T  and pi
' s. 14 
The MW test for unit roots in panel data is inspired on a Fisher type test that 
combines P-values from unit root tests for each cross-section i .  
Being in contradiction with LLC’s alternative hypothesis that imposes a 
homogeneous  i  across cross sections, this test also allows a different autoregressive 
coefficient across i . 
The MW unit root test is defined as P p
i
N
i= −
=
2
1
ln , with P  being distributed as 
 2  with 2N  degrees of freedom as Ti →  for all N . 
This test presents an advantage over the IPS test since it does not require a 
balanced panel, however, the test presents also a significant disadvantage associated 
to the fact that the p -values must be derived through Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
                                                          
13 Phillips and Moon (1999) clearly defined the implications of the way the cross sectional and time 
series dimension approach infinity for the definition of asymptotic properties of the estimators and tests 
proposed for nonstationary panels, imposing cross-sectional independence. 
 
14 A 1997’s version of the IPS article includes two tests, one corresponds to t-bar statistic already 
described and the other relies on the average of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests.  
The LM-statistic allows for heterogeneity in the value of  i  and lets the errors  it  be serially 
autocorrelated with different serial correlation properties across the units.  
 
 85 
2.2. Comparison of the performance of the panel data unit root tests with the 
assumption of cross-section independence  
 
Comparing the previous three unit root tests is not appropriate since those tests rely 
on different null hypothesis. Although, Breitung (2000) investigates the local power 
of the LL and IPS tests15 and concludes that the LL test is very sensitive to the lag 
augmentation.16 MW also point out that under the presence of cross correlation, 
situation that neither of the three tests described above contemplate, the LL test is the 
one with the worst results regarding power of the test. 
Cumulatively, when the assumption of independent error terms is violated, the 
derived distributions of IPS and MW test statistics are no longer valid. In the former 
case the t-bar statistic does not have the stated variance and consequently the 
asymptotic normal distribution and in the second case the test does not have a  2  
distribution.17 
Banerjee et al. (2001-b) compared the LL test, with the IPS LM-bar test, the IPS t-
bar and with the MW test and found that under the presence of cross-unit 
cointegration relations, which implies the existence of weak exogeneity, the MW test 
                                                          
15  Karlsson and Lothgren (1999) compare the small sample power properties of the LL and the IPS 
tests and found that panel unit root tests can have high power when a small fraction of the series are 
stationary and low power when a large fraction is stationary. 
 
16 The author also found that the power of the LL and IPS tests is very sensitive to the specification of 
the deterministic terms. 
 
17 MW propose a bootstrap method that permits a reduction of the size distortions of the test under 
cross sectional correlation, although it does not eliminate them. 
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is the worst in terms of size distortions and the IPS-t-bar test it is the one which 
performs better. 
Hadri (2000) also proposes a residual based LM test for the null hypothesis that 
time series for each i  are stationary around a deterministic level or around a 
deterministic trend against the alternative of a unit root in panel data. Hadri considers 
the following two models y rit it it= +  and y r tit it i it= + +  , with r r uit i t it= +−, 1 . The 
null hypothesis is defined as H0 0: =  against Ha:  0 , where 

 
= u
2
2
. This test 
can be used as a complement to the tests that consider nonstationarity as the null 
hypothesis, since in this case, the null hypothesis corresponds to stationarity, specially 
when the researcher are unsure about the stationary or nonstationarity characteristics 
of the panel data.18  
Choi (2000) has explored this approach called confirmatory analysis. The author 
argues that combining a test under the null hypothesis of stationarity with a test under 
the null of unit root in panel data can improve the reliability of test inferences over 
using either test alone, when the two tests corroborate each other. Further, if under 
different null hypothesis the two tests reject their respective nulls simultaneously, this 
disagreement is a sign that the panel data under study has a mixed structure, where 
unit root time series coexist with stationary time series. 
Banerjee et al. (2001-a) argue that the assumption of a tie absence between time 
series of a panel data is very often violated when analysing macroeconomic time 
series across countries. Further, the authors prove that the presence of cross sectional 
correlation adds a problem, since when it is not adequately considered as in the 
                                                          
18 Following this argument, Bac and Pen (2002) study the unit root properties of the health care 
expenditures and per capita GDP panel data, using both the IPS and the Hadry approaches. 
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common cointegration analysis on panel data, it can lead to the finding of “spurious” 
cointegration in cross-section regressions.19 In this sense, the common used unit root 
tests and cointegration methods only can be employed successfully in a restricted 
number of cases. 
 
2.3. Testing for cross-section independence 
  
In order to evaluate if the time series that compose a panel are in fact correlated or 
not, a Granger (1969) causality analysis is used. This test allows approaching the 
question of how much time series y  Granger cause x  and vice-versa. However, one 
does not imply the other. 
After the selection of a reasonable lag length, the Granger causality analysis is 
based on two regressions, generally defined as 
 
0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
... ...
... ...
t t l t l t l t l t
t t l t l t l t l t
y y y x x
x x x y y e
     
    
− − − −
− − − −
= + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + +
,  
for all possible pair of x y,b g time series in the panel and where l  is the selected lag 
length. 
 The Granger causality is reported through a F -statistic that corresponds to a 
Wald-statistic for the joint null hypothesis that  1 0= = =... l . The null hypothesis is 
                                                          
19 Larsson and Lyhagen (1999 and 2000) and Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001) develop a 
likelihood-based panel test of cointegrating rank in heterogeneous panel models based on the average 
of the individual rank trace statistics as presented by Johansen. However, the authors found that the test 
requires a large time series dimension to be implemented. Further, the model proposed allows 
cointegration within units but rules out cointegration relationships across the units and simultaneously 
assumes that the cointegration rank is the same for each unit, conditions which are often violated as 
shown by Banerjee et al. (2001-a). 
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therefore that x does not Granger-cause y in the first regression and that y does not 
Granger-cause x in the second regression. 
 Through the analysis of the relations that are established across cross sectional 
series, it is possible to evaluate the existence of cross section correlation and, 
consequently, the adequacy of panel unit root tests that rely on the assumption of 
cross sectional regressions independence.20 
In what follows panel unit root tests that allow the existence of dependencies 
across units are described, which configures a second branch of the literature in this 
research area. 
 
2.4.  Panel data unit root tests without the assumption of cross-section 
independence 
  
Unit root tests in panel data that take into account the existence of cross sectional 
correlation have recently being developed and follow two orientations. One that 
solves the problem using a non-linear regression approach and the other that relies on 
a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20  The cross sectional dependence can appear from cross-sectional correlation or from cross-sectional 
cointegration or from both, as pointed out by Bornhorst (2002). However, given the inability to deal 
with the cointegration across cross-sections through a Johansen (1995) cointegration test given our N 
length, our panel unit root tests will be mainly concerned with the former form of cross-sectional 
dependence.  
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2.4.1. The use of instrumental variables in panel data unit root tests  
 
To deal with the presence of cross-sectional dependency, the first model described 
is the panel unit root test proposed by Chang (2002), based on non-linear IV 
estimation of the usual ADF type regression for each cross-sectional unit, using as 
instruments non-linear transformations of the lagged levels. The test statistic is 
defined as an average of individual IV t-ratios, which is asymptotically normal, and 
does not require the tabulation of critical values.21 
The IV test is performed on the following autoregressive regression: 
y y yit i i t ij it j
j
p
it
i
= + +− −
=
  , 1
1
                 (2.4) 
and the null hypothesis is given as H i0 1: = , against the alternative : 1a iH    
for some i . The rejection of the null does not imply that the entire panel is stationary, 
while the unit root non-rejection means that all yit ’s have unit roots.
 22 
The cross-sectional dependency is present in the innovations  it .
23 
                                                          
21 In previous work, Chang (forthcoming) deals with the presence of cross-sectional dependency using 
a bootstrap procedure, which leads to limiting distributions of the unit root tests in panels that are 
nonstandard. 
 
22 Chang and Song (2002) using also as instruments non-linear transformations of the lagged levels, 
present a panel unit root test that accounts for the cross-sectional dependencies of innovations and for 
the presence of cointegration across cross-sections. The unit root tests are performed at individual 
levels adding to expression (2.4) the component  ik
j
Q
i t k
i
w' ,
=
−
1
, where wit  are the covariates added to 
the ADF regression for the i -th cross-sectional unit. 
 
23 Choi’s (2002) work introduces cross sectional dependency through error-components (more precisely 
through the time effect variable) and not through innovation terms of autoregressive processes. The 
panel unit root test is performed by combining p-values from the ADF test applied to each cross-
section, whose nonstochastic trend components and cross-sectional correlations are eliminated 
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Expression (2.4) is estimated using a non-linear function F yi t, −1c h  for the lagged 
level yi t, −1 . For the lagged differences ( y yi t i t pi, ,,...,− −1 ), the variables themselves 
are used as instruments. The autoregressive order for each cross-sectional unit is 
selected using the Schwartz Information Criterion (BIC). 
The use of the instrument F yi t, −1c h  requires that it be correlated with the regressor 
yi t, −1 . Chang (2002) presents some regularly integrable functions that might be used 
as instruments in the IV estimation. From them the following function: xe
x−
 is 
chosen as instrument for the IV panel unit root tests. 
From the autoregressive coefficient of expression (2.4), estimated for each cross 
section, the IV t-ratio statistics are obtained by Z
s
i
i
i
=
−
F
H
I
K


^
^
1
, where s i
^F
H
I
K  is the 
standard error of the IV estimator 
^
i
. The IV t-ratio Zi  follows a standard normal 
distribution and the cross-sectional independence is ensured by the integrable function 
used as instrument in individual estimations, since, as is shown by Chang (2002), the 
non-linear instruments F yi t, −1c h  and F y j t, −1d i  are asymptotically uncorrelated, even 
when yi t, −1  and y j t, −1  are correlated.  
Chang’s panel unit root test is based on an average of the cross-sectional t-ratios 
statistics. The average IV t-ratio statistic is thus defined as S
N
ZN i
i
N
=
=

1
1
. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
following an approach suggested by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock’s (1996) for conventional unit root 
tests. However, a t-statistic computed from quasi-differenced data also suffers from a Nickell (1981) 
type bias so that a bias correction is required to obtain a reasonable test procedure. 
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This panel unit root test limit theory is developed for models with no deterministic 
components, although it can easily be implemented to models with nonzero means 
and deterministic trends by replacing the lagged level yi t, −1  in expression (2.4) with 
the adaptive demeaned y
i t, −1
  or with the adaptive detrended y
i t, −1
 , respectively. 
Chang’s test for the presence of a unit root is now based on the test regression 
y y y
it it j
i
i i t ij
j
p
it
    = + +−
=
−, 1
1
  or y y y
it it j
i
i i t ij
j
p
it
    = + +−
=
−, 1
1
 , respectively. 
Knowing that the stochastic component yit  comes from a time series zit , with a 
nonzero mean, as in the former case, given as z yit i it= + , or with a more general 
deterministic time trends, as in the latter case, given as z t yit i i it= + +  . 
The transformations are called adaptive because data is used up to period t −1  
instead of using the full sample. 
In this sense, the respective transformed time series are obtained as, 
y z
t
zit it ik
k
t
 = −
− =
−

1
1 1
1
 
y z
t
zi t i t ik
k
t
, ,− −
=
−
= −
−
1 1
1
11
1
  
 y z k pi t k i t k i, , , ,...,− −= =
      1 , for the adaptive demeaning and 
y z
t
z
t t
kz
T
zit it ik
k
t
ik
k
t
i
iTi
 = +
−
−
−
−
=
−
=
−
 
2
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
b g  
y z
t
z
t t
kzi t i t ik
k
t
ik
k
t
, ,− −
=
−
=
−
= +
−
−
−
 1 1
1
1
1
12
1
6
1

b g  
 y z
T
z k pi t k i t k
i
iT ii, ,
, ,...,− −= − =
 1 1     , where the term z TiT ii /  is the total sample 
mean of zit , for the adaptive detrending. 
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2.4.2.  The use of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in panel data unit 
root tests  
 
The second approach to panel unit root tests that allows for the presence of 
contemporaneous cross-correlation and heterogeneous serial correlation of the 
regression residuals was suggested by Breuer, McNown and Wallace (1999), hereafter 
BNW.24  
Returning to the IPS and the MW panel unit root tests, it can be said that those tests 
are joint hypothesis tests in the sense that all units of a panel contain a unit root. When 
the joint null hypothesis is rejected it is possible that one or a few time series in the 
panel contribute to this finding. Cumulatively, given that these tests allow the 
autoregressive parameter to differ across cross sections under the alternative, then the 
rejection of the null hypothesis means that not all units of the panel contain a unit 
root. Effectively, a mixture of stationary and nonstationary time series can cohabit in 
the same panel data.25 
In this sense and having in mind the limitations associated with the previous panel 
unit root tests, the BNW test main advantage is to permit to determine which cross 
sectional series rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root and which does not. Given 
that in the empirical application the major focus will be on the estimation of a panel 
                                                          
24 A recent empirical application of the BNW panel unit root test is presented by Wagner (2003), which 
uses the test on budget stabilization funds in order to separate pool estimates, considering, on the one 
hand, those American states that present stationary data and, on the other hand, those with 
nonstationary data. 
 
25 Kónya (2001) compares the LL, IPS, MW and BNW unit root tests performance on a panel 
composed by the logarithm of real GDP across OECD countries. The author emphasizes that the major 
advantage of BNW test is to permit the identification of those time series that are stationary and those 
that are nonstationary. 
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data model relying on regressions specified for cross sections, the study of the 
properties of the individual time series becomes important. 
Taking into account this argument, the main incentive now is to test for each panel 
unit the null and the alternative hypothesis using a SUR framework, which exploits 
the information in the error covariances to produce efficient estimators and potentially 
more powerful test statistics. The structure of hypothesis follows the ADF 
specification used in the IPS test procedure.  
The panel specification that is used in the SURADF estimation is described as 
 
 
y y y z
y y y z
t t j t j
j
p
t t
N t N N t N j N t j
j
p
N t N N t
i
i
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1
, , , , ,
'
,
, , , , ,
'
,
.
.
.
= + + +
= + + +
− −
=
− −
=


   
   
 
The null hypothesis is H i0 0: =  for each time series of the panel. 
In general the SURADF is a more powerful test than the ADF test. For the I 0b g  
time series, BNW show, based on median rejection rates, that SURADF has twice the 
power or even more then a single equation ADF to reject the null hypothesis when the 
autoregressive coefficient on each I 0b g  time series is 0.90. However, these power 
gains vanish for an autoregressive coefficient between 0.95 and 0.99.  
The BNW test has however a disadvantage that emerges from the fact that the tests 
statistics obtained through SURADF model have no standard distributions, implying 
the need for simulation of the necessary critical values. To compute these critical 
values it is necessary to consider the estimated covariance matrix for the system under 
analysis, the sample size and the number of panel units. This means that each study 
has its own critical values. 
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Bearing in mind that the interest, at this point, is not to study the cointegration 
properties but only to check the existence of a unit root in the time series that 
compose the panels the simulation procedure is discarded because that procedure will 
be too demanding. Instead, an approach that demands less work, but which is also less 
reliable, is used, since appeals to an estimated regression to generate the critical 
values. In this sense, the critical values presented in the study are slightly different 
from the ones obtained if a simulation process were used to compute them. This is so 
because the specified regression does not adjust perfectly to the simulated values. In 
fact, the regression estimated by BNW only explains around 0.8 of the critical values 
simulated. 
Based on the BNW regression, the following expression is obtained, adapted to the 
T  length: 
CV AverCorr NumCountry. * . *05 0161b g = − − −  , 
being   and   parameters that change with the number of countries included in the 
analysis, using as reference the information regarding those countries presented in 
BNW tables, which were adjusted to the data. The parameter   takes the values 
0.171 and 0.127 and the parameter   assumes the values 6.04 and 4.48, respectively, 
when either fifteen or ten countries are respectively in the panel unit root test.26 
The AverCorr corresponds to the average correlation of the time series residuals 
with the residuals from all other time series in the panel, the NumCountry  
denominates the number of countries included in the panel unit root tests and 
CV .05b g is the critical value attributed, considering a 5% significance level. 
                                                          
26 The performance of the panel unit root tests on a subset of countries is a consequence of the number 
of countries that are considered in the estimated regressions. The reason for an empirical application on 
a subset of European countries is described in detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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In order to complement the overview of the more recent developments on panel 
unit root tests, the main routes followed to evaluate cointegration relations between 
variables and the inherent cointegration tests are briefly summarised. The intention 
here is to highlight the main restriction that underlies this strand of the literature, 
which induces the choice of a second strand for the empirical application. 
 
2.5. Cointegration tests in panel data 
 
Parallel to the panel unit root test developments, great attention has been given to 
cointegration tests and estimation within regression models in panel data.  
The most widely referred cointegration tests are the ones introduced by McCoskey 
and Kao (1998)27, Kao (1999)28 and Pedroni (1999)29. 
McKoskey and Kao (1999) compare the three panel data tests for cointegration, 
under the null of no cointegration in the latter two articles and under the null of 
cointegration in the former one. The authors found that in those cases where economic 
                                                          
27 McCoskey and Kao (1998) derive a residual-based LM test for the null of cointegration in panel data, 
allowing for varying slopes and intercepts. The test evidences good power performance for panels 
where 50T  , being indicated for panels with also an approximate number of cross-sections. 
 
28 Kao (1999) develops a framework for understanding the behavior of spurious panel regression using 
fixed-effects model to estimate panel regression when the dependent variable and independent variable 
are ( )1I processes. Kao also presents two types of cointegration tests for panel data; the Dickey-Fulley 
(DF) and the ADF types tests and derives the asymptotic distributions for each test. 
 
29 Pedroni (1999) derives asymptotic distributions and critical values for several residual-based tests of 
the null of no cointegration in panels where there are multiple regressors. The model includes 
regressions with fixed and time effects and allows heterogeneity across units resulting from the 
presence of cointegrating vectors and from the dynamics of the error process. 
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theory predicts a long run steady state relationship, the null of cointegration rather 
than the null of no cointegration seemed to be more appropriate.  
In what concerns the estimation of cointegrating relations between variables, the 
principal references are the dynamic OLS (DOLS) proposed by Kao and Chiang 
(2000) and the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) developed by Pedroni (2000).30 
The DOLS estimation method describes a system of cointegrating regressions 
between yit  and xit , where the disturbances are stationary. However the estimation 
procedure assumes too restrictive assumptions like the independence across i  of the 
error terms and no cointegration of the I 1b g regressors.  
The FMOLS also assumes the same restrictions as DOLS but allows the associated 
serial correlation properties of the error processes to vary across individual units of 
the panel. Pedroni proposes, in this sense, a group mean t-statistic to test the null 
hypothesis that the cointegrating vector   between yit  and xit  is equal across 
sections: H i0 0: =  versus the alternative hypothesis that Ha i:  0  for all i , so 
that the values of   are not necessarily constrained to be homogeneous across units. 
The described strand of literature is mainly concerned with nonstationarity, 
spurious regressions and cointegration. Another strand is worried with the rejection of 
homogeneous regression parameters implicit in the use of a pooled regression, 
favouring the idea of heterogeneous parameters.  
When some of the individual time series that compose a panel show evidence of 
the existence of unit roots (see Chapter 6), then an estimation procedure like mean 
group estimation or pooled mean group estimation, described in Chapter 3, seems to 
be appropriate. This argument is reinforced when simultaneously there is a suspicion 
                                                          
30 Kao, Chiang and Chen (1999) present an application of these two estimation methods under panel 
cointegration. 
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of the existence of heterogeneous autoregressive coefficients on the dependent 
variable across cross-sections. The mean group estimation or pooled mean group 
estimation can be used despite of the stationarity or nonstationarity characteristics of 
the regressors, which constitutes a main advantage. 
Further, under heterogeneous slopes and under small sample properties of panel 
time series estimators, Coakley, Fuertes and Smith (2001) prove that allowing for 
I 1b g errors, which implies a spurious time series regressions, the pooled and mean 
group estimators appears unbiased. The authors also argue that if individual units in a 
panel cointegrate with different coefficients, then the penalties associated with 
pooling increases with T. 
This is the principal argument for the subsequent empirical approach and for the 
use of the estimation technique proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). The 
respective framework and the theoretical details of the estimation procedure are 
described in the next Chapter. 
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3. Survey of panel estimation procedures 
 
The transition from economic theory to a testable formulation necessarily involves 
the use of certain “simplifying assumptions”. However, if these are not valid, a 
misspecified model results. In what follows the empirical route that the quantitative 
studies have accomplished throughout the last decades is put into evidence.31 
Specifically, the main focus is on the contribution that estimation techniques have 
been giving to the field of comparative political economy, in order to fundament the 
options taken in the empirical application. 
The present Chapter systematises the econometric approach followed in the 
empirical application, which relies on panel data estimation. The goal of this Chapter 
is to survey the most recent developments made in the field. Given that those recent 
developments on the literature on panel data inference and estimation are dispersed 
elsewhere, a systematisation of those disperse literature imposes as an auxiliary tool. 
The intend is to contribute for an easier understanding of the econometric techniques 
used in the empirical application.  
Simultaneously, a survey on the panel data estimation techniques more widely used 
is also presented, evidencing their main applications and limitations. The reasoning 
for the use in the empirical application of a certain estimation technique is as well 
presented. The empirical results using the selected panel data estimation technique, 
                                                          
31 Quantitative techniques to more adequately estimate empirical models have developed very rapidly, 
with new results emerging in recent years which minimize some of the underlying problems detected in 
previous estimation methods. Some authors like Smith (2000) and Hall and Urga (2001) present 
interesting surveys for applied researchers of the main problems that have been identified and how the 
econometric theory for panel data regressions proposes to solve them. 
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which combine time series for several cross-sections32, are reported in Chapters 7 and 
8. 
 
3.1.  Estimation techniques that assume homogeneous slopes and estimation 
techniques that allow heterogeneity only in the error components 
 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimates (POLS) are commonly used, although the 
standard assumptions about the error processes are often violated, namely because 
errors tend to be serially correlated across time and countries and tend to be 
groupwise heteroscedastic. If errors observe some of those effects, then the POLS 
estimates of the parameters will be consistent but inefficient. To overcome this 
problem, Beck and Katz (1995) propose to retain the POLS parameters but replacing 
POLS standard errors by panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE).33 
The violation of the assumptions about error processes can also be caused by 
model specification imposing the level of the dependent variable to be homogeneous 
across time periods and countries.34 To deal with this problem, the error component 
                                                          
32 Hsiao (1986, 2003) presents the first systematic textbook work on panel data estimation. 
 
33 This research field is usually defined as time-series-cross-section (TSCS) models. 
  
34 This problem is well evidenced, in a dynamic model framework, by Wawro (2000) who argues that if 
individual specific effects are not adequately accounted for, this induces an inappropriate POLS 
estimates. Under these conditions, the fundamental requirement for consistency of parameter estimates 
is violated –the explanatory variables in a regression equation have to be uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term. 
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model was used, referred to as fixed effect model, which allows the intercept term to 
vary, thus capturing the differences in behaviour over time and countries.35 
To understand the consequences of erroneously abstracting from slope 
heterogeneity, consider the following static fixed-effects panel data model: 36 
y x uit i it it= + + ' , with i N=12, ,..., and t T=1 2, ,..., , 
where   is the vector of unknown slope coefficients, assumed to be the same 
across countries and  i  the fixed-effects, when the true model is 
y x uit i i it it= + +  ,                 (3.1) 
with   i i= +  being described as having a homogeneous and a heterogeneous 
component like random coefficient models (see Swamy, 1971).  
If a researcher ignores this slope heterogeneity and instead considers the model  
y x z vit i x it z it it= + + +   , 
where zit  is an additional regressor spuriously thought to be important, then the 
fixed-effects estimator of the slope coefficient   = x z,b g is generally inconsistent. 
The above problem is substantially improved in dynamic models as shown by 
Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
The authors state that, under heterogeneous slopes, both the fixed-effects and the 
random-effects model are not consistent in a dynamic panel data model. 
                                                          
35 Baltagi (1995, 1999) presents the details of the fixed effect model. Marques (2000) reviews the main 
estimators that assume homogeneous slopes and systematizes specification tests. 
 
36 For panels with very small time dimension T  and a dynamic specification, Cermeño (1999) shows 
that OLS median-bias correction is more appropriate than the fixed-effects estimation given that the 
former has much smaller upward bias. Judson and Owen (1997) have already found that the fixed 
effects model bias can be significant, even with a time dimension as large as 30. Bun and Kiviet (2001) 
propose a bias adjustment for the fixed effect model under dynamic specification when both the time-
series and cross-section dimensions of the data set are small.  
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To see this through an example, consider a simple dynamic panel data model 
(Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model-ARDL (1,0))37. 
y y xit i i i t i it it= + + +−   , 1 ,                (3.2) 
with i N=12, ,..., and t T=1 2, ,..., , where the slopes,  i  and  i , as well as the 
intercepts,  i  are allowed to vary across countries. In this way, heterogeneity is 
introduced into the model through the short-run coefficients  i  and  i . 
In this sense, the long-run coefficient of xit  for country i  is defined by 
  i i i= −1 . 
Then expression (3.2) can be re-written as an error-correction model (ECM): 
y y xit i i i t i it it= − − − +−   1 1b gc h, , or equivalently as, 
y y xit i i i t i it it= − − +−   , 1c h , where  i i= −1 .                                             (3.3) 
The exogenous regressor is described as following a first-order autoregressive 
process: 
x x uit i i t it= − + +−  1 1b g , ,  
where  i  is the (unconditional) mean of xit ,  1and homogeneous across 
countries, and for each i , u iidit i~ ,0
2c h . 
Considering now that the random coefficients model is given as   i i= + 1  and 
  i i= + 2 , then     i i i i= = + 3 , with     i i i i i3 2 1 1 2= + + . 
If, alternatively,  = −1  and  = , then returning to expression (3.2) it 
becomes: 
                                                          
37 The advantage of the use of ARDL models is presented in Pesaran and Shin’s (1999) article. The 
authors point out that these models are robust to integration and cointegration properties of the 
regressors, and for sufficiently high lag orders they are immune to the endogeneity problem, at least as 
far as the long-run properties of the model are concerned. 
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y y x vit i i t it it= + + +−  , 1 , 
where v y n xit it i i t i it= − +−  1 1 3, .
38 
It is now clear that vit  and yi t, −1  are correlated, thus implying the inconsistency of 
fixed-effects and random-effects models. In fact, neglecting slope heterogeneity 
causes the disturbances to be serially correlated as well as contemporaneously 
correlated with the included regressor(s). 
Further, in Pesaran and Smith’s work it is stated that even when having T →  
and N → , the inconsistency of those models remains, if the slopes  i  and  i  are 
heterogeneous across countries. Thus, the larger the degree of parameter 
heterogeneity, the greater the bias of those models.  
More precisely, the fixed-effects model evidences a tendency to underestimate the 
short-run effects and overestimate the average long-run effects under the presence of 
parameter heterogeneity.39 In this case, none of the usual remedies such as 
instrumental variables estimation technique or differencing the variables solves the 
problem. 
Traditional studies on electoral budget cycles using panel data techniques have 
relied on the fixed effects model. In spite of that, a new branch of studies have 
questioned the adequacy of this model which only allows heterogeneity across 
countries through the intercept, arguing that slope homogeneity seems unlikely to 
                                                          
38 For a detailed proof see Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
 
39 This statement is true independently of the stationary or integrated nature of the variables. In fact, 
Pesaran, Smith and Im (1996) argue that with integrated variables under slope heterogeneity a 
differentiating cointegrating relation across countries is found. Thus, incorrectly imposing common 
slope parameter for all countries introduces an ( )1I component in the disturbances, leading to 
inconsistent parameter estimators, even in the static form.  
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hold when countries are at different stages of their economic development and have 
diverse institutions, customs and social norms. 
 
3.2. Estimation techniques that allow for heterogeneity beyond fixed effects 
 
Pesaran (1995,1999) has been developing different approaches, which allow either 
slope heterogeneity across panel estimations or a differentiation between long-run 
effects and short-run effects. In the latter approach the long-run effects are fixed to be 
homogeneous across countries but heterogeneity is allowed in the short-run effects. 
The reference is to Mean Group Estimator (hereafter MG) in the former case and to 
Pooled Mean Group Estimator (hereafter PMG) in the latter case. 
 
3.2.1. The Mean Group (MG) Estimator 
 
When heterogeneity is erroneously neglected, an inconsistency problem occours. 
Pesaran (1995) proposes the MG estimator to overcome this problem. The estimation 
procedure is briefly described below. This estimator is shown to be consistent and 
having asymptotic normal distribution for N  and T  large. 
The expression (3.3) defined as:  
y y xit i i i t i it it= − − +−   , 1c h ,  
where  it iiid~ ,0
2c h  (the disturbances  it  have zero means and are heteroscedastic 
across different countries), is used here again for expositional purpose. 
To estimate expression (3.3), the first step is to run an individual OLS regression 
for each country, in order to estimate for each one  i , i  and  i , using temporal 
observations from t T=1 2, ,..., , assuming that the time span is equal across i . 
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Denoting the estimates by 
^
iT , 
^
iT
 and 
^
iT , respectively, then the second step 
consists of an arithmetic average of the individual estimated coefficients40. The 
estimators depend on T, but for expositional simplicity from now on the subscript T  
is dropped.  
The MG estimator is found through this two step procedure and the estimators are 
given as 
 
−
=
= 
^
^1
1N
i
i
N
,  
−
=
= 
^
^1
1N
i
i
N
 and  
−
=
= 
^
^1
1N
i
i
N
, respectively.  
The variance-covariance matrix of the MG estimator is given as 
V
N N
i i
i
N

   
−
− −
=F
H
GG
I
K
JJ =
−
F
H
GG
I
K
JJ −
F
H
GG
I
K
JJ
−
^
^
^
^
^
'
1
1b g , where 




i
i
i
i
i
=
F
H
GGGG
I
K
JJJJ
. 
The MG estimator41 relies on a set of assumptions that are not reproduced here 
extensively, reporting to Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) article for more details. In spite 
of that, some assumptions are needed to ensure the validity of MG estimation that are 
emphasised here. Specifically, xit  and  is  are independently distributed for all t and 
s , i.e. xit ’s are strictly exogenous and both set of variables are independently 
distributed from i1  and i2 . Recently, Pesaran, Smith and Im (1996) include also as 
                                                          
40 The MG estimator provides an estimate of the averages of the long-run and the short-run parameters 
while the fixed-effects and pooled OLS provide estimates of the long-run and the short-run averages, as 
distinguished by Phillips and Moon (1999). 
 
41 For expositional purpose ( )1,0ARDL  specification is considered, but the statements are valid for 
any other ARDL  specification. In fact, the ARDL  specification is a crucial matter as discussed later. 
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an assumption that the disturbances are uncorrelated across different countries, i.e., 
E it js d i = 0 , for all t and s , if i j . 
When T  is small, the MG estimator of the dynamic panel data model is biased, 
even when N → . This means that for that bias to disappear it is necessary to have a 
large enough T .  
The empirical application includes 32 observations across countries, which is 
considered a large enough T  length 42, since the lower limit is commonly established 
at T = 25 . 
To evaluate the estimation adequacy of the fixed-effects model versus the MG 
model, Pesaran, Smith and Im (1996) propose a Hausman (1978) type test for 
heterogeneity of both the short-run and the long-run coefficients. 
Taking fixed-effects estimators and MG estimators, the Hausman type test for the 
homogeneity of the long-run coefficients, i.e., the test for the null hypothesis i =  
for all i , is given as 
h V VMG FE MG FE MG FE      = −
F
H
I
K
F
H
I
K −
F
H
I
K
L
NM
O
QP −
F
H
I
K
−
^ ^
'
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
1
. 
Under the null hypotheses, for large T , h k ~
2 , where k  is the number of 
parameter estimates. 
For expositional convenience expression (3.2) is re-introduced, written more 
compactly as 
y wit i i it it= + +  
' ,  
                                                          
42 To deal with the MG estimator small sample bias, Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (1999) and 
Pesaran and Zhao (1999) propose alternative methods, respectively, for the short-run coefficients and 
for the long-run coefficients. 
 
 106 
where   
^ ^ ^
,
i i i
=
F
H
I
K  is the vector of estimators for each country.  
For testing the homogeneity hypothesis, now on short-run coefficients (i.e., 
 i = ,  i =  and V it b g = 2 , for all i ), the following Hausman statistic43 is 
presented: 
h VMG MG FE MG FE= −
F
H
I
K −
F
H
I
K
−
    
^ ^ ^
'
^ ^ ^2 1
, 
where  
^ ^
MG i
i
N
N
2 2
1
1
=
=
  and V
N
W H W W H Wi T i
i
N
i T i
i
N^
' '= −
F
HG
I
KJ
−
= =
−
 
1
2
1
1 1
1
c h c h , with 
H I l l l lT T T T T T= −
−
' 'c h 1 , where IT  is an T T  identity matrix, and lT  is a T 1 unit 
vector. 
Now, under the null hypothesis, h k~  +1
2 . 
Using a static model like expression (3.1), Coakley, Fuertes and Spagnolo (2001) 
present the standard error for the MG estimator as se
NMG
i

 ^
^
F
H
I
K =
F
H
I
K
, where 
   
^ ^ ^
i i MG
i
N
N
F
H
I
K = −
F
H
I
K −
=

2
1
1b g . 
Consequently, the standard t -statistic is then calculated as 


^
^
MG
MG
se
F
H
I
K
. 44 
                                                          
43 If the Hausman’s test reveals that the pooling estimate is adequate, the existence of contemporaneous 
errors across countries should also be tested and, if this is not rejected, the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Equation (hereafter, SURE) procedure is the one recommended. Following Zellner (1962), 
the advantage of the SURE procedure lies in the fact that it allows the contemporaneous error 
covariances to be freely estimated. 
 
44 The explanatory power of the MG model is an outcome of the average of the country-specific 
adjusted 
2
R . Under an error correction model specification, a reasonable good fit is considered when a 
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Somewhere between total slope heterogeneity as is assumed by the MG estimator 
and total homogeneity beyond the one that is considered in the fixed-effects estimator, 
there is a wide range of intermediate estimators45 that allow for some degree of 
heterogeneity across countries (cross-sections). 
 
3.2.2. The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Estimator 
 
The PMG estimation procedure is an intermediate estimator between the total slope 
heterogeneity as assumed by the MG estimator and the heterogeneity that is 
considered in the fixed-effects estimator. In fact, the PMG estimator proposed by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is more interesting and reliable than the other two 
estimators since it involves both pooling and averaging.  
The PMG estimator allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances 
to differ across countries, but imposes equality of one or more of the long-run 
coefficients. In this sense, the PMG estimator imposes some homogeneity across 
                                                                                                                                                                      
model explains over 35 percent of the total variance. A model using only variables in levels typically 
leads to a much higher 
2
R , but this is only because the lagged dependent variables artificially inflate 
the total explained variance. 
 
45 Other intermediate estimators between the fixed effects estimators and the MG estimator are the 
shrinkage estimator and the Pooled MG estimator (PMGE). Maddala, Li and Srivastava (2001) 
introduce the former estimator and Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (1999) introduce the later. 
The short-run effects of the former estimator are calculated by shrinking the simple average of each 
separate country’s OLS estimator to a weighted-average inversely proportional to the respective 
variances. The long run effects are allowed to vary across countries, being adjusted by a weighting 
process defined as the Stein-rule estimator. 
The second estimator is a kind of fixed-effects estimator, since the computation of the estimator 
consists on pooling a model that includes a regressor that weights differences across countries observed 
on an explanatory variable.  
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countries compared with the MG estimator, which imposes quite strong assumptions, 
as mentioned above, like the independence of parameters and regressors, as well as 
strictly exogenous regressors. Cumulatively, the PMG estimator reveals to be quite 
robust to outliers 46 as well as to the choice of the lag order of the model, more than 
the MG estimator, whose estimates can be highly influenced by those factors. 
The PMG estimation has been applied in several areas, for instance in panel data 
studies on economic growth (Asteriou and Price, 2000; Bassanini and Scarpetta 2001, 
Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings, 2001), on labour markets changes (Fedderke, 
Shin and Vaze, 2001; Serres, Scarpeta and Maisonneuve, 2002), on private saving 
rates growth (Serres and Pelgrin, 2002) and on public budget balance growth 
(Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002). 
The general model is an ARDL(p,q,q,...,q) such as: 
y y xit ij i t j
j
p
ij i t j
j
q
i it= + + +−
=
−
=
    , ' ,
1 0
               (3.4) 
with i N=12, ,..., and t T=1 2, ,..., . 
Expression (3.4) can be re-parameterised into an Error Correction Model (ECM) as 
  y y x y xit i i t i i t ij i t j
j
p
ij i t j
j
q
i it= + + + + +− − −
=
−
−
=
−
      , ' , * , *' ,1 1
1
1
0
1
            (3.5) 
where  i ij
j
p
= − −
F
HG
I
KJ=1 1 ,  i ijj
q
=
=

0
,  ij im
m j
p
* = −
= +

1
, with j p= −1 2 1, ,..., , and 
 ij im
m j
q
* = −
= +

1
, with j q= −1 2 1, ,..., . 
                                                          
46 In small samples, the MG estimator, being an unweighted average, is excessively sensitive to the 
inclusion of outlying country estimates. The PMG estimator performs better in this regard because it 
produces estimates that are similar to weighted-averages of the respective country-specific estimates, 
where the weights are given according to their precision (i.e., the inverse of their corresponding 
variance-covariance matrix). 
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The lag order used into ARDL specification is obtained from each country’s 
unrestricted regression model, where the selection is done according to the best 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) associated with each lag specification. The 
homogeneous lag order used in the ARDL model is determined by the highest most 
common lag specification that is chosen in the individual regressions. 
Below some of the underlying assumptions of PMG estimator are reported. 47  
The PMG estimator assumes that the disturbances  it  are independently distributed 
across i  and t , with zero means, variances  i
2 0  and also distributed independently 
from the regressors xit . 
The assumption that the disturbances  it  are independent across time is not very 
restrictive and usually is satisfied by increasing the distributed lag orders on yit  and 
xit . The independence of the disturbances and of the regressors is needed for the 
consistent estimation of the short-run coefficients, but can be relaxed when estimating 
the long-run coefficients, allowing for these coefficients the possible dependence 
between xit  and  it . 
Another assumption is the existence of a long-run relationship between yit  and xit , 
which is ensured by i  0 . The long-run relationship is defined by  
y xit i i it it= − +  
'c h  
for each i N=12, ,..., , where it  is a stationary process.
48 
As mentioned before the PMG estimator assumes also long-run homogeneity, 
meaning that  i = , for i N=12, ,..., , where   i i i= − . To test this assumption a 
                                                          
47 For more details see Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
 
48 Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) test this assumption in a time series framework, irrespective of the 
underlying variables considered in the estimation being ( )0I  or ( )1I . 
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Hausman test must be performed between PMG estimates and MG estimates, through 
a procedure analogous to the one described above to test long-run coefficients 
homogeneity between MG estimates and fixed-effects estimates.  
The Hausman statistic test for the long-run coefficients is now defined as 
h V VMG PMG MG PMG MG PMG      = −
F
H
I
K
F
H
I
K −
F
H
I
K
L
NM
O
QP −
F
H
I
K
−
^ ^
'
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
1
.  
Under the slope homogeneity hypothesis the Hausman statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as  2  with   degrees of freedom.  
If the homogeneity assumption is invalid then the PMG estimates are no longer 
consistent, which implies the prevailing of the MG estimates. If the long-run 
coefficients are in fact equal across countries, then the PMG estimates will be 
consistent and efficient, whereas the MG estimates will only be consistent.  
Under the assumption of long-run homogeneity some complications are expected 
in estimation of equation (3.5), namely the regression equation for each country is 
non-linear in i  and  , there are cross-equation parameter restrictions since   is 
common across countries and the error variances differ across countries. 
In this framework the standard pooled estimators relying on the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are not applicable, thus the long-run coefficients   of the PMG 
estimation is obtained based on Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. The long-run 
coefficients are subsequently used to estimate country-specific error-correction 
coefficients i  and short-run coefficients  ij  and  ij , which, after averaging, gives 
the estimates of the respective aggregate coefficients. 
It can be said now that the PMG estimator is a two-step procedure: one is the joint 
estimation of the homogeneous long-run coefficients across countries through the ML 
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procedure and the other is the estimation of the error-correction coefficients and the 
short-run parameters of the model, on a country-by-country basis. 
To simplify the exposition and using an ARDL (1,1) as a particular case, the first 
step to PMG estimation is defined by the following equation 
y y x xit i i t i it i i t i it= + + + +− −    , ,1 10 11 1 ,              (3.6) 
being the second step implemented through the error correction model  
 y y x xit i i t i i i t i it it= − − + +− −    , ,1 0 1 1 11c h ,            (3.7) 
where 


0
1
i
i
i
=
−
, 
 

1
10 11
1
i
i i
i
=
+
−
 and  i i= − −1b g .  
In expression (3.7), i  is the error correction coefficient measuring the speed of 
adjustment 49 towards the long-run equilibrium.  
The consistency and efficiency of the PMG estimates depend on several conditions 
regarding the specification. In order to assess the robustness of the empirical model 
some previous diagnostic statistics are applied on individual country ARDL equation. 
The usual battery of statistical tests include the Breusch-Godfrey test for residual 
serial correlation, the Ramsey RESET test for functional form misspecification, the 
Jarque-Bera test for errors normality, and the White test for homoscedasticity, which 
are computed for each individual country regression. The former two statistics and the 
latter one have a qui-square distribution with p -degrees of freedom, where p  
represents the number of lags included in regressions, having the third statistic a qui-
square distribution with two degrees of freedom. 
                                                          
49 The magnitude of the adjustment speed is smaller in the PMG than in the MG specification (or, 
equivalently, the autoregressive coefficient is higher) according to Robertson and Symons (1992) 
predictions that pooling in the presence of heterogeneity tends to increase inertia. 
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Only individual country regressions that pass the above four diagnostic tests can be 
included either into the PMG estimation or into the MG estimation. 
Returning to expression (3.6), the set of explanatory variables is restricted to 
follow an AR process, which does not depend on contemporaneous values of y . This 
restriction arises from the assumption that there is only one long-run relationship 
between x and y . However, as Calderón, Loayza and Servén (1999) point out, there is 
a possibility for x  to be endogenous in the sense that the factors that affect x  may be 
correlated with contemporaneous effects in y .  In this case, the endogeneity of x  
must be taken into account when the long-run relationship is derived from the 
dynamic ARDL specification, as it was in the PMG estimation procedure. 
The simultaneous causation possibility, i.e., the existence of a feedback between y  
and x , is captured in what follows by a non-zero  u . 
Using a single equation framework, Calderón et al. derive the parameterisation that 
should be introduced to account for the endogeneity of x . 
The ARDL 11,b gmodel in expression (3.6) is now given as 
y y x x at t t t t= + + + +− −   1 10 11 1 , for each country, where x x ut t t= +− 1 ,
50 and 
 t
tu
iid
F
HG
I
KJ ~ ,0 b g ,  =
F
HG
I
KJ
 
 
 

  
  
u
u uu
. 
                                                          
50 Loayza and Ranciere (2002) introduce a slightly different specification of the regressor variable, 
which takes the form x x u
t t t
= + +
−
 
1
, thus leading to an error correction model with a component 
1u
uu
a 

 

− −
 
 
 
. 
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The contemporaneous correlation between  t  and ut  is then represented by a 
linear regression of  t  on ut  as follows, 


t
u
uu
t tu=
F
HG
I
KJ + , where  t  is distributed 
independently from ut (and, thus, from xt ). 
In this way, the new residual in the ARDL 11,b g model is uncorrelated with all 
explanatory variables and is given as  
y y x x at t
u
uu
t
u
uu
t t= + +
F
HG
I
KJ + −
F
HG
I
KJ + +− − 


 


 1 10 11 1 .  
The error correction model implied by the ARDL 11,b g given above can be 
expressed, analogously as in expression (3.7), by 
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Therefore, the long-run relationship is given as  
y
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.  
Pesaran et al. (1999) use a Gauss Program to implement the PMG estimator, where 
the long-run relationship between y  and x  assumed no contemporaneous feedback 
effect. In order to eliminate the presence of such effect from model specification, each 
equation is modelled analogously to Calderón et al. (1999) and Loayza and Ranciere 
(2002). The PMG estimates corrected from the contemporaneous correlation problem 
are obtained through a dynamic equation specification, using the Eviews 3.0 Program. 
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4. Empirical variables of Proposition 1 
 
The present Chapter describes the variables included in the empirical application to 
test Proposition 1 and its statistical sources: the dependent variable denominated EXP 
and 8 independent variables. 
The sample covers 15 countries and 32 years. The countries comprise the current 
European Union in full: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. Data are available on an annual basis from 1970 to 2001. 
 
4.1. The dependent variable 
 
The explanation begins with a description of the variable which behaviour the 
present part intends to explain in order to sustain Proposition 1’s statements of the 
theoretical model, i.e., the dependent variables EXP. 
 The dependent variable EXP corresponds to the difference between central 
government’s current expenditure weight in every year budgetary values of public 
expenditures and its capital counterpart weight. 
The dependent variable defined by such difference is in accordance with the 
theoretical model that defines g gA B−  as being the comparison between the weight 
that current expenditures have on government’s budget and the weight attached to 
capital expenditures. The theoretical model evaluates the bias towards some of the 
two types of expenditures, meaning that the difference takes the values zero when the 
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respective weights are balanced.51 In this sense, the variable captures the bias to a 
certain type of expenditure, i.e., positive values mean a bias towards current 
expenditures and a negative value indicate a bias towards capital expenditures. A 
variable defined in this way permits to evaluate the influence of the explanatory 
variables, described in next Sections, to the bias evolution. 
The main data source for the absolute values of central government’s current 
expenditures as well as capital expenditures is the IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook, with information published until 1999. However, for some 
countries the series were incomplete, implying the use of others complementary 
statistical sources, namely: National Accounts (OECD), National Bank of Belgium, 
Eurostat, INSEE National Accounts, National Accounts - Dutch Department of 
Finance, European Commission (2001), and Bank of Portugal.52 
With the purpose of having all the variables included in the empirical specification 
with a similar time lag, all EXP series are expanded until 2001 through a simulation 
program of Honaker et al. (2000), named Amelia, which runs in Gauss, and permits to 
                                                          
51 An argument for the definition of the variable in such a way relies on the goal of the empirical 
application. The goal is to evaluate the budget bias towards some of the two types of public 
expenditure. Since 1
A B
g g+ =  the reader can state that defining only the weight of the current 
expenditures in the budget will do the same, since when current expenditure weight increases, the 
capital expenditure weight decreases necessarily. However, the model does not intend to explain the 
evolution of one of the expenditure’s component but how the deviation between the two components 
evolves. 
An example illustrates the argument. Let’s consider that the current expenditure takes in three years 
the following values: 40, 50 and 80%. Considering only the current expenditure, the current 
expenditure weight increases 10% and 30% respectively, between years. Considering the variable 
defined as a difference, the bias towards capital expenditures decreases 20% (being the two weights 
balanced) and the bias towards current expenditures increases 60%. 
 
52 Having different data sources in the compilation of the data is considered that fact, being the 
published data adjusted in order to prevent structural breaks into the dataset. 
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complete each country data. The program produces five simulated results for each 
country missing values. The authors suggest the use of each simulation in the 
empirical estimation, giving origin to an upper and a lower limit to each coefficient 
estimated. Although, taking into account that the missing values are only 
approximately 6% of the central government’s expenditure data compiled, the option 
was to use solely the simulated series which panel evidences the lower standard 
deviation and variance.  
 
Having explained how the dependent variable was compiled, a description of the 
independent variables proceeds. 
The empirical model considers, as referred, eight explanatory variables. More 
precisely, two dummies variables based on legislative election date, the 
unemployment rate, the consumer price index, a measure of the government’s 
ideological position, a measure of the government’s power in the assembly, a turnout 
variable as well as a variable that measures the weight of population older than 65 
years.  
Each one of these variables is described in the next Section. 
 
4.2. The regressors 
 
The empirical application must accomplish another set of variables in order to 
check the relevance of other influences on the nature of the electoral expenditure 
cycle preconized in the theoretical Propositions.  
In this sense, the empirical model includes variables to evaluate either the presence 
of an electoral expenditure cycle, i.e., electoral variables, as well as other control 
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variables to capture institutional and economic differences across countries. In that set 
of variables, political variables like parliamentary strength measures, turnout and 
party ideological positions as well as economic variables like unemployment rate, 
consumer price index and population over 65 are considered. 
 
4.2.1. The electoral periods 
 
The first regressor that comes naturally from the theoretical model is a variable that 
translates the elections into post-election and pre-election periods. In this sense, two 
dummies were considered, denominated by ELEC0 and ELEC1, following 
Schucknecht (1998)’s approach.53 
The former dummy variable assumes value 1 in the pre-election year when 
elections take place until the fourth month of the year and in the election year when 
elections take place during or after the fifth month. In this periods the difference 
between current expenditure and capital expenditure is expected to be wider. 
Otherwise, the variable takes the value zero. 
The later dummy variable takes value 1 in the election year when elections occur 
during the first two months of the year and in the after election year when elections 
occur in or after the third month of the year. In this period it is anticipated that the 
difference between current expenditure and capital expenditure becomes smaller. 
Otherwise, the variable takes the value zero. 
                                                          
53 There are several approaches proposed in the literature for the definition of the electoral dummies. 
After analyzing the alternative specifications, namely those proposed by Blais and Nadeau (1992), by 
Dalen and Swank (1996), by Franzese (1999), by Carmignami (2000), by Shi and Svensson (2000), by 
Chang (2001), by Huber, Kocher and Sutter (2002) and by Mulas-Granados (2002), the Schucknecht’s 
approach was considered the most reasonable to capture the phenomena nature that the present work 
intend to explain. 
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During the dictatorial regimes, both variables take the value zero given the absence 
of any electoral cycle in the correspondent periods. 
The two dummy variables are based on legislative election date, whose information 
is mainly taken from the following net-address: www.electionworld.org/. Early 
election dates are collected from Wolderdorp et al. (1993, 1998) and it were held, for 
Belgium on 1971, 1974, 1981 and 1985, for Denmark on 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984 and 
1987, for Greece on 1977 and 1990, for Ireland on 1982, 1987 and 1992, for 
Netherlands on1977 and 1989 and for Austria on 1970. Greek legislative election date 
is retrieved from the site: www.janda.org. Some election data information is also 
available in the Lijphart Election Archive at the net-address: 
http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij. 
In order to test empirically Proposition 1, the relation between the electoral cycle 
(pre-election periods versus post-election periods) and the budget composition bias 
towards current expenditures is investigated. In this sense, in a regression including 
both ELEC0 (pre-election period) and ELEC1 (post-election period), the parameter 
associated with the former is expected to be significantly positive and with the second 
is anticipated as being smaller than ELEC0 and probably not significant statistically. 
The parameter of the ELEC1 variable is an empirical question, thus a positive or a 
negative sign can be considered. 
This result would confirm the prior expectations regarding the effect of the 
electoral cycle on the governments’ manipulation of the composition of the public 
expenditures. In the former case, a positive sign to the parameter of the ELEC0 
variable indicates that pre-elections periods induce governments to bias the budget 
composition towards current expenditures. In the second case, having a parameter to 
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the ELEC1 variable not statistically significant means that governments do not bias 
the budget composition in the post-election periods. 
 
4.2.2. The economic and social variables 
 
The incorporation of economic variables permits to contemplate empirically the 
existence of economic cycles that might restrain government’s incentives to 
manipulate public expenditures. The economic variables are the unemployment rate 
and the consumer price index. 
The unemployment rate variable, named UER, is collected from OECD (1996, 
2000) until 1999, and OECD (2001-a) afterwards. 
The consumer price index (CPI variable) values are taken from Eurostat (2001) 
until 1997, from OECD (2001-b) between 1998 and 2000, and from Institute Flores de 
Lemus (2000), which report to Eurostat, to the last year. 
Both economic variables the unemployment rate and the consumer price index are 
expected to reflect the economic cycle impact on public expenditure cycle. Thus, in 
the regression, the parameter of the unemployment rate variable must be positive; 
meaning that higher unemployment induces the increasing of current expenditures 
through public funds. Contrarily, a negative sign is expected on the parameter of the 
consumer price index variable in the regression, especially if the variable enters in 
estimation with a period lag. In this case, the budget plays a stabilisation role, 
controlling for the inflationary stress on economy, through a contraction on the 
amount attained to current expenditures on the next budgetary exercise. 
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The last variable corresponds to a social variable identified as POP65, which 
represents the weight of population older than 65. Data sources are Eurostat (2001) 
until 1999 and CIA-World Factbook afterwards. 
Analogously as to unemployment rate, the weight of the population over 65 bias 
budget’s composition towards current expenditures through social transfers and health 
care expenditures and, in this sense, is anticipated a positive sign to the coefficient of 
this variable. This is reasonable given the rivalry in consumption this kind of welfare 
expenditures evidence, being a direct function of the number of unemployed and the 
number of older citizens in population. 
 
4.2.3. The ideology 
 
The inclusion of an ideological variable in the empirical application intends to 
evaluate the extent of partisan bias on the public expenditures’ mix. However the 
theoretical model defines the government as being ideological neutral. In this sense, 
the investigation of the sign and significance of the ideology variable coefficient 
assumes relevance because in fact governments have ideological positioning since 
parties that are not ideologically neutral compose them. Having in mind the 
statements regarding government’s preferences of the theoretical model, the prior 
expectation is that government’s ideological position does not significantly determine 
budget manipulation. 
The ideological variable allows the position of governmental preferences regarding 
public expenditures since the common knowledge is that left-wing parties are more 
prone to spend on current expenditures than right-wing parties. This argument is 
confirmed by Cusack (1995), who shows, using industrialised democracies data 
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during 1955 to 1989, the importance of ideological preferences of the ruling parties to 
the levels of governing spending determination. Parties on the left, favour 
redistribution, thus providing greater public expenditures while parties on the right, 
favour the untrammelled workings of the market system, which reduces government’s 
spending. Dalen and Swank (1996) using Netherlands data for 1953-1993 also 
reported that left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health 
care and right wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defence. 
The Tsebelis and Chang (forthcoming)’s database is used to define the 
government’s ideological position, identified as IDEOL variable. The database is 
available at http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/. 
The authors compiled earlier versions of ideological party positioning studies 
under democratic regimes driven by Castles and Mair (1984), Laver and Hunt (1992) 
and Huber and Inglehart (1995) and extended it. Since neither of the studies 
aggregates results for all countries considered in the empirical application, a different 
ideological scale between countries according to data availability is used. 
The positioning of each party, with assembly representation, are taken from Huber 
and Inglehart (1995) for Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden 
and United Kingdom, from Castles and Mair (1984) for Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Spain and France, and from Laver and Hunt (1992) for Luxembourg. 
The government’s ideological position is completed with Greece, with by Beck et al. 
(2000) on the net-address http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck/. 
Information regarding more recent legislative election results and respective 
assembly composition is obtained through CIA – The World Factbook (2001), at the 
internet site: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos. 
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In order to harmonise the different party ideological scales the approach of 
Carmignami (1999) is followed, which orders each parliamentary party in a scale 
from 0 to 10, corresponding to a sequence from the left to the right. A party 
positioned below (above) 5.5 is considered a left (right) one. Following this approach 
the democratic governments’ ideology in Europe vary between a lowest value of 2.3 
in the United Kingdom and a highest value of 8.453 in Italy. 
During the 70s, Greece, Portugal and Spain faced a transition from a dictatorial to a 
democratic regime. Dictatorial regimes are not quoted in a scale as a party with 
democratic legislative representation commonly are, which leaves a problem of 
unbalanced panel data for those countries.  
In order to minimise this situation the ideological data emptiness was filled. In that 
filling the goal is twofold. Firstly to overcome the problem of working with 
unbalanced panel data which will leave information regarding other variables outside 
the estimation procedure, and secondly not distort the explanatory effect of this 
variable, since the motivation is to evaluate party’s behaviour under democratic 
regimes.  
The lower the value of the IDEOL variable as defined, the higher will be the 
expected budget bias prone current expenditures, given the leftist party preferences in 
what concerns public expenditure pattern, under a democratic regime.  
In the theoretical model the incumbent’s opportunistic behaviour is refrained by 
elections, since if she displeases too much voters the next election context can not be 
gained and she does not get re-appointed. Under a dictatorship the government does 
not face those constraint that are impose by the electoral cycles. Given the certain re-
appointment under a dictatorial regime, the incumbent will prefer to spend on current 
expenditures rather than on capital expenditures since the latter type of expenditures 
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gives her an utility with a period delay. So why expect to have pleasure tomorrow if 
she can get it now. In this sense, the incentive of a dictatorial regime to manipulate 
budget composition is at the higher position compared with any democratic regime, 
which is independent of the ideological position of the dictatorship, according with 
the theoretical model. In accordance with this argument, the value zero is allocated to 
the period of democracy absence in those three countries. 
This filling is in line with the theoretical model, which considers the government as 
being ideologically neutral and ideology importance comes up through electorate, 
whose preferences for the two types of public expenditures are ideologically 
positioned. In this sense, a government only cares about voters’ preferences if re-
election is uncertain, which is not the case under a dictatorship. This argument is in 
line with Block, Singh and Ferree (2001), who confirmed, under an African context, 
that if elections do not entail multiparty competition, an incumbent’s utility function 
does not produce incentives to engage in electoral economic manipulation to satisfy 
the electorate. 
The European governments evidence, during the three decades in analyse, different 
ideological positions. In mean terms, left-wing parties predominantly governed 
Europe between 1970 and 2001; however three countries present a rightist tendency, 
namely Italy, Ireland and United Kingdom. 
The parameter of the political variable IDEOL is anticipated to have a negative 
sign in the regression. The sign is in accordance with the literature that describes 
right-wing parties as being less prone to welfare transfers, thus less prone to current 
expenditures. 
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4.2.4. The legislative share of the largest party 
 
The theoretical model focuses on the incumbent’s opportunistic behaviour prior 
elections. The incumbent is modelled as being the head leader of a government.  
In real world, government can be of a single party or a coalition. In this sense 
assumes relevance the evaluation of what of the two configurations of government 
produces a more evident political budget cycle with a nature of the one presented in 
the theoretical model. 
 The political variables evidence different realities across countries. Some 
European countries have a very divided parliament, with many parties having a 
reduced share of total parliamentary seats. As expected, in those countries, coalitions 
are the natural government outcome. The European countries evidence a differentiated 
pattern on the formation of governments, which gives an incentive to test 
government’s behaviour under the alternative configurations. On some countries like 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland, for example, to 
mention just a few, coalition governments are dominant. In contrast Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and United Kingdom present a tradition of a single party governments. 
The empirical application will show that single party governments do not perform 
equally to coalition governments, determining differences on the manipulation of 
public expenditures across European countries. 
The importance of government’s polarisation to the electorally manipulation of 
public expenditures is well documented.54 From a government composed by a set of 
                                                          
54 Carmignami (2000) argues that different electoral institutions will produce different forms of bias in 
fiscal policy formation. Scartascini and Crain (2001) examine the structure of party competition across 
democratic nations and its impact on the size and composition of government’s expenditures and find, 
empirically, that increases in the number of effective political parties has a significant effects on 
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parties is expected to feel less responsible for budget options since the probability of 
being in government again is substantially smaller than when one party represents a 
significant parcel of the electorate. To reinforce this argument Economides, Miaouli 
and Philippopoulos (2001-pp.16) can be quoted:  
“As the re-election probability gets smaller, the party in power cares less about the 
future and spends more now.” 
Another explanation is that the war of attrition is higher if there is not a leading 
party of considerable size in a ruling coalition, thus leading to more systematic 
manipulations on the composition of public expenditures by coalition rather than by 
single party governments. 
In order to capture those differences on government’s behaviour in the empirical 
application is introduced a variable that measures the weight of the larger party in a 
parliamentary assembly. The LPS abbreviation becomes the name of the legislative 
share of the largest party variable. The correspondent values are found by dividing the 
number of seats of the most representative party in the assembly by the assembly’s 
total number of seats. This variable intends to capture different budgetary behaviours 
across countries distinguishing between countries where coalition governments are the 
rule from countries where single party dominates the legislatures. 
In the definition of the LPS variable, the Beck et al. (2001) jointly with the 
Tsebelis et al. (forthcoming) databases are used as data sources. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
expenditure composition. The authors affirm (pp.3) that “for each effective political party that gains 
parliamentary representation, central government expenditure as a share of GDP increases by roughly 
two percentage points in OECD countries and by half a percentage point in the large sample of 
countries.” Also Huber, Kocher and Sutter (2002-pp.1) found that “coalition governments with about 
equally strong parties have higher deficits than governments where there is one dominating party and 
one or more relatively weaker parties.” 
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 When budgetary options are taken under dictatorial governments, the variable is 
coded to one, since it is assumed that government’s opposition had no role in the 
government’s budget decisions. 
In the regression, for the parameter associated with the political variable LPS is 
anticipated a negative sign.  
If the major parliamentary party has a significant fraction of the parliamentary 
seats, the party has a smaller incentive to manipulate budget composition in the pre-
election years, since the re-election comes more likely. However, if the largest 
parliamentary party only shares a small proportion of the seats an inverse incentive is 
expected. Any party in such a minority position will have a higher present ego-rent 
when bias budget to current expenditures compared with a party with a more enlarged 
electorate.  
In this sense, the parameter can be interpreted as how party re-election chances 
determine the bias on the expenditure mix. 
 
4.2.5. The turnout rate 
 
The last political variable considered is a measure of participation in elections by 
the electorate. The turnout rate might be a constraining force on government’s 
freedom to manipulate expenditure. Governments know that manipulating excessively 
public expenditures, far from voters’ preferences will be translated into a price to be 
paid in election terms. In fact, the model distinguishes from common electoral cycle 
literature where electors are mistaken by fiscal illusion. 
The theoretical model shows that if voters have no public expenditure bias, even so 
the incumbent increases current expenditures in the pre-election years.  
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Under the circumstances in which voters do not have preferences regarding current 
expenditures, the incumbent knows that the higher the turnout rate the more heavy 
any electoral punishment will be. The main idea is that if there are countries with a 
greater number of effective voters, this means more participant societies. 
And a society is more participant as more informed is. In fact, as Coupé and Noury 
(2002-pp.1) argued “information is a major determinant of abstention. Uninformed 
agents use abstention to delegate their “vote” to their more informed fellows.” 
Matsusaka (1995) also developed a decision theoretic model of abstention showing 
that more informed voters get a higher expected return for voting then do their less 
informed counterparts. Ghirardato and Katz (1999) demonstrated that as voters 
acquire more information about an election, they are more likely to vote on it, since 
the informational costs needed to avoid the vote on the wrong candidate are lower. 
Indirect evidence on the importance of voters’ information can be also found in 
Matsunaka and Palda (1999), which show that more educated people are more likely 
to vote. The relevance of information to explain voters’ participation in elections is 
more directly evaluated, in Larcinese (2000), who shows that people that are more 
informed (measured, for example, by how many of the candidates can be named) are 
more likely to turnout in the UK. 
 More voters expressing their dissatisfaction to government’s expenditure options 
imply a more responsible government to their constituents, thus lowering budget 
manipulation. If voters’ displease is too prominent, government’s political account 
can be too high, loosing any re-election chance that might have. 55 
                                                          
55 A government evidencing a bias to current expenditures, in a persistent manner, is generally 
punished in elections. For this statement, we can present, as an example, the Portuguese case and the 
parliamentary 2002‘s election results, which lead to a change from a PS government to a coalition 
government between PSD and PP-CDS. 
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So, in the empirical application, the expectation is that the greater the number of 
voters’ bailouts, the smaller the incentives for governments to engage in excessive 
current expenditures compared to capital expenditures. This result is expected if 
voters preferences are prone to capital expenditures or if voters have no preference 
regarding the expenditure mix, in accordance with the theoretical model. 56 However, 
if voters prefer current expenditures the budget will have this bias given the 
government’s manipulation incentive in the pre-election periods, as stated in the 
theoretical model. 
Ultimately, given that voters’ preferences are unknown, the turnout variable effect 
on the public expenditure mix remains an empirical question. 
In order to test the above effect, a measure of the turnout rate is introduced in the 
empirical application. The turnout variable (VPR) is defined by the ratio between the 
number of votes cast and the number of people entitled to vote, The information used 
to define the variable can be found at http://idea.int/voter_turnout/westeurope/. 
Belgium turnout rate is a particular case since an upper 90% of voter’s 
participation is found across the three decades of the present study, which is an 
outcome of the compulsive election law. 
Since elections are not an every year’s phenomena, middle year data is completed 
according to Franzese (2000)’s suggested methodology. The number of votes cast and 
the number of people entitled to vote are obtained by holding fixed the information 
related to each variable, in each election, until next election and, then smoothing the 
                                                          
56 Franzese (2000) presents a different argument, that leads to a contrary expectations from the ones we 
have relating to turnout variable signal, showing, in an OECD countries framework, that higher voter 
turnout produces more transfers, since there are a greater electoral representation of the relatively poor. 
Our empirical work does not come up with the same conclusion. The main reason can reside on the set 
of countries included in the study, since OECD is a more heterogeneous set regarding poverty levels 
than the one composed by the EU countries.   
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resulting series by a moving average that contemplates the previous and the last 
variable results.  
The population data is retrieved from Eurostat (2001) between 1970 and 2000 and 
the information for 2001 is collected from CIA-World Factbook (2001). 
If the parameter associated with the VPR variable takes a negative sign that would 
mean that the higher the turnout rate, the more voters’ disciplinary force reduces 
government’s manipulation prone to current expenditures. This case will indicate that 
voters do not prefer current expenditures, since the participation of voters constraint 
the government’s incentive to spend more on current expenditures. A parameter with 
a positive sign would mean that voters have a preference bias towards current 
expenditures. 
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5. Empirical variables of Proposition 2 
 
This Chapter describes the variables included in the empirical application to test 
Proposition 2 and correspondent statistical sources: the dependent variable EXPF and 
5 regressors. 
The sample covers the 15 EU countries from 1970 to 2001. 
 
5.1 The dependent variable 
 
Differences regarding the composition of public expenditures between society’s 
preferences and voters’ preferences cannot be directly evaluated.  
The public expenditure partition between current and capital expenditures is quite 
general and does not allow for an effective differentiation between voters’ preferences 
and non-voter’s preferences. The non-voters group determines the differences 
between society’s preferences and voters’ preferences. In order to evaluate more 
appropriately the kind of public expenditure that is more prone to each of society’s 
groups, a split by functions of the public expenditures becomes necessary57.  
In this sense, for the definition of the other dependent variable considered in the 
study (EXPF), central government’s expenditures are broken down by functions and 
clustered into two categories, in line with Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998)’s 
methodology. These authors proposed a dichotomy between productive and non-
                                                          
57 Sanz and Velásquez (2002) present a comprehensive review of the literature that uses models with a 
public expenditure partition by functions and the respective forms of aggregating those functions. 
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productive functions for central government’s expenditures58. The main argument for 
this partition is that the former category favours voters more and the last category is 
more prone to non-voters. 
The productive central government’s expenditure includes expenditure on general 
public services, defence, public order and safety, education, health, housing and 
community amenities, economic affairs and services as well as other undifferentiated 
expenditures. The remaining functions categories, namely social security and welfare 
expenditures as well as recreational, cultural and religious affairs expenditures 
correspond to a second category of expenditures, referred to as non-productive. 
An analogous approach taken for the EXP variable is now followed in the EXPF 
variable definition where this variable represents the difference between weights that 
each of the public expenditure category mentioned above have on central 
government’s total expenditure. 
The IMF’s - Government Finance Statistics Yearbook is once again the main 
source for the compilation of this variable. However, central government’s 
expenditure data by function are only available until 1997 and even so with many 
incomplete series. In fact, only Belgium, Denmark and Spain have a full-range of 
information. There is also a group of countries for which the first two years are 
missing (Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom), and another group with the two or 
three last years missing (Germany and Luxembourg). For the remaining countries, 
missing values are dispersed through the series and are a more frequent event. 
Given the information holes regarding central government’s expenditure by 
function, a solution already followed is adopted and the missing data were simulated 
                                                          
58 Previously, Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) already distinguished between productive 
functions, which stimulate growth, and non-productive functions, that increase social welfare. 
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using the Amelia package. As previously mentioned, to each missing value, five 
possible values are attached. 
Having in attention that the missing values in the EXPF variable are in higher 
number than in the EXP variable (27.5% of central government’s expenditure data, by 
function), some additional caution must be taken and in the estimation should not be 
considered only one of the simulated value series. The most appropriate simulated 
values for each regression specification is in this sense evaluated.  
With this purpose, a country by country regression with each five values simulated 
is run and the robustness of the regressions is checked through four tests: residual 
serial correlation, functional form specification, homocedasticity and normality of the 
residuals. The simulated values used in regression estimations are not always the 
same, being adjusted according to the robustness tests performed on each regression 
specification (i.e., the number of regressors’ lags included in the regression 
specifications). 
The country’s simulated values used in panel estimation identified on Table A in 
the Appendix as EXPF1 and EXPF2 were, in this sense, the ones with better 
robustness tests results.  
To test the adequacy of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, a function in which EXPF is 
the dependent variable is estimated. In this sense, EXPF is regressed on economic 
variables, namely on UER and on CPI and, on political variables as IDEOL, LPS and 
VSP. 
This means that the goal is to investigate the evolution of public expenditures by 
function and its relation to both economic and political phenomena. 
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5.2. The regressors 
 
5.2.1. Common regressors 
 
To test the adequacy of Proposition 2, the unemployment rate (UER) and the 
consumer price index (CPI) are maintained as regressors in the empirical application 
in order to evaluate the influence of the economic cycle on the composition of public 
expenditures. The included political variables in the regression are again the 
government’s ideological position (IDEOL) and the government’s power to decide 
alone the composition of public expenditures (LPS). 
As explained in detail in Section 3.2, in the estimation procedure is allowed the 
finding of two parameters to each variable: one for the long run and other for the short 
run effects. 
In this framework, the parameters of some explanatory variables can evidence an 
ambiguous effect in the long-run but a very precise effect in short-run.  
More precisely, in the long-run, do not exist prior expectations regarding the 
coefficient signs of the unemployment rate as well as the consumer price index, but in 
the short-run a negative sign for UER and an ambiguous sign for CPI are expected. 
The reasons for the expected sign are in conformity with the already stated effects 
those two variables have on budget mix. On the one hand, an increase on the number 
of unemployed implies more public transfers to those citizens, which implies an 
increase of welfare expenditures included into non-productive expenditures. On the 
other hand, given budget stabilisation role, an increase on the consumer price index 
leads to government’s refraining to expand both types of public expenditures, given 
the multiplier effect expenditures have on inflation. 
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In what concerns political variables, the short-run and the long-run effects of 
IDEOL and LPS59 on budget composition between pro-voters and non-pro-voters 
expenditure remains an empirical question. Although it is reasonable to expect that as 
larger a parliamentary party is, the more flexible a government composed by that 
party will be to satisfy non-voters’ preferences without facing a too high reduction on 
the electorate base. 
 
5.2.2. The voters share of population 
 
In a society with a more pronounced participation of voters, governments are too 
tight to voters’ preferences thus leading to a significant bias towards public 
expenditure functions that favour voters, since in that case it also favours society. The 
expectation is that the more participant in elections a society is the less likely will be 
to find a great difference between society’s preferences and those expressed by 
voters.60 Thus, if effective voters represent a significant weight in total population 
then the expectation is that governments will follow voters’ preferences given that 
would not be too much differentiated from society’s preferences. If voters prefer a 
specific type of public expenditures, then budget composition must be directly and 
                                                          
59 Using panel estimation with 21 OECD countries in the period 1982-1997, Kittel and Obinger (2002) 
find that party fractionalization and coalition governments only explain a small percentage of the 
variance in social spending in times of austerity. Although, the authors consider that consolidation is 
much more difficult if parties need to find a compromise between different ideological orientations, as 
is the case on coalition governments.  
 
60 The possibility of differentiated preferences pattern between effective voters and the reminding 
society’s citizens was already referred by Sanders (1996) when refers that registered electors evaluate 
candidates differently than the unregistered. 
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positively correlated with the degree of representation that effective voters have in 
society.  
 Contrarily, a smaller weight of voters in society will imply a larger scope for 
governments to please non-voters’ preferences.  
After the public expenditure partition into two subgroups according to either 
expenditure more prone to voters or expenditure more oriented to non-voters, then the 
greater the number of effective voters in society, the higher a bias towards the former 
type of public expenditure is expected.61 The major motivation at this point is to test 
empirically if in fact a more participant society leads to that kind of bias on public 
expenditures. 
The variable that measures the weight of the effective votes cast into population is 
denominated by VSP variable. The information used to define the variable is available 
at http://idea.int/voter_turnout/westeurope/. 
The sign of the parameter associated with the VSP variable is expected to be 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that the higher the weight of effective 
voters in society the more likely governments engage into a budget manipulation 
prone to pro-voters expenditures. 
 
To the insight of the above explanation, Table A on the Appendix presents a 
summary of the descriptive statistics, by country, of both dependent and explanatory 
variables. 
                                                          
61 Cusack (1995) argues that the preferences of voters are based on objective differences across groups 
within the electorate, differences that reflect the economic well being of the individuals within these 
groups. Thus electorate evidences different public expenditures preferences. While poorer groups, less 
politically active, tend to favor greater government intervention in the economy, which increases 
transfers and consequently the weight of unproductive expenditures, more influent groups are 
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5.3. Goals of the empirical application 
 
Summarising, the empirical application intends to test empirically the following 
results: 
- a positive relationship between a bias on public expenditures towards current 
expenditures and the pre-election periods; 
- a relationship between a bias on public expenditures towards current 
expenditures and turnout rate and, 
- a positive relationship between a bias on public expenditures towards pro-
voters expenditures and the weight of effective voters in society. 
 
Generally, the empirical model presented is: 
 
Current expenditure weight - Capital expenditure weight =
      =  f(electoral cycle) + f(economic variables) + f(political variables)
  
 
to test Proposition 1. 
In order to accomplish the goals relative to Proposition 2, the empirical model used 
the following expressions: 
 
Current expenditure weight - Capital expenditure weight =
      =  f(economic variables) + f(political variables)
 
Pro - voters expenditure weight -  Pro - non - voters expenditure weight =
      =  f(economic variables) + f(political variables)
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interested in restricting government intervention, holding a lower preference for that expenditure’s 
type. 
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6. Unit root tests on the EU panel data 
 
In this Chapter a preliminary analysis of the data set is presented. In a first step the 
panel series are analysed in order to determine their unit root characteristics. Then the 
stationary properties of these time series are investigated, for each country, through a 
SURADF procedure. The panel unit root tests performed on the entire country set and 
on the set of countries included in the estimated regressions of the empirical 
application are reported in tables B1 to B10 in the appendix. The panel referred to as 
10-I considers the set of countries included in the estimation of Proposition 1, whose 
estimated results are presented in Chapter 7. Analogously, the panel indicated by 10-II 
refers to the set of countries included in the estimation of Proposition 2. Chapter 8 
reports the results achieved for this Proposition. 
The first step consists of checking for the presence of a unit root in the dependent 
variables and in the regressors. In this sense, both the IPS and the Chang panel data 
unit root tests are applied.  
 
6.1. The implementation of the panel data unit root tests that assume cross-
section independence 
 
Performing a standard ADF test on each individual time series with an intercept 
and with both an intercept and a time trend, the IPS test is implemented, exploiting the 
panel dimension of the data set. The number of lags pi  included in individual 
regressions to eliminate residual auto correlation is chosen according to the BIC 
Criterion with a maximum length of 8 periods. To confirm absence of residual serial 
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correlation as required for the implementation of IPS’ t-bar test, a LM test is 
performed on the residuals with a lag span of three. 
 
6.2.  Results for the panel data unit root tests that assume cross-section 
independence 
 
Results from the IPS panel data unit root test show that the null hypothesis of a unit 
root can be rejected for the dependent variables EXP, EXPF1 and EXPF2, and for the 
regressors UER, IDEOL, LPS and VSP. However, this hypothesis cannot be rejected 
for the regressor CPI when the test is performed with an intercept and a time trend 
and, for the regressors VPR and POP65 when the test only includes an intercept.  
As already referred to, the IPS test assumes cross-country independence. 
Nevertheless being the panel unit root test, which performs better comparatively with 
other tests with the same assumption, as already pointed out in sub-section 2.1.2, 
when cross-section dependence is in fact present in the panel, other panel unit root test 
techniques are more adequate. 
 
6.3. The implementation of the panel data unit root tests that allow cross-
section dependence 
 
The existence of cross-section dependencies is shown using a Granger Causality 
Test with 2 lags, the results of which are presented in Table C of the appendix. This 
Table reports the results of the F-statistic that are statistically significant, meaning that 
time series expressed in line Granger cause the time series expressed in column. As 
can be observed, all variables present a causality relation across some of the countries 
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that compose the panel, thus violating the independence assumption required by the 
IPS panel unit root test. 
In this sense, Chang’s non-linear IV unit root tests are performed, in each cross-
section. The number of lags pi  included in individual regressions is once again 
chosen according to the BIC Criterion with a maximum length of 8 periods. An 
analysis of the residual serial correlation LM test is also performed with a lag span of 
three. 
Finally the SURADF unit root test is performed. This procedure makes use of the 
panel data setting and uses seemingly unrelated regressions, but performs separate 
unit root tests in each panel unit, as previously described. This procedure has the 
advantage of identifying which cross-sections are stationary and which cross-sections 
have unit roots. This analysis is interesting in the sense that in a panel the rejection of 
a unit root does not mean that all units are stationary. 
 
6.4.  Results for the panel data unit root tests that allow cross-section 
dependence 
 
As can be observed in tables B1 to B10, the unit root null of Chang’s test cannot be 
rejected for the CPI regressor, when considering the panel as a whole. Apart from this 
regressor, all the other regressors and the dependent variables reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in the panel, either considering all the set of countries or sub-
sets. 
After performing the SURADF unit root test it can be observed that the panel data 
are composed of a mix between stationary and nonstationary time series. The CPI 
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panel unit root test is the only one that presents systematic evidence of a unit root in 
all cross section units. 
The present results indicate the presence of a unit root puzzle in the cross sections 
that compose a panel. As indicated, the rejection of the null of a panel unit root does 
not imply that all time series are stationary. More, the rule appears to be a mix 
between stationary and non-stationary time series when the presence of cross sectional 
dependence is taken into account. Further, cointegration tests are derived under the 
assumption of cross sectional independence across individual units, which seems not 
to be appropriate here. 
The panel unit root tests presented and the mixed characteristics of the panels 
considered in the empirical application provide the main argument for the subsequent 
analysis and to use the estimation procedure described in Section 3.2, with empirical 
results shown in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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7. Empirical results for Proposition 1 
 
7.1. Model selection and sensitivity analysis 
 
The estimation procedure begins with the selection of the appropriate specification 
form to empirically test Proposition 1 of the theoretical model. 
To begin with, five alternative specifications are considered and, according to each 
specification, different countries were included for the MG and PMG estimations, 
depending on the results obtained for the four diagnostic tests, performed on cross-
section regressions. As already referred in Section 3.2.2 the tests are the Breusch-
Godfrey test for residual serial correlation, the Ramsey RESET test for functional form 
misspecification, the Jarque-Bera test for errors normality, and the White test for 
homoscedasticity.  
For the performance of the four diagnostic tests the following statistical distributions 
are considered. In the performance of the former two statistics a qui-square distribution 
is used with a one-degree of freedom, and for the third statistic a qui-square distribution 
with two degrees of freedom performance is considered. White test statistic has a  2  
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of slope coefficients 
(excluding the constant) considered in the tested regression. 
Table D in the appendix shows the countries included in the analysis under each 
initial model specification. 
Since each specification includes different countries, the results are not immediately 
comparable. To more accurately select the specification for the empirical model, PMG 
estimates on each specification are run. The option was to use the model specification 
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whose estimation retrieves the highest log-likelihood, with acceptable Hausman-test 
results. 
The selected specification is:62 
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Conditional on the long-run homogeneity hypothesis, the above model can be re-
written as:  
 
, 1 0 1 2 3
51,
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 7 8
exp 0 1
exp +
65
i t it it it
it i i it it
i t i t it it it
elec elec uer
ideol
cpi ideol lps vpr pop
   
  
    
−
− −
− − − − − 
 = −  +  − − − − 
 
 
where  i i= −1b g ,   

z
z z
i
=
+
−
0 1
1
, with z =1 2 8, ,...,  and 


0
1
=
−
i
i
. 
The empirical application initially includes fifteen countries in the analysis. 
However, after performing the four robustness tests on cross-section regressions, that 
number is reduced to ten, since the other five do not accomplish the necessary 
conditions to be included in the PMG estimation. Those results are reported in Table I. 
In particular, at a conventional statistical level, there is evidence of serial correlation 
in the residuals of one country, functional form misspecification in another country and 
evidence of non-normality of residuals in four countries. 
Excluding from the analysis those countries that do not accomplish the necessary 
conditions to be included in the regression estimation, the empirical application 
                                                          
62 The other model specifications tested are reported in Table D of the appendix.  
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comprehends the following ten countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland. 
 
  
In addition, as required for a long-run relationship to exist, the estimated 
convergence coefficient  ib g is negative in the ten countries and statistically significant 
in 8 of them. 
 
7.2. The estimation approach 
 
As discussed above, results are also likely to vary significantly with respect to the 
estimation method, i.e., from the least restrictive, but potentially not efficient (MG), to 
PMG and to Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) that only allow intercepts to vary across 
countries. 
Table II reports results using these three approaches. 
 
Breusch-Godfrey's Test Jarque-Bera Test Ramsey's RESET Test White Test
BEL 0,052116 1,275839 3,385411 21,2806 0,909606
DNK 0,184541 4,941352 0,093022 17,07866 0,590126
GER 0,000112 0,214095 1,476925 17,13051 0,889244
GRE 2,304666 0,845987 0,36098 24,0798 0,782926
SPA 0,002729 0,064018 0,05646 19,75415 0,906398
FRA 0,393959 0,073142 1,045848 17,94314 0,373421
IRE 0,481154 94,27131 0,161818 20,9128 0,693
ITA 1,329297 0,694517 0,001692 16,83381 0,410702
LUX 0,605456 0,885231 0,251367 18,13184 0,687865
NLD 2,62076 6,392635 1,306113 21,88212 0,856796
AUS 0,08278 0,775733 14,75666 26,87497 0,859621
POR 0,42349 0,055713 3,834293 18,88052 0,354273
FIN 1,076634 0,090927 2,251494 11,48089 0,965561
SWE 4,444167 46,34976 0,000123 27,49989 0,783061
UK 2,835337 17,47262 1,554527 19,71031 0,635846
Critical Value
TABLE I - Tests of model specification: Mean Group Estimators

( ) ,18
2
28 869=
( ) ,1
2
3 841=  ( ) ,1
2
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2
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
The validity of DFE depends critically on the assumption of a common economic 
development stage, on homogenous political behaviour and participation of the 
electorate as well as a common adjustment speed of convergence to a long-run 
equilibrium on budget composition across countries. 
However, if it is reasonable to expect that economic effects can have a similar impact 
on the composition of public expenditures, the same is more difficult to accept when the 
political impacts are considered, given the different realities across countries. 
DFE MG Hausman-Test PMG Hausman-Test PMG_Corrected
elec0 0,012251 0,005881 1,251044 0,013488 1,956527 0,009660
4,9338 * 0,9544 4,4655 * 3,5002 *
elec1 0,014010 0,007260 2,200988 0,000728 1,955502 0,000778
4,9554 * 1,3756 *** 0,2837 0,2731
uer 0,002381 0,001568 0,028759 0,004579 0,393018 0,005607
3,9721 * 0,3248 9,1585 * 11,6082 *
cpi(-1) -0,019744 0,015483 0,357493 -0,024136 0,452114 -0,028822
(-3,5394 *) 0,2617 (-4,4149 *) (-6,6638 *)
ideol(l) -0,003785 -0,001462 0,180541 -0,000635 0,022783 -0,000063
(-2,9374 *) -0,261 -0,5216 -0,0584
lps -0,135458 -0,217804 0,797345 -0,019461 4,610467 -0,024932
(-7,9936 *) (-2,3269 **) -1,2329 -1,1604
vpr 0,202980 -0,260536 1,359327 0,009390 0,461486 0,090868
3,8873 * -0,6503 0,1758 1,9136 **
pop65 2,670162 0,920212 3,801388 2,084878 1,676180 2,003935
11,0019 * 0,9932 9,0194 * 9,5333 *
Hausman Test 9,976885 11,528077
exp(-1) 0,678239 0,459121 0,670796 0,662753
-0,321761 -0,540879 -0,329204 -0,337247
d(ideol) -0,002538 -0,000280 0,000115 0,000912 0,001008
-1,2723 -0,0752 0,2904 0,3130
Hausman Test 0,000115
Nº of countries 10 10 10 10
Nº of obs. 310 310 310 310
Log likelihood 932,0809 838,13521 791,1516 803,0828
0,76 0,69 0,53 0,52
Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, GRE, SPA, FRA, ITA, LUX, POR and FIN. t-student statistics are in italic.
***:significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; * at 1% level
TABLE II - Selection of the estimation method and estimation results
Long-Run Coefficients
Adjustment speed
Short-Run Coefficients
R
2
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In fact, if the DFE estimation is compared with an estimation where political 
variables are introduced, one at a time, namely IDEOL, LPS and VPR with cross 
section specific effects, the DFE estimation evidences an increase of the adjusted R-
squared to 0.777, 0.775 and 0.777, respectively. The Log Likelihood becomes 951 when 
a cross section of the former variable is contemplated in the DFE estimation and is 
equal to 949 when cross section is considered in the other variables. 
The improvements achieved with the DFE estimation constitute evidence that it 
cannot be assumed that all the estimated slopes are homogeneous, being plausible to 
think that at least political variables are in fact heterogeneous across countries. 
Besides, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest, if there is slope heterogeneity that is 
not adequately modelled the DFE estimates of the adjustment speed are affected by a 
heterogeneity bias. To this problem the usual small-sample downward lagged dependent 
variable bias can be added. 63 (see Nickell, 1981). 
Moving from MG to PMG (i.e., imposing long-run homogeneity) reduces the 
standard errors and reduces significantly the measured speed of convergence, with some 
impacts on the size, sign and the statistical significance of the estimated long-run 
coefficients. The homogeneity assumption is not rejected by the Hausman test. 64 
Comparing PMG to DFE, the latter yields a lower speed of convergence due to a 
downward bias in dynamic heterogeneous panel data. Moreover, restricting the short-
term dynamics 65 to be homogeneous affects the significance of the long-run 
                                                          
63 Instrumental variables (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Arrelano and Bover, 1995) are applied in the 
case of existence of lagged dependent variable bias, but are generally used in dynamic panel data when N 
is large and T relatively small. However, this does not solve the heterogeneity problem. 
 
64 The critical values for the Hausman test are 5.991 and 16.919 respectively for each long-run coefficient 
and for the joint long-run coefficients, at a 5% significance level. 
 
65 The Hausman test critical value for the short-run coefficient is 3.841, at a 5% significance level. 
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coefficients. The DFE estimation of the parameters related to political variables 
becomes extremely relevant to explain budget composition, with an importance similar 
to the economic factors, importance which disappears under PMG estimates. The PMG 
outcome is more in line with the results expected given MG estimates. 
 
7.3. Statistical results 
 
Returning to Table II it can be easily observed that the evaluation that the electoral 
cycle has on public expenditures is very sensitive to the estimation method used in the 
analysis. 
In fact, at one extreme, MG estimates indicate that the electoral cycle is not 
statistically significant and, on the other extreme, DFE estimates show that the budget 
bias towards current expenditures is significant and almost of the same magnitude in the 
two periods (pre-election and post-election periods). Given the small sample, MG 
estimates are very sensitive to outliers, which gives a reasoning for the use of PMG 
estimates, when the long-run coefficients homogeneity assumption is not violated, as 
already described.  
The DFE estimates indicate rigidity of the composition of public expenditures and 
consequently no government’s manipulation with electoral purposes, as described in 
some studies referred in Chapter 1. 
However, comparing the speed of convergence estimates under MG and DFE, cross 
country homogeneity cannot be assumed, given the difference of values found when 
total heterogeneity is accepted and total homogeneity is imposed, i.e., between –0.54 
and –0.32, respectively. In fact, under MG estimates, the adjustment speed varies 
between –0.21 in the regression for France to –0.81 in the regression for Denmark. 
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There seems to be a wide gap for a homogenous adjustment speed to be established. 
This implies that although Hausman tests do not reject the homogeneity assumption of 
the long-run coefficients, DFE cannot be the most appropriate estimation technique 
used in the present estimation case. 
The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of the long-run coefficients 
homogeneity as required for the PMG estimation, meaning that the difference in the 
estimated coefficients between MG and PMG are not significantly different and PMG is 
more efficient.  
 
7.4. Economic results 
 
As predicted by the theoretical model, governments do manipulate budget 
composition towards current expenditures in the pre-election years, as the PMG 
estimate for ELEC0 demonstrates. Simultaneously, the long-run coefficient for the post-
election period, referred to as ELEC1, is not statistically significant, meaning that there 
is no evidence that governments change the composition of public expenditures in those 
periods. 
Putting it differently, a political budget cycle is found in the pre-election years and 
no cycle is determined in the post-election periods. This statement confirms the prior 
expectations described in Proposition 1 of the theoretical model. 
Simultaneously, it can be affirmed that, contrarily to the DFE estimation, only the 
economic variables estimated by PMG procedure are statistical significant in 
determining the composition of public expenditures. More precisely, the UER and 
POP65 regressors influence positively a budget bias towards current expenditures, 
which are a natural outcome, and the CPI regressor with a year delay refrains 
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government’s incentive to increase that type of public expenditures to avoid an 
inflationary effect on the economy. 
In what concerns political variables, it seems that they are not relevant in explaining 
the composition of public expenditures. However, some caution must be put in those 
conclusions given the small sample analysis. As it is shown in the next Section, the 
political variables are very sensitive to the subset of countries included in the analysis, 
meaning that it cannot be definitely ensured if those variables determine or not changes 
in the composition of public expenditures across periods. The long-run coefficient 
associated to the VPR variable is also sensitive to the countries covered by the 
estimation, as it is demonstrated in Section 7.5. 
The PMG estimate of the short-run coefficient to IDEOL, although not being 
statistically significant, its sign changes comparatively to the DFE estimate. This change 
can be explained by the fact that on average (equal to 5.077) those ten countries have 
leftist governments,66 implying that ideology variations presented by the successive 
governments are slight and turn around parties politically positioned on the left.67 
After controlling for contemporaneous correlation, the adjustment speed estimated 
through the PMG procedure, which allows differentiation across countries68, translates 
an intermediate value between DFE and MG estimates, as expected. 
 
 
                                                          
66 The only exceptions are the Italian and the Finland governments.  
 
67 Allowing different short-run coefficients, changes to the right in Italian governments are found to 
reduce budget bias to current expenditures. Although politically positioned on the left, Greek 
governments change to the right also decreases the difference on the weight attributed to current 
expenditures and to capital expenditures.  
 
68 The adjustment speed varies between -0.169 in Belgium and -0.476 in Portugal. 
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7.5. Stability analysis 
 
In small samples, as in the present case, one individual country can significantly 
affect the estimated parameters, even when the Hausman tests do not reject the 
hypothesis of common long-run coefficients. A sensitivity analysis is thus performed in 
order to assess the robustness of results to variation of country coverage, by eliminating 
one country at a time and re-running the PMG estimation procedure. 
Taking into account the width of confidence intervals ( coef stdD+
−
196. ), the ELEC0 
and ELEC1 estimates seem to be sufficiently stable, thus implying that it can be stated 
that a political budget cycle of the above described kind can be defended, despite of the 
countries included in the analysis. 
The stability of the ELEC0 and ELEC1 long-run coefficients is presented in the 
subsequent Graphs I and II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of the election cycle, the major goal of the empirical analysis, can be 
considered stable in the sense that in pre-election periods governments manipulate 
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current expenditures in order to get re-appointed, irrespective of the set of countries 
included in the analysis. The same cannot be argued for other variables. In fact, the 
sensitivity analysis carried out for the other regressors of the model show that some of 
them are not stable. The change in some of the long-run coefficients is very significant 
when a different set of countries are considered in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III describes the maximum and the minimum values each long-run coefficient 
can take when the country coverage is reduced to nine countries. Table E of the 
appendix presents more detailed information regarding each PMG re-estimation. 
As can be observed it cannot be argued that the long-run estimates of IDEOL and 
VPR are stable since their sign and significance level can vary substantially, allowing 
either a significant negative value or a significant positive value, depending on the 
countries that have been covered by the analysis. 
These results have two implications for the analysis and for the link with the 
theoretical model.  
Graph II  
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The first is that the impact of IDEOL on the composition of public expenditure 
cannot truly be evaluated in the small sample that is considered in the present 
application. In this sense either of the following three scenarios for the impact of 
IDEOL on the composition of public expenditures is viable: no impact, as found in the 
estimation, increases in the gap between current expenditure and capital expenditure or 
decreases in that difference. However, since the theoretical model is related to the 
opportunistic political business cycle branch of literature, evaluating how political 
business cycles are influenced by the government’s ideology is not of primer concern. 
In this sense and given that, the present estimation does not allow to conclude about the 
PMG-Corrected
Variable Maximum Excluded country Minimum Excluded country Estimative
elec0 0,015309 FRA 0,007248 LUX 0,009660
6,6572 2,5003 3,5003
elec1 0,005244 GER -0,001736 GRE 0,000778
1,6853 -0,5822 0,2732
uer 0,007246 FRA 0,004731 GER 0,005607
14,6544 10,2647 11,6083
cpi(-1) -0,017987 FRA -0,032456 GER -0,028822
-3,4258 -7,2119 -6,6639
ideol(l) 0,003932 SPA -0,003819 BEL -0,000063
2,0646 -2,6248 -0,0585
lps 0,0020281 GRE -0,073165 FIN -0,024932224
0,1020 -1,8605 -1,1604
vpr 0,2070887 GER -0,109086 FRA 0,090867854
3,5657 -3,1080 1,9137
pop65 2,7017424 SPA 1,6184464 FRA 2,003934724
13,1698 4,7315 9,5334
t-student statistics are in italic. Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not
reported here,
Table III - Stability Analysis
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partisan budget cycle ideology still can play a role in electoral budget manipulation, as 
predicted by the correspondent literature branch. 
The relationship between the number of effective voters in an election (VPR 
variable) and the composition of public expenditure is also ambiguous. Contrarily to 
what it is expected, the number of voters can have no disciplinary force on the 
government’s bias towards current expenditures, seeming that in many cases there is a 
contrary phenomena. However, some caution must be taken in the analysis of this 
variable, since if France is excluded from the PMG estimation, the sign of the regressor 
becomes significantly negative, which indicates a presence of an outlier in the calculus 
of this variable, determining its final coefficient. This leads to think that VPR can have 
a significant impact in restraining the opportunistic government’s behaviour, as initially 
expected. 
This outcome can be more accurately evaluated later when the empirical relevance of 
Proposition 2 is tested, given in this sense the present results regarding VPR variable a 
mobile for the study of the importance that voters participation in elections have in the 
governmental manipulation of public expenditures. 
The sign of the LPS variable also evidences some sensibility to the countries 
included in the analysis. Although in the majority of the cases, not statistically 
significant, the effect of the largest party representation in parliament can be positive or 
negative. This result can be influenced by the structure of governments’ power 
considered in the estimation procedure, since estimation included countries governed by 
a single party and by a coalition. As a consequence, an analysis where only countries 
with coalition governments are considered appears to have interest at this point. The 
main results are exposed in the next Section.  
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7.6.  Economic results when only countries with coalition governments are 
considered in the estimation 
 
In this point the countries considered in the estimation procedure are the ones where 
coalition governments is dominant. The goal is to evaluate if the previous economic 
results sustain when the analysis is focused on such a subset of countries. The analyse 
contemplates only seven countries, being excluded from the empirical application, in 
comparison with the number of countries initially included the following countries: 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. 69 
Comparing the results under this subset of countries with the initial results, it is 
interesting to notice that after correcting for contemporaneous correlation, the PMG 
estimates of the electoral cycle are reinforced. In fact, there is evidence that countries 
with higher fractionated power resulting into coalition governments have an enlarged 
pre-election manipulation of public finances prone to current expenditures. This 
outcome is anticipated since ministers that compose coalition governments, expecting to 
lose their positions in the next election period, prefer to maximise their utility spending 
on current expenditures as much as possible in the pre-election periods. This incentive 
is only refrained by the impact that budget bias may have on ministers’ self-interests in 
outside income. 
 Besides, it seems that those coalition government countries also increase the current 
expenditures in the post-election periods, although slightly. This might be interpreted as 
a reaction of parties in a minority position in government. Under these circumstances, 
parties want to satisfy some fringes of their electorate increasing specific types of public 
transfers in the post-election period.  
                                                          
69 Results not reported here, but that can be seen in Table F of the appendix. 
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However, it is interesting to notice that CPI variable has a positive effect on budget 
bias towards current expenditures. This coefficient sign means that the governments of 
these countries have less power to use budget composition as an instrument to stabilise 
inflation, contrarily to what is found when all the ten countries are considered. This 
result is in accordance with the usual belief that coalition governments are less able to 
deal with negative shocks in the economy since such governments usually face a 
prisoner’s dilemma of whose ministry should reduce current expenditures. 
This phenomenon leads to the conclusion that coalition governments having in their 
interior decision process more forces to be gathered conduce to a more pronounced 
manipulation on the composition of public expenditures. This result is in agreement 
with the theoretical model statement in the sense that lower parliamentary 
representation means reduced electorate representation and consequently lower 
probability of continuing to integrate government after elections.70 
Accordingly, it can be said that single party governments, given their higher re-
election chances are less prone to manipulate public expenditures. Single party 
governments know that if re-elected (very likely event), then they will also retrieve 
utility from decisions made in the pre-election periods regarding capital expenditures, 
although visible only in the next legislature. This expectation reduces the government 
incentive to excessively increase current expenditures in the pre-election periods. 
                                                          
70 In line with this argument, Hallenberg and Hagen (1997) show that in European Union states with 
multi-party governments are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish who 
defects on budget agreements. The authors state that a strong finance minister is only feasible in countries 
where one-party governments are the norm. Although the ministers of a coalition government can 
cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game, in a budget game that solution is unlikely since it involves the 
need for monitoring and punishing all ministers who have different budget goals and defeat from 
compromises. 
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Simultaneously, the LPS variable continues to be not statistically significant after re-
running the PMG procedure excluding the countries where a single party government 
dominates. 
 
7.7. Economic results when dictatorial regimes are excluded from the estimation 
 
It can be argued that including in the estimation countries that have dictatorial 
regimes during part of the seventies can bias the result. In order to evaluate if the mix of 
governmental regimes influences the results, PMG estimates are re-run considering 
series beginning at 1978 data, when all the ten countries have already implemented 
democratic regimes. 
Table IV shows the new PMG estimates, after controlling the contemporaneous 
correlation, for the period 1978-2001. 
Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
As can be observed, when the dictatorial regimes are excluded from the analysis, the 
political business cycle in the pre-election years become more statistically significant, 
thus evidencing, as predicted by the theoretical model, that dictators do not have the 
same incentive to induce budget manipulation.  
Variable PMG estimates t-Statistic
elec0 0,013604 4,0796
elec1 -0,004298 -1,0611
uer 0,005286 7,7416
cpi(-1) -0,048476 -5,3893
ideol(l) 0,000073 0,0588
lps -0,051911 -2,1696
vpr 0,050620 0,8897
pop65 2,005614 5,2684
Table IV - Sensitivity Analysis excluding dictatorial regimes
(1978-2001)
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The variable LPS becomes now statistically significant indicating, as already 
explained, that governments with a larger parliamentary representation are less induced 
to manipulate budget prone current expenditures. Given governments’ higher re-
appointment chances, governments restring their incentive to engage excessively into an 
increase on this type of expenditures, irrespective of the electoral period considered. 
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8. Empirical results for Proposition 2 
 
8.1. Model selection and sensitivity analysis 
 
The Proposition 2 presented in the theoretical model proposes a budget partition 
according two types of public expenditures. One type is more aligned with voters’ 
preferences and the other type, despite of being able to potentially benefit all society, is 
more directed to those individuals in society with lower income resources who typically 
participate less in elections, as previously stated.  
To test the adequacy of the Proposition 2 it is necessary to evaluate empirically the 
significance and sign of the VSP variable, which captures the significance that the 
number of effective voters in society have in the budgetary process. The expectation is 
that a society with a higher number of effective voters presents a lower budget weight of 
the considered non-productive expenditures. When governments satisfy voters’ 
preferences they also achieve higher re-election probability and get a higher reputation 
level given the representation of voters in society. Under a less participant society, the 
number of non-voters is more prominent which leads the government to a dilemma 
between how to please exclusively its electorate basis and get some reputation in society 
by increasing the expenditures, which favours more those who do not vote. Under these 
circumstances, the governments restring their natural interest to spend more on 
expenditures that please voters. 
The dependent variable of the empirical model is now EXPF. As described in 
Section 5.1, five alternative data values for the missing values presented in EXPF series 
are simulated. In order to choose a better model specification, several specifications for 
each one of the five panel series are tested and it is found that for each simulated panel 
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the model specification that better fits the data is not always the same. In this sense the 
option was to use the panel series simulation, defined as EXPF1, whose model 
estimation allows the inclusion of a higher number of countries. The comparison with 
alternative missing value imputations and respective model specifications is left to a 
stability analysis. 
After analysing the robustness test results achieved under each model specification 
associated with each one of the completed panel series, the following model 
specification is selected as being the one that allows the inclusion of a higher number of 
countries: 
 
, 1 10, 11, , 1 20, 21, , 1
30, 31, , 1 40, 50, 51, , 1
expf expf +
           +
it i i i t i it i i t i it i i t
i it i i t i it i it i i t it
uer uer cpi cpi
ideol ideol lps vsp vsp
     
     
− − −
− −
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
 
Re-writing the above model under a long-run homogeneity hypothesis leads to: 
 
( ), 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 5 , 1
11, 21, 31, 51,
expf expf +
              +
it i i t i t i t i t it i t
i it i it i it i it it
uer cpi ideol lps vsp
uer cpi ideol vsp
      
    
− − − − − = − − − − − − −
 +  +  +  +
 
where  i i= −1b g ,   

z
z z
i
=
+
−
0 1
1
, with z =1 2 5, ,...,  and 


0
1
=
−
i
i
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Table V reports the robustness tests performed on the model specified above using 
cross-section regressions. This test determines which countries can be included in PMG 
estimation. 
Despite of only Ireland being rejected by the individual regression robustness tests, 
the estimation procedure is reduced to ten countries, since four of them do not present 
reliable PMG estimation results. More specifically, three countries have a negative 
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adjusted R-squared: France, Portugal and Italy and the other country (UK) have a 
positive adjustment speed, meaning that the long-run equilibrium is not attainable. 
 
 
 
8.2. The estimation approach  
 
Following an analogous procedure already adopted to test Proposition 1, the DFE, 
MG and PMG estimations are run for the above described model.  
Table VI summarises the estimation results. 
Contrarily to the case described in Table II, the Hausman test between DFE 
estimation and MG estimation do not accept the null hypothesis of a homogeneous 
short-run coefficient, implying that DFE estimation, imposing that homogeneity does 
not translate reliable results. As previously indicated this result points to the PMG 
estimation when long-run coefficients homogeneity hypothesis is accepted, as in the 
case, since this econometric technique translates an increase on estimation efficiency 
compared to MG estimation, given the small number of countries included in the 
analysis. 
Breusch-Godfrey's Test Jarque-Bera Test Ramsey's RESET Test White Test
BEL 3,041442 5,550108 1,89141 29,63872 0,317148
DNK 0,175453 2,497026 0,133948 11,57839 0,262856
GER 0,42804 0,93104 0,89533 24,67622 0,418345
GRE 0,032328 1,951524 0,764458 23,73609 0,369466
SPA 1,660399 0,850531 1,687671 26,26768 0,577153
FRA 0,08171 0,456799 1,739927 21,74401 0,690967
IRE 10,02482 0,102831 24,02308 23,09984 0,509586
ITA 0,011722 0,569741 2,195175 17,24017 0,390238
LUX 3,160999 0,829122 1,224971 23,27716 0,399535
NLD 1,439112 2,444747 0,231123 29,97626 0,062748
AUS 1,041863 2,182298 3,371989 21,04639 0,446009
POR 1,251217 0,55101 0,092571 19,15 0,281893
FIN 0,081368 0,742033 0,850076 26,05855 0,639822
SWE 2,472565 0,512527 0,187302 14,64336 0,236755
UK 0,357406 0,824723 0,173199 27,28258 0,542577
Critical Value
TABLE V - Tests of model specification: Mean Group Estimators

( ) .20
2
3141=
( ) .1
2
3841=  ( ) .1
2
3841= ( ) .2
2
5991=
R
2
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
The short-run coefficient heterogeneity is essentially observed in VSP coefficient, 
meaning that an increase on the number of effective voters in society has a 
differentiated short-run impact across countries on the budget bias towards pro-voters 
expenditures. 
Comparing the long-run coefficients estimated by DFE and MG procedures, it can be 
observed that imposing homogeneity on the short-run coefficients artificially increases 
the statistical significance of the long-run coefficients. In fact, under DFE estimation all 
DFE MG Hausman-Test PMG Hausman-Test PMG_Corrected
uer(l) 0,012995 0,006078 0,319727 0,000354 0,218934 -0,003718
9,6847* 0,4943 0,2754 (-1,8948**)
cpi(l) -0,067700 -0,113215 0,065632 -0,038682 0,175974 -0,006922
(-10,558*) -0,6369 (-6,6513*) -0,1885
ideol(l) -0,008573 0,003979 0,798574 -0,002400 0,206269 0,003682
(-3,0749*) 0,2786 -0,8886 0,8241
lps 0,232672 -0,355504 3,674768 0,089714 2,118904 0,238263
7,2484* -1,1532 2,2397* 8,08*
vsp(l) 1,665085 0,841667 2,591402 1,408255 1,187333 1,413155
11,4544* 1,5907*** 13,8398* 7,5199*
Hausman Test 7,450104 3,907414
expf(-1) 0,764609 0,393078 0,662161 0,673073
-0,235391 -0,606922 -0,337839 -0,326928
d(uer) -0,000892 -0,000352 0,000007 -0,000518 -0,000349
-0,3052 -0,1204 -0,1687 -0,1087
d(cpi) 0,112553 0,275810 3,000911 -0,003997 0,007556
1,7284* 1,3552*** -0,0995 0,1808
d(ideol) -0,000494 0,004331 0,002243 0,001388 0,002425
-0,1785 0,3409 0,1834 0,303
d(vsp) 0,162963 1,178819 128,043858 0,297155 0,331981
0,8093 0,9446 0,398 0,463
Hausman Test 131,047020
Nº of countries 10 10 10 10
Nº of obs. 310 310 310 310
Log likelihood 748,9272 614,753085 600,9033 613,412
0,94 0,37 0,47 0,52
Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, GRE, SPA, LUX, NLD, AUS, FIN and SWE.
t-student statistics are in italic. ***:significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; * at 1% level
Long-Run Coefficients
TABLE VI - Selection of the estimation method and estimation results
Adjustment speed
Short-Run Coefficients
R
2
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the regressors have a significant t-student test, when MG estimates only indicate that 
VSP variable has some explanatory power on the composition of public expenditures. 
Looking at the speed of convergence estimates under MG and DFE, it cannot be 
assumed that their estimates are homogenous across countries, given the difference of 
values achieved by the two estimation procedures: –0.61 and –0.24. In fact, under MG 
estimates, the adjustment speed varies between –0.14 in Germany regression to –0.94 in 
Denmark regression. Once again and with this gap, a homogenous adjustment speed 
cannot be established. This implies that although Hausman test does not reject the 
homogeneity assumption of the long-run coefficients, DFE cannot be the most 
appropriate estimation technique to be used in the case. 
The Hausman test on PMG estimates does not reject the long-run coefficient 
homogeneity assumption.71 Without contemporaneous correlation correction, PMG 
estimates indicate that CPI, LPS and VSP variables are important to determine the 
partition of public expenditures by functions between the two sub-sets considered. To 
the former variable PMG estimates retrieve an odd result, in the sense that a negative 
and significant impact of this variable on the dependent variable was not expected. 
 
8.3. Economic results  
 
After controlling for the presence of contemporaneous correlation, the PMG 
estimates only indicate that UER, LPS and VSP variables are determinant in explaining 
the bias on public expenditures towards pro-voters type of expenditures. 
The weight in society of effective voters is effectively a major force to explain this 
kind of public expenditure bias. In this sense, it can be stated that a society with more 
                                                          
71 The joint long-run coefficients critical value to Hausman test is 12.592, at 5% significance level. 
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participant citizens in elections constrains governments to engage into a purely 
redistributive policy by increasing non-productive expenditures. 
In the light of the theoretical model the reason for this governments’ behaviour is the 
government seeking for re-election which is achieved if governments please their 
electorate basis. 
As expected, the unemployment rate induces a bias towards non-voters type of public 
expenditures. This result is in accordance with the previous results for Proposition 1 
which indicates that the unemployment rate increases those types of expenditures 
included in the welfare transfers, considered here as being prone to non-voters, and 
account on current expenditures in Proposition 1. However, as shown in the following 
Section, this result is very sensitive to the set of countries included in the analysis. 
Although being always negative, it is not clear that this variable is statistically 
significant. 
The budget bias towards pro-voters expenditures appears to be positively and 
significantly related to the party with the major share of legislature seats (LPS variable). 
The interpretation of this result can be that a bigger representation in a parliament of a 
certain party implies a more pronounced motivation to satisfy voters’ preferences 
regarding public expenditures. This is so because governments’ re-election chances are 
higher when a ruling party has a significant number of the parliamentary seats, thus 
reducing the governments’ incentive to bias the budget mix prone to welfare 
expenditures. 
The PMG estimate of the adjustment speed indicates, on average, an intermediate 
value between DFE and MG estimates, as expected, varying between -0.06 to Spain and      
-0.59 to Luxembourg, taken cross-sectional results. 
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The PMG estimates of the short-run coefficients, aggregately taken, are not 
statistically significant.72 73 
 
8.4. Stability analysis 
 
The above analysis can be significantly affected in small samples by an outlier 
country, thus a stability analysis assumes a major importance, principally on the VSP 
parameter stability. 
To perform this analysis one country is eliminated at a time and the PMG estimation 
procedure is re-run. 
Taking into account the width of confidence intervals ( coef stdD+
−
196. ), the VSP 
estimates can be considered stable, implying that despite of the countries included in the 
analysis, there is evidence supporting the Proposition 2. In this sense, the weight of 
voters in society that participate in elections do induce governments to spend more to 
pro-voters kind of public expenditures and reduces the percentage of those classified as 
being unproductive expenditures. 
Graph III presents the long-run coefficient sensitivity to reduction of country 
coverage of the VSP variable.  
 
 
                                                          
72 Cross sectional results reveal that unemployment rate changes are important to Finland and that 
changes on governments’ ideology position affect negatively the budget composition towards pro-voters 
expenditures in Finland and Sweden. Changes on the voters’ participation in society are not statistically 
significant in most of the countries to explain changes on the composition of public expenditures. 
However, is highly significant to Finland and Sweden. 
 
73 The Hausman test critical value to the joint short-run coefficients is 9.488, at 5% significance level. 
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Table VII presents the maximum and the minimum values of the long-run 
coefficients when the country coverage is reduced to nine countries. A more detailed 
information regarding each PMG re-estimation is presented in Table G in the appendix. 
The table below shows that only VSP and LPS seems to be stable, with a positive 
sign and statistically significant, despite of the nine countries included in the analysis. 
Simultaneously, the CPI variable presents a stable behaviour although not statistically 
significant. 
In what concerns the UER variable, it cannot be stated that the coefficient of this 
variable is statistically significant, given its sensitivity to the countries included in the 
PMG estimation. However, the variable sign does not change, being in accordance with 
the prior expectations. 
 
Graph III
Sensitivity of the long-run coefficients to reduction 
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The IDEOL variable is not stable both in statistical significance and sign. In fact, it 
cannot be assumed that the ideology does not influence the weight a government assigns 
to public expenditures by function. In fact, taking either Belgium or Spain out of the 
PMG estimation induces a statistically significant budget bias prone to pro-voters 
expenditures. 
The present stability analysis is based on a particular model specification, which was 
found to be the best specification, given certain values attributed to the missing values. 
However, using other simulated values for the missing values 74, identified as EXPF2 
in table A in the appendix, a different model specification fits better the data. 
At this point evaluating how sensible the PMG estimates are to the imputed missing 
values becomes relevant. Putting it differently, it is necessary to check if the sign and 
                                                          
74 Amelia generates five alternative values for each missing value. The present work only uses the values 
that retrieve model specifications, on a country by country basis, whose regressions are robust to the four 
diagnostic tests: residual serial correlation, functional form specification, residuals normality and 
homocedasticity.  
 
PMG-Corrected
Variable Maximum Excluded country Minimum Excluded country Estimative
uer(l) -0,000013 GRE -0,006413 LUX -0,003718
-0,0064 -3,2982 -1,8948
cpi(l) -0,064489 GRE -0,001254 BEL -0,006922
-1,032 -0,0328 -0,1885
ideol(l) 0,011793 BEL -0,003718 FIN 0,003682
2,6014 -0,8777 0,8241
lps 0,312314 BEL 0,098804 FIN 0,238263
9,6917 2,7798 8,0803
vsp(l) 1,639151 GER 1,118185 GRE 1,413155
4,7881 5,0523 7,5199
t-student statistics are in italic. Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not
reported here.
Table VII - Stability Analysis
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statistical significance of the regressors included in PMG estimation are reliable in the 
sense that changing missing values imputation may induce variations in the long-run as 
well as in the short-run coefficients. 
Using another set of simulated values, the following model specification is re-
estimated by PMG: 
 
, 1 10, 11, , 1 20, 21, , 1
30, 31, , 1 40, 41, , 1 50,
expf expf +
           +
it i i i t i it i i t i it i i t
i it i i t i it i i t i it it
uer uer cpi cpi
ideol ideol lps lps vsp
     
     
− − −
− −
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
 
Conditional on the long-run homogeneity hypothesis, the above model can be re-
written as:  
 
( ), 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5
11, 21, 31, 41,
expf expf +
              +
it i i t i t i t i t i t it
i it i it i it i it it
uer cpi ideol lps vsp
uer cpi ideol lps
      
    
− − − − − = − − − − − − −
 +  +  +  +
 
where  i i= −1b g ,   

z
z z
i
=
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−
0 1
1
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The above re-specification of the empirical model includes only eight countries. 
Although the fifteen countries have passed the individual regression robustness test, 
seven countries present non-reliable PMG estimation results when all countries are 
considered. Six of them have a negative adjusted R-square: Germany, France, Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy and Austria and the other (UK) have a positive adjustment speed, implying 
that it does not have a long-run equilibrium. 
Table H in the appendix presents the estimation results of the DFE, MG and PMG 
estimates under this alternative specification. 
With a comparison purpose PMG procedure is re-run with the former model 
specification considering the same eight countries included in the second specification. 
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Table VIII summarises the PMG estimates of the long-run coefficients under the two 
specifications, being on the left hand the former model specification, including only 
eight countries and, on the right hand the alternative model specification allowing a 
different missing value imputation. 
 
Apart from the long-run coefficients associated with VSP and CPI regressors, being 
the former statistically significant, all the other long-run coefficients included in the 
model estimation appear to be very sensitive to the missing values that have been input. 
Although the coefficients’ signs do not change between the two specifications with 
the same eight countries considered in the analysis, the significance of the coefficient as 
well as the coefficient itself evidences a wide variation. 
PMG-Corrected PMG-Corrected
Variable Estimative Variable Estimative
uer(l) -0,001305 uer(l) -0,000092
-0,6859 -0,0412
cpi(l) -0,005847 cpi(l) -0,016828
-0,1512 -0,3568
ideol(l) -0,001245 ideol(l) -0,010063
-0,3162 -1,9822
lps 0,251098 lps(l) 0,073199
8,4679 1,8258
vsp(l) 1,838484 vsp 1,959286
4,2936 16,1581
Included countries: BEL, DNK, GRE, SPA, LUX, NLD, FIN and SWE.
t-student statistics are in italic. Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not
reported here.
Table VIII
PMG estimates of long-run coefficients
allowing different model specifications and
different missing values imputation
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The IDEOL long-run coefficient that under the former model specification can be 
positive and statistically significant appears in the latter model specification that can 
also be negative and statistically significant. 
The long-run coefficient associated with the LPS variable that seems to have a great 
statistical importance in the former model specification loses significantly its statistical 
relevance under the second specification. The interpretation of this result can be that 
when different missing value inputs are used in the estimation procedure, the coefficient 
changes too much to be considered reliable. 
In this sense, it cannot be concluded what is the statistical significance of the IDEOL 
and LPS variables in the composition of public expenditures by function. 
In what concerns CPI variable it can be expected with some certainty that this 
variable does not determine the budget bias to pro-voters expenditures. 
The VSP regressor, the prior interest, seems to be positive and always statistically 
significant, although with a large difference on its significance. 
This result allows to state, with a reasonable trust, that the number of effective voters 
in society restrains governments’ welfare expenditures, considered more prone to non-
voters. Putting it differently, a more participatory society gives the governments an 
incentive to increase those types of expenditures that mostly please the electorate. 
The present result validates the prior expectations that were enunciated in the 
Proposition 2 of the theoretical model. 
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8.5. Comparison of the results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 
 
At this point it is reasonable to ask how is the convergence of the results presented to 
Proposition 1 and to Proposition 2. The electoral participation in society links the two 
propositions since it determines simultaneously government’s manipulation of public 
expenditures prone to voters’ preferences and, in accordance, restrains budget bias to 
current expenditures. 
With this purpose, the dependent variable EXPF is replaced by EXP in the latter 
model specification described above and the PMG procedure is re-run. 
Table IX presents the estimated long-run coefficients. Under this model specification 
and using EXP as a dependent variable, only a restrict set of six countries are not 
rejected by the four robustness tests taken on a country by country regression basis, as 
previously described and implemented. 75 
Using such a restricted number of countries in estimation, the results must be 
analysed very carefully, since the exclusion of any country can change significantly the 
estimated coefficients and their significance.  
Looking at Table IX it seems, as expected, that the number of voters that actually 
vote in society do restrain the government’s incentive to engage in a budget 
manipulation prone current expenditures which include welfare expenditures, 
considered separately when EXPF is used as the dependent variable. However, despite 
of the sign not changing it is only necessary to reduce the estimation coverage to five 
countries, excluding Portugal, to have a lower statistically significant coefficient related 
to VSP variable. The coefficient with these five countries becomes equal to -0.127 with 
a t-Statistic equal to –1.54, which is only significant at 10% level. 
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
Under the present results it is reasonable to conclude that the weight of effective 
voters in society actually reduces the prior governments’ incentive to excessively 
manipulate current expenditures namely the non-productive component that mostly 
benefit that fringe of population that usually evidences a lower turnout rate in elections. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
75 If the former model specification, defined to test Proposition 2 and, EXP as the dependent variable are 
used, after the robustness tests, only four countries can be included in the PMG estimation. 
MG PMG Hausman-Test PMG_Corrected
uer(l) 0,001949 0,002758 0,024105 0,005349
0,3721 4,8171* 4,8907*
cpi(l) 0,019940 0,026717 0,032734 0,023206
0,5288 5,7977* 3,7076*
ideol(l) -0,019351 -0,009269 0,818913 -0,012072
(-1,7217*) (-5,9361*) (-3,8283*)
lps(l) -0,060677 -0,146409 0,222435 -0,145804
-0,3311 (-5,9486*) (-4,7926*)
vsp 0,016910 0,000686 0,004583 -0,148209
0,069 0,0126 (-2,6013*)
Hausman Test 1,102770
Nº of countries 6 6 6
Nº of obs. 186 186 186
Log likelihood 504,23 456,1248 463,916
0,30 0,45 0,60
Included countries: DNK, GRE, SPA, NLD, POR and FIN
t-student statistics are in italic. ***significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; * at 1% level
Table IX - Long-run coefficients
using EXP as dependent variable to test Proposition 2
Long-Run Coefficients
R
2
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9. Concluding remarks 
 
This empirical application has applied the pooled mean group estimation method to a 
system of dynamic equations to analyse the effects of electoral, economic and political 
variables on the composition of public expenditures. This econometric technique allows 
for the speed of convergence as well as for the short-term dynamics and variances to be 
different across countries, unlike most panel data approaches that impose homogeneity 
restrictions on all of these parameters.  
The results have confirmed that econometrics do matter in explaining the studied 
phenomena: the composition of public expenditures. In this sense, the choice of the 
estimation approach was crucial. The imposition of cross-country homogeneity 
restrictions on short as well as on long run parameters and speeds of convergence as in 
the standard dynamic fixed effects estimator produce, in some cases, extremely 
differentiated coefficients from those obtained when the PMG technique is used. 
Using a panel of European Union countries, the budget composition regarding annual 
public expenditure was systematically analysed. With this purpose the two propositions 
established in the theoretical model were tested empirically. The first look was to the 
impact of election terms on public finances in what concerns the government’s 
manipulation prone to current expenditures. Secondly, an evaluation is made on how the 
differences across countries in the degree of society’s participation in elections through 
vote determine a bias of public expenditures towards pro-voters expenditures versus 
expenditures that benefit transversally all the society. 
The findings lead to the following conclusions. First, elections still play a role in 
shaping the cycles of public expenditure in the European Union: central governments 
increase the share of current expenditure whenever they come close to electoral 
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contests. This result clearly states that the electoral cycle in public expenditures has a 
significant effect in the European Union.  
Besides the electoral cycle, the dynamic analysis revealed how economic variables 
influence public expenditures.  The component of expenditures that is directly related to 
the unemployment rate and to the number of older people in population translates an 
increase on current expenditures through the relation those variables have with public 
transfers. The inflation rate with a delay of one period induces a contraction of current 
expenditures, meaning that budget composition also plays a stabilisation role. Other 
variables such as government ideology or the weight of the largest party in the 
parliamentary structure do not prove to influence systematically the composition of 
public expenditures. The turnout variable reveals an ambiguous sign, which leads to an 
empirical test of Proposition 2, i.e., the evaluation of the impact that voters’ 
participation in elections produces on the composition of public expenditures. 
This leads to the second conclusion. The budgetary bias, towards voters’ preferred 
expenditure items, is positively and directly related with the weight of effective voters 
in society.  
Analysing the other set of variables, namely the economic and the ideological 
variables it does not seem to have a significant effect on the partition of public 
expenditures by function. As opposed to the results obtained for Proposition 1, the level 
of parliamentary fragmentation appears to have contributed towards country differences 
in what concerns the orientation of government’s manipulation of expenditures prone to 
voters’ preferences. 
A series of tests of specification and parameter stability indicate that the overall 
estimation results are fairly robust. Taken together, the estimation results survive to a 
stability test using different country coverage and different specification. 
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Description of the variables used for the econometric applications 
 
 
EXP  Difference between central government’s current expenditure weight in 
every year budgetary values of public expenditures and its capital 
counterpart weight. 
 
EXPF  Difference between weights that each of the public expenditure category: 
productive and non-productive functions, have on central government’s total 
expenditure.  
 
 
ELECO  Dummy variable assumes value 1 in the pre-election year when elections 
take place until the fourth month of the year and in the election year when 
elections take place during or after the fifth month. Otherwise, the variable 
takes the value zero. 
 
ELEC1   Dummy variable takes value 1 in the election year when elections occur 
during the first two months of the year and in the after election year when 
elections occur in or after the third month of the year. Otherwise, the 
variable takes the value zero. 
 
UER  Unemployment rate. 
 
CPI Consumer price index. 
 
IDEOL  Government’s ideological position. 
 
LPS  Legislative share of the largest party. The correspondent values are found 
by dividing the number of seats of the most representative party in the 
assembly by the assembly’s total number of seats. 
 
VPR  Turnout. Ratio between the number of votes cast and the number of people 
entitled to vote. 
 
VSP  Weight of the effective votes cast into population. 
 
POP65 Weight of population older than 65. 
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(Continues to next page)
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 0,864415 0,98316 0,745194 0,05293 0,175857 0,24898 0,09531 0,041601 0,175857 0,24898 0,09531 0,041601
dnk 0,903782 0,942824 0,852543 0,027287 0,153312 0,24095 0,074568 0,043293 0,153312 0,24095 0,074568 0,043293
ger 0,879029 0,950138 0,797846 0,040204 0,02834 0,109891 -0,118799 0,043872 0,02834 0,109891 -0,118799 0,043872
gre 0,697784 0,844607 0,492382 0,082255 0,536252 0,672671 0,376741 0,082174 0,536252 0,672671 0,376741 0,082174
spa 0,799335 0,912708 0,657241 0,07216 * * * * 0,062313 0,256175 -0,305594 0,164728
fra 0,899735 0,954032 0,862413 0,02039 0,113281 0,237339 -0,06934 0,061799 0,113281 0,237339 -0,06934 0,061799
ire 0,817262 0,874485 0,666667 0,047804 0,447743 0,561901 0,301067 0,053021 0,447743 0,561901 0,301067 0,053021
ita 0,853452 0,942397 0,722579 0,05896 0,301552 0,394454 0,133343 0,066649 0,294297 0,412195 0,133343 0,077593
lux 0,765833 0,801542 0,709953 0,026371 -0,02794 0,070824 -0,175143 0,053385 -0,027032 0,070824 -0,168718 0,050126
nld 0,869867 0,930277 0,824647 0,033771 0,190039 0,283806 0,011357 0,090335 0,190039 0,283806 0,011357 0,090335
aus 0,812848 0,894124 0,608644 0,070038 0,057049 0,19836 -0,127107 0,069893 0,073963 0,19836 -0,030096 0,046905
por 0,762171 0,827125 0,707112 0,032968 0,472867 0,558299 0,36301 0,044471 0,472867 0,558299 0,36301 0,044471
fin 0,815295 0,937776 0,577798 0,089155 0,485679 0,658997 0,342449 0,058401 0,290707 0,46047 0,043804 0,129328
swe 0,912543 0,973481 0,795222 0,048054 0,036359 0,153584 -0,125636 0,074847 0,02827 0,153584 -0,139025 0,077341
uk 0,879104 0,924253 0,799072 0,033622 0,386374 0,559777 0,256316 0,095163 0,386374 0,559777 0,256316 0,095163
Panel 0,835497 0,98316 0,492382 0,079168 0,239769 0,672671 -0,175143 0,198406 0,215106 0,672671 -0,305594 0,191451
Table A - Descriptive Statistics by variable and country
Dependent variables
EXP EXPF1 EXPF2
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 (Continues to next page) 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 8,956055 13,21394 1,819141 3,71847 0,918621 1,383177 0,3512 0,334692 5,07155 6,671154 4,193284 0,9502
dnk 6,460931 11,42002 0,085819 2,837469 0,936498 1,528878 0,2674 0,417008 5,10153 7,005085 3,8 1,350878
ger 5,539112 9,799594 0,555618 2,671908 0,9681 1,359326 0,5034 0,261767 5,136794 6,324604 3,704667 1,126668
gre 6,216075 10,34392 1,687764 3,140802 1,950301 5,470433 0,103 1,943161 4,5 7,6 0 2,550142
spa 13,79637 23,81187 2,528237 7,147104 1,032074 2,049864 0,1369 0,655683 4,086515 8,4 0 3,008515
fra 8,087868 12,45683 2,472707 3,286765 0,89503 1,398528 0,2525 0,403719 5,483872 7,623656 2,428866 2,333372
ire 10,60368 17,35791 3,927534 4,366451 0,88193 1,55854 0,1555 0,466342 5,9514 6,460465 5,262189 0,29708
ita 9,210909 11,83071 5,278913 2,343398 0,991931 1,942955 0,1424 0,626229 6,333256 8,453489 5,920286 0,7501
lux 1,218861 2,743249 0 0,802025 0,91388 1,378262 0,3695 0,325872 4,803084 5,702941 4,097826 0,658021
nld 6,242986 11,93487 0,910259 3,128797 0,934521 1,361996 0,3998 0,282544 5,222526 6,455556 3,949485 0,942445
aus 2,892561 4,258168 0,971178 1,083882 0,965679 1,411005 0,4284 0,312432 5,151296 6,29 4,75 0,422364
por 5,852943 8,529021 1,686808 1,951693 1,214952 2,818666 0,064 1,006396 4,661571 6,405 0 2,356195
fin 6,87629 16,39213 1,69639 4,430095 0,953874 1,561443 0,2272 0,455271 5,595142 7,065652 4,12917 0,649153
swe 4,173101 10,19006 1,499779 2,975246 1,025642 1,738407 0,2688 0,531126 4,823106 7,275092 4,08 1,156524
uk 6,996146 11,80833 2,056395 2,999375 1,012507 1,823022 0,1959 0,541732 6,031807 7,8 2,3 2,447406
Panel 6,874926 23,81187 0 4,511826 1,039703 5,470433 0,064 0,73832 5,196897 8,453489 0 1,720569
UER
Table A - Descriptive Statistics by variable and country
Explanatory variables
CPI IDEOL
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              (Continues to next page) 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 0,246326 0,4 0,153333 0,079568 0,925133 0,950747 0,903102 0,01541 0,639046 0,664365 0,584766 0,028129
dnk 0,284832 0,4 0,125714 0,09144 0,866149 0,899255 0,828472 0,019868 0,635149 0,662506 0,572331 0,023346
ger 0,422873 0,51 0,350101 0,055987 0,854451 0,912958 0,777607 0,048137 0,623466 0,742983 0,585766 0,032619
gre 0,633826 1 0,5 0,168838 0,804734 0,844965 0,746359 0,03145 0,618845 0,676329 0,528619 0,052693
spa 0,621248 1 0,428125 0,226161 0,735702 0,798321 0,665351 0,032498 0,538522 0,636239 0,401534 0,064296
fra 0,4392 0,580448 0,251282 0,095799 0,714068 0,813125 0,66182 0,04258 0,45836 0,517334 0,358939 0,028317
ire 0,446434 0,583333 0,271084 0,084654 0,717576 0,769243 0,643281 0,044789 0,480739 0,506202 0,399479 0,025125
ita 0,396211 0,58254 0,280952 0,080074 0,884622 0,933659 0,814351 0,038375 0,685112 0,716453 0,613396 0,026381
lux 0,358976 0,40678 0,288136 0,036889 0,877616 0,901417 0,817736 0,016972 0,491829 0,523065 0,431369 0,029115
nld 0,306849 0,36 0,233333 0,039196 0,80986 0,880028 0,692662 0,053509 0,578969 0,631538 0,462799 0,038917
aus 0,456644 0,519126 0,284153 0,065096 0,883534 0,928955 0,776875 0,047914 0,619147 0,651141 0,559822 0,023984
por 0,589245 1 0,352 0,212652 0,767267 0,982163 0,583982 0,119725 0,58032 0,6265 0,512404 0,026117
fin 0,370188 0,890909 0,255 0,184955 0,723774 0,822306 0,636483 0,049738 0,571364 0,616345 0,514578 0,030749
swe 0,38134 0,536481 0,111748 0,114394 0,876478 0,917601 0,764842 0,040764 0,643138 0,673488 0,575951 0,025624
uk 0,543247 0,62519 0,499205 0,040925 0,731341 0,778301 0,593767 0,040727 0,539048 0,580178 0,442015 0,033349
Panel 0,433162 1 0,111748 0,166309 0,811487 0,982163 0,583982 0,086423 0,580204 0,742983 0,358939 0,072926
VSPLPS
Table A - Descriptive Statistics by variable and country
Explanatory variables
VPR
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Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 0,146927 0,1695 0,133 0,010868
dnk 0,144934 0,156 0,122 0,010256
ger 0,150558 0,1661 0,135 0,006887
gre 0,13729 0,1772 0,11 0,018123
spa 0,126194 0,1718 0,095 0,023968
fra 0,139925 0,161315 0,128 0,01005
ire 0,110715 0,114 0,106 0,00287
ita 0,140696 0,1835 0,108 0,022039
lux 0,134398 0,143 0,125 0,004793
nld 0,120573 0,1372 0,101 0,011442
aus 0,148698 0,155 0,14 0,004553
por 0,122896 0,1562 0,092 0,019845
fin 0,124402 0,1503 0,09 0,017406
swe 0,165271 0,178 0,136 0,013188
uk 0,149409 0,158 0,13 0,008716
Panel 0,137526 0,1835 0,09 0,019505
POP65
Table A - Descriptive Statistics by variable and country
Explanatory variables
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -6,510924 1 2,617362 -3,265709 3 2,316189 -1,5226 3 3,129419 -3,166254 -5,371804
BEL -1,169652 1 3,888623 -3,388662 5 1,700074 -2,556148 2 1,783327 -3,272074 -1,51815 -2,688801 -1,75794
DNK -2,201944 0 1,320884 -0,585193 3 2,008807 -1,411165 1 1,208476 -3,287809 -5,328129 -2,176182 -3,648916
FIN -1,833707 3 1,533472 -3,46378 0 2,546086 -0,374987 6 4,205493 -3,155946 -2,84016 -2,129569 -2,276228
FRA -3,121199 6 3,834904 -2,993 6 4,139984 -0,444681 5 5,961813 -3,395923 -7,476542 -2,730274 -6,27578
GER -1,380542 0 4,212476 -2,886886 0 2,790251 -2,069483 2 1,19902 -3,046424 -2,46158 -2,492956 -2,788478
GRE -2,20818 3 3,959167 -1,216528 3 4,860507 -1,648507 2 5,553929 -3,119144 -4,748904 -2,247931 -2,869618
IRE -1,298384 3 4,889689 -1,941913 0 4,200529 -0,726104 2 1,607682 -3,068338 -0,91163
ITA -2,265012 0 1,56438 -4,316726 7 6,552451 -0,361472 8 5,227434 -3,022965 -2,35279 -2,408086 -2,766141
LUX -2,405566 0 2,897127 -4,066833 3 1,896026 -3,014067 0 4,890997 -3,425306 -1,65849 -2,480771 -2,44421
NLD -1,265386 0 2,281905 -1,70648 0 2,664863 -1,307018 0 1,229003 -3,064305 -2,40678
POR -2,713695 0 1,138772 -1,941495 2 2,352143 -1,262112 5 1,094645 -3,260518 -4,900291 -2,605572 -4,245173
SPA -1,446036 0 2,697054 -2,916286 3 1,072895 -2,895151 0 2,895768 -3,384192 -1,96609 -2,565148 -2,27703
SWE -2,425504 5 4,582379 0,088814 4 2,088339 -0,872576 5 3,789354 -2,101154 -1,03898
UK -2,604051 0 1,843684 -2,344798 0 1,817692 -1,419418 4 3,203938 -2,734831 -4,657075
PANEL(15) -13,61826 Rejects Ho -16,0685808 Rejects Ho -5,650809 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) -11,78695 Rejects Ho -19,044703 Rejects Ho -5,071589 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B1 -  Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the dependent variable EXP (1970-2001)
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10-I)CHANG PANEL TESTIPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -1,499594 0 2,593714 -1,807266 1 2,239594 -0,841584 5 5,011692 -4,896533 -1,816389 -3,705677 -1,83163
BEL -3,212698 7 1,397131 -1,570596 7 2,196259 -1,818763 1 2,13247 -5,599943 -4,885123 -3,348329 -4,792535 -4,070264 -4,57698
DNK -2,547766 1 3,86582 -2,516446 3 1,387169 -2,865842 0 1,798266 -4,262334 -4,155602 -2,906592 -2,803334 -3,364567 -3,72545
FIN -1,688846 3 1,340768 -2,080156 2 5,165996 -2,445693 0 4,656541 -4,996099 -2,115606 -2,519359 -1,977364 -3,679544 -1,7071
FRA -1,954472 2 2,002584 -0,570964 2 2,012444 -1,036293 5 1,5109 -5,257343 -4,249564 -3,265443 -2,997788
GER -2,158598 1 2,137544 -3,228046 1 2,485664 -1,252722 6 2,574331 -5,215172 -2,397697 -3,436258 -2,49556 -3,793235 -2,49167
GRE -1,554744 2 1,322883 -2,598742 1 2,351968 -1,612887 1 1,743143 -4,956396 -2,178757 -3,254525 -2,788314 -3,669134 -2,1159
IRE -1,436666 2 1,502764 -0,547121 2 2,761606 -2,231727 7 3,308047 -4,826097 -2,395544
ITA -2,193169 5 1,366648 -0,219989 5 1,896181 -0,656562 6 1,068261 -3,11138 -2,375993 -1,444227 -3,518743
LUX -1,879899 3 1,704845 -3,180434 2 2,884049 -2,959446 1 3,531255 -5,14185 -3,178797 -3,225067 -3,010729 -3,71601 -2,91876
NLD -1,782444 6 2,373355 -1,618295 6 4,69174 -2,562281 7 1,953955 -4,11921 -4,725371 -2,476536 -3,36614
POR -2,457177 8 3,494814 -3,548112 4 2,668085 -2,414014 8 4,089029 -3,237164 -3,584871 -1,540446 -2,919321
SPA -2,078361 2 3,530589 -0,970216 2 3,529085 -3,088928 8 5,315368 -5,055428 -4,773012 -3,199044 -3,195555 -3,653999 -3,6034
SWE -1,616214 2 1,323169 -2,67503 1 2,677804 -2,576418 1 1,667145 -5,206076 -2,212497 -3,865156 -1,48198
UK -1,745895 2 1,87849 -1,057988 2 3,336399 -1,376552 5 1,823979 -5,015143 -3,761861
PANEL(15) -8,684131 Rejects Ho -6,8397575 Rejects Ho -7,678761 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) -7,819609 Rejects Ho -6,41023226 Rejects Ho -6,372354 Rejects Ho
PANEL(10-II) -5,835568 Rejects Ho -8,14235409 Rejects Ho -6,964779 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B2 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor UER (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -2,18603 1 1,264136 -0,798481 3 1,577018 -0,160308 4 2,803372 -5,661321 -3,42034 -4,125662 -3,31162
BEL -2,193506 4 2,675317 -0,041942 4 2,584858 -0,974356 6 4,044891 -5,666448 -1,681924 -4,230077 -1,456274 -4,092822 -1,94411
DNK -2,458887 5 3,713535 -1,780343 1 3,194735 -0,445418 8 5,430045 -4,540149 -4,045309 -3,398555 -2,895825 -3,229641 -3,87383
FIN -2,0903 1 2,65011 -1,204802 1 1,79388 -0,69517 4 5,149811 -5,834269 -3,433059 -4,306434 -3,047752 -4,106213 -3,16006
FRA -2,488727 1 3,722989 -2,100124 1 3,253304 -1,15455 2 1,348105 -5,742206 -4,125326 -4,257765 -3,852312
GER -1,572493 2 2,934284 -2,069213 3 2,59082 -0,394054 6 1,705709 -5,286386 -3,124604 -3,783106 -2,234288 -3,779102 -2,92612
GRE -2,887831 1 1,440016 -3,21775 1 2,936901 0,603384 0 5,345677 -4,376696 -2,466424 -2,924364 -2,990784 -3,011081 -2,58393
IRE -1,108574 1 4,83205 -1,566224 3 4,661517 -1,565859 1 4,018996 -5,633785 -1,594171
ITA -1,297115 1 1,405274 -1,936867 3 2,899411 -1,100535 3 1,952153 -5,662256 -1,386176 -4,17283 -1,604536
LUX -2,001586 2 1,979226 -0,625804 2 1,958698 -0,487577 5 5,218596 -5,692797 -2,446525 -4,193074 -2,157298 -4,055282 -2,27872
NLD -1,971974 2 1,280679 -2,888305 1 3,226205 -1,491018 1 2,32363 -4,881771 -3,055532 -3,634692 -2,89619
POR -0,549316 2 3,128915 -2,398304 2 4,109163 -1,275351 2 4,908982 -4,564506 0,365914 -3,386235 -0,630548
SPA -1,051718 1 3,757134 -2,447459 1 2,795961 -1,369923 1 2,137224 -4,761902 -1,184583 -3,38769 -1,170833 -3,173363 -1,18714
SWE -1,045712 1 1,384104 -1,597931 1 2,843726 -1,173156 1 1,132289 -4,65804 -1,443159 -3,233183 -1,33862
UK -3,090265 8 2,252339 1,085173 8 3,008035 -1,289563 4 2,602584 -4,945031 -4,514506
PANEL(15) -8,254319 Rejects Ho -1,66492552 Accepts Ho -3,349731 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) -6,048727 Rejects Ho -3,23473519 Rejects Ho -2,306423 Accepts Ho
PANEL(10-II) -7,029351 Rejects Ho -1,93762683 Accepts Ho -2,083181 Accepts Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B3 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor CPI (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS 0,327524 1 0,299164 -2,728051 0 1,666726 -0,217677 1 0 -3,266567 2,653615 -2,286128 1,26405
BEL -1,471489 0 0,882469 -2,61471 1 2,117856 -1,798392 0 4,281924 -2,730817 -0,858282 -1,941936 -1,609538 -2,127667 -0,56132
DNK -2,177444 5 2,339013 -1,914109 5 2,167106 -1,545614 5 0,429927 -2,876495 0,181443 -2,278397 -3,889086 -2,249168 -4,23475
FIN -2,172312 0 1,033906 -2,087714 0 1,657954 -2,105787 3 1,494137 -3,210292 -4,599654 -2,5736 -3,091907 -2,284961 -4,11844
FRA -2,201 0 1,300253 -3,197357 1 4,826672 -1,629569 0 3,31385 -3,154758 -1,34209 -2,281845 -1,183104
GER -1,07424 0 3,250582 -0,201838 0 1,721213 -1,445459 3 3,989406 -3,16239 -2,669916 -2,334333 -2,744049 -2,260643 -3,2571
GRE -3,796162 6 3,893534 -3,92306 6 5,942034 -1,381585 0 0,833675 -3,113538 -6,382517 -2,263598 -5,138073 -2,509018 -7,24256
IRE -2,295881 0 2,024303 -2,521617 0 1,415206 -2,242982 0 3,114958 -2,865692 -2,347279
ITA -2,366008 0 4,012279 -3,590314 1 4,839076 -3,070066 0 2,871388 -2,68833 -4,517212 -1,75404 -4,527874
LUX -1,559588 2 2,938237 -1,696012 3 2,683699 -1,526538 1 5,262966 -2,751868 -3,025568 -1,596151 -2,290395 -2,156575 -2,30009
NLD -2,109274 0 2,218286 -2,104416 0 2,88868 -1,757749 5 1,46813 -2,970234 -3,597026 -2,113547 -3,31417
POR -1,390387 6 3,265902 -1,619393 6 4,775063 -0,17755 0 0 -2,761232 -6,891255 -1,996238 -3,952615
SPA 0,153888 8 3,331812 -1,971332 0 2,65533 -0,849957 0 0,499082 -2,646311 0,905901 -1,816138 -0,36594 -1,969893 2,96937
SWE -3,068714 1 3,652594 -3,047848 1 4,109688 -1,781447 0 1,907155 -3,043983 -2,307872 -2,307424 -2,28327
UK -1,472165 5 2,033816 -0,637884 5 2,925421 -2,39829 8 3,418463 -2,841516 -4,165892
PANEL(15) -5,121459 Rejects Ho -12,6255768 Rejects Ho -6,178354 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) -3,863011 Rejects Ho -8,72534068 Rejects Ho -4,911181 Rejects Ho
PANEL(10-II) -2,522187 Rejects Ho -8,07593922 Rejects Ho -4,556907 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B4 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor IDEOL (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS 0,49688 0 3,480969 -1,754094 0 2,628854 -1,615889 0 0 -3,220076 -0,655481 -2,452749 0,95763
BEL -1,601017 0 0,119869 -2,720029 0 2,374728 -1,447311 0 0 -2,665105 -4,295349 -1,217562 -1,972483 -2,010616 -1,99135
DNK -3,050818 0 4,049864 -3,024502 0 4,451396 -2,909789 0 4,053267 -2,89835 -5,208863 -2,16196 -4,026068 -2,194586 -3,34837
FIN -3,203549 8 4,476056 -3,185695 8 4,714002 -0,342569 8 2,404833 -3,080455 -2,306896 -2,626274 -1,771175 -2,397244 -2,47136
FRA -4,057778 1 0,454201 -4,027715 1 0,782758 -2,768561 0 3,095121 -2,771118 -7,089814 -2,383676 -4,342339
GER -1,89202 0 0,576262 -1,398712 0 0,697622 -1,363791 0 0 -2,876234 -1,568484 -2,080896 -1,961726 -2,221722 -2,1351
GRE -2,234176 0 2,076004 -1,64327 0 1,979938 -1,253362 5 5,39707 -2,66724 -2,423657 -1,857779 -1,939939 -1,894989 -1,48288
IRE -2,618986 0 3,030241 -4,395126 3 2,482884 -2,536827 0 4,467972 -3,215398 -3,327793
ITA -1,768424 0 2,535969 -2,548835 0 2,182421 -1,3627 0 0 -2,391716 -4,139203 -1,995259 -2,642533
LUX -1,849687 4 1,251307 -2,982085 3 5,493848 -2,063176 4 0 -3,324412 -2,225512 -2,666204 -1,633946 -2,30505 -1,3943
NLD -2,107952 0 0,663141 -2,032976 0 0,751833 -2,062162 0 0,259193 -2,939214 -2,502926 -2,183639 -2,30677
POR -1,838863 6 0,54492 -1,863156 6 2,254377 -1,369381 6 0,066304 -2,302326 -3,829583 -2,046134 -0,61258
SPA -1,727218 8 2,291343 -14,56924 7 4,609518 -1,767987 8 3,856687 -3,142204 -5,475728 -2,68934 -2,94106 -1,664139 -2,85685
SWE -2,602661 0 2,193963 -2,551565 0 1,89998 -2,313982 0 1,88884 -2,578922 -2,96688 -1,593993 -3,03484
UK -1,757345 0 2,946341 -1,859021 0 2,862101 -1,665568 0 0,479479 -3,341947 -3,112573
PANEL(15) -10,54347 Rejects Ho -30,6691105 Rejects Ho -6,930847 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) -9,317838 Rejects Ho -24,8896863 Rejects Ho -5,264758 Rejects Ho
PANEL(10-II) -5,543317 Rejects Ho -22,8021635 Rejects Ho -5,42015 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B5 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor LPS (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS 0,966237 4 1,021672 -1,512433 3 1,265435 -0,291749 5 1,076512 -2,296957 3,660007
BEL -1,517012 2 3,692599 -2,985433 8 5,410642 -1,562434 1 3,212522 -3,823694 -4,546444 -2,829508 -4,290722
DNK -1,625323 1 1,339437 -1,214158 3 1,013319 -0,993513 0 5,546512 -2,990429 -2,288842 -2,088934 -1,705734
FIN 1,561856 8 2,624406 -1,177721 8 1,383253 -1,076949 8 1,848417 -3,736807 2,986444 -2,713309 1,470443
FRA -2,192054 3 3,941326 -3,483196 4 2,91345 -1,834852 5 1,439226 -3,78614 -5,50037 -2,955717 -4,88797
GER -2,194312 4 4,863684 -2,658608 4 3,89001 -1,421408 1 3,957619 -3,339057 -2,991652 -2,107964 -1,767988
GRE -1,539731 1 4,81277 -1,605969 1 3,775782 -1,339846 1 4,022085 -3,24878 -2,003876 -2,728914 -2,490739
IRE 0,242891 0 3,108949 -2,560978 0 3,743487 -1,855653 2 1,001861 -3,646066 0,311019
ITA -0,227166 1 1,396083 -2,788818 1 1,114738 -1,848891 3 1,266237 -3,79468 -1,805212 -2,920661 -1,28488
LUX 0,280853 7 3,09112 -2,443967 6 3,180266 0,000885 5 3,371895 -2,911637 -0,250173 -2,002255 -0,087568
NLD 0,33792 2 1,781693 -3,856764 0 1,950892 -0,012063 7 1,776831 -3,816313 0,14251
POR -2,258801 8 3,396564 -3,466132 8 2,309028 -0,247119 8 5,996998 -3,740746 -4,321882 -2,898972 -5,017801
SPA -3,571178 1 2,777046 -3,491677 1 2,622551 -3,572922 1 2,386389 -3,073493 -3,140777 -2,24074 -3,872452
SWE 0,566314 2 1,924881 -1,371825 1 1,47971 -0,277872 3 4,301497 -3,126274 0,342718
UK -0,798694 3 5,788138 0,090135 3 1,147096 -0,705884 3 1,033597 -3,404992 0,0522
PANEL(15) 10,007158 Accepts Ho -13,656042 Rejects Ho -4,399779 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) 0,9855364 Accepts Ho -11,6054025 Rejects Ho -4,394633 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B6 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor VPR (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -3,327234 1 1,143324 -2,928234 2 2,764647 -2,70526 1 2,121613 -4,677534 -5,096004
BEL 0,312723 1 1,677001 -1,422638 1 1,94899 -1,083854 3 1,865267 -5,154051 -0,574342 -3,839906 -0,452401
DNK -2,493717 2 3,160574 -2,251656 3 2,785857 -1,137692 2 2,701695 -2,776685 -4,534174 -1,86335 -3,45634
FIN -1,918902 2 2,297984 -4,513407 4 5,434649 -0,944515 2 1,389599 -4,246317 -5,498857 -3,255255 -3,481751
FRA -1,129603 1 2,210439 -2,503953 1 1,057954 -1,255998 3 1,454353 -4,793594 -1,990887 -3,699438 -1,687453
GER -1,124029 1 4,364446 -2,204322 1 4,745314 -1,620421 1 3,627956 -4,241617 -1,097814 -3,231578 -1,123381
GRE 2,058477 8 5,046356 -3,426874 5 2,656549 -3,146407 5 1,155456 -2,883364 1,962788 -2,273149 3,154112
IRE -0,563986 0 4,753875 -3,278401 4 2,370063 -1,115742 0 1,492425 -3,828064 -0,144762
ITA 1,091887 1 3,431875 -1,091563 1 2,643207 -0,857145 1 1,667356 -4,769218 0,4972 -3,312993 0,049674
LUX -1,481919 1 2,131032 -2,938666 2 2,08844 -0,440323 1 1,330753 -4,103709 -2,437447 -2,565763 -1,625697
NLD -1,991094 1 1,512173 -0,566588 1 1,835898 -0,485919 2 2,333358 -4,159499 -4,211269
POR 0,863999 6 4,238758 -2,491153 6 4,162236 -1,875106 6 5,037616 -4,06098 -0,28178 -3,24307 -0,464128
SPA 4,419935 1 1,407303 -0,771138 1 2,174825 0,034618 0 2,044374 -3,310529 4,769899 -2,572578 4,993507
SWE -2,429499 2 1,229202 -0,657551 1 2,867523 -1,127634 2 1,363026 -2,912588 -4,025737
UK -2,574671 1 1,277231 -1,283449 1 1,650808 -0,237106 2 1,445556 -4,195217 -4,517077
PANEL(15) 12,772428 Accepts Ho -10,9898638 Rejects Ho -4,647194 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-I) 16,19464 Accepts Ho -9,55113976 Rejects Ho -3,89809 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B7 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor POP65 (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-I)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -1,469758 0 3,717212 -2,308925 6 2,656481 -0,004708 6 2,154671 -3,225017 -4,16962 -2,88079 -5,047042
BEL -1,747493 0 5,149931 -3,317074 3 3,919196 -1,696655 0 1,63847 -2,115643 -2,280386 -1,339544 -2,607725
DNK -2,152753 0 5,642398 -2,227453 0 4,451161 -1,867099 0 4,424665 -3,010236 -3,803108 -1,683412 -1,081125
FIN -2,220193 2 0,430584 -2,969374 2 1,076978 -1,788691 0 0 -3,738212 -8,220118 -2,993645 -7,550532
FRA -4,057194 1 1,013561 -4,619664 1 3,045243 -3,669557 1 1,316002 -2,940051 -3,015001
GER -2,515723 1 4,865467 -2,95624 1 1,654721 -2,119329 1 0 -3,321417 -3,118134 -2,281092 -3,01665
GRE -1,690458 0 0,553032 -2,102314 0 3,801023 -1,526218 0 0 -3,002685 -2,204453 -2,557111 -1,415061
IRE -3,176938 1 3,333497 -2,912643 1 3,729462 -3,116162 1 4,608313 -3,527273 -5,488834
ITA -2,996746 0 0,619433 -3,476655 4 2,415977 -2,944897 0 0,137092 -2,726261 -4,162299
LUX -1,728913 0 0,569406 -2,727621 0 3,568058 -1,806047 0 0 -3,12081 -2,952973 -2,780163 -3,988948
NLD -2,27462 7 2,813737 -1,847805 7 1,636197 0,468541 7 0 -2,918305 -4,274388 -2,673137 -3,405768
POR -2,474907 0 4,615471 -3,964271 0 1,185667 -4,289841 0 0,572554 -3,369499 -3,867454
SPA * * * * *
SWE -1,524072 1 2,882386 -2,869885 1 3,490992 -0,82972 0 2,585723 -3,859219 -5,339279 -2,747589 -3,850073
UK -1,861158 4 2,470302 -3,06523 1 2,228421 -0,720164 1 0,229932 -2,164746 -1,415313
PANEL(14) -11,97865 Rejects Ho -22,2629438 Rejects Ho -6,924885 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(9-II) -4,237428 Rejects Ho -10,8769363 Rejects Ho -3,723308 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B8 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the dependent variable EXPF1 (1970-2001)
SURADF(14) SURADF(9-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -0,73817 6 5,278513 -2,380603 4 5,212272 -1,877251 6 3,978979 -3,002465 -0,967422 -2,643763 -1,107944
BEL -1,747493 0 5,149931 -3,317074 3 3,919196 -1,696655 0 1,63847 -2,359685 -3,730349 -1,894584 -2,873099
DNK -2,152753 0 5,642398 -2,227453 0 4,451161 -1,867099 0 4,424665 -3,380544 -3,502618 -2,176753 -3,276679
FIN -1,129809 1 0,651448 -3,142043 1 0,711917 -0,752565 0 0 -3,159548 -5,839456 -1,703829 -3,303106
FRA -4,057194 1 1,013561 -4,619664 1 3,045243 -3,669557 1 1,316002 -3,448682 -5,690992
GER -2,515723 1 4,865467 -2,95624 1 1,654721 -2,119329 1 0 -2,802296 -2,982274 -1,901912 -2,400332
GRE -1,690458 0 0,553032 -2,102314 0 3,801023 -1,526218 0 0 -2,853663 -3,021361 -2,265515 -2,19187
IRE -3,176938 1 3,333497 -2,912643 1 3,729462 -3,116162 1 4,608313 -3,476978 -6,225029
ITA -3,012864 0 2,018343 -3,029966 0 1,663681 -2,818598 0 0 -2,729701 -3,289741
LUX -2,184595 0 0,022044 -2,879524 0 2,124449 -2,249063 0 0 -3,083595 -3,357787 -2,333665 -2,895841
NLD -2,27462 7 2,813737 -1,847805 7 1,636197 0,468541 7 0 -2,800215 -4,079999 -2,504684 -3,74038
POR -2,474907 0 4,615471 -3,964271 0 1,185667 -4,289841 0 0,572554 -3,11143 -4,236425
SPA -1,4494 0 3,428381 -2,11107 0 2,961012 -1,601987 0 4,696074 -3,343289 -2,240757 -2,46696 -2,281929
SWE -1,512804 2 1,310551 -3,449182 4 0,334873 -3,119417 3 3,7502 -3,717012 -7,483596 -2,400267 -3,206751
UK -1,861158 4 2,470302 -3,06523 1 2,228421 -0,720164 1 0,229932 -2,941727 -3,612509
PANEL(15) -10,54234 Rejects Ho -23,5025138 Rejects Ho -7,992641 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-II) -2,829957 Rejects Ho -12,5358875 Rejects Ho -5,167491 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B9 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the dependent variable EXPF2 (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
  
 188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) ADF test Lags LM TEST(3) Zi Lags LM TEST(3) Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS 1,127278 0 3,768265 0,075101 0 1,183358 0,349361 0 0 -3,15475 0,76537 -1,81509 1,908758
BEL -6,391236 8 4,120329 -5,013729 8 4,685197 -0,876015 5 1,174345 -3,616769 -14,73267 -2,060723 -12,99403
DNK -2,959765 4 4,807456 -2,48669 4 4,66358 -1,14101 1 0,009006 -2,947143 -4,44708 -2,000759 -3,411762
FIN -0,965906 3 2,316093 -4,508211 2 2,165699 -0,988218 3 0 -2,797104 -0,11314 -1,715233 -0,597256
FRA -3,823129 1 1,964051 -3,777696 1 2,017413 -2,407478 1 2,550047 -3,192015 -4,818024
GER -2,830433 0 1,823157 -2,793704 0 1,855013 -2,797475 0 1,840124 -2,747669 -3,201448 -2,029858 -3,314343
GRE -1,662363 1 1,050101 -0,758751 1 1,269332 -0,470418 1 0,747464 -3,099471 -1,819812 -2,31892 -1,604504
IRE -3,252145 1 3,305463 -3,45334 0 4,486844 -1,087178 1 1,891581 -3,689932 -7,567069
ITA -2,256409 1 0,39307 -2,535872 1 0,688436 -0,846008 1 0 -3,036231 -1,685529
LUX -2,301208 7 1,796702 -3,062436 5 4,219561 -2,760261 6 1,388655 -4,065784 -8,33453 -2,32787 -4,410547
NLD -0,0181 2 0,776932 -1,214163 2 2,266287 -1,238707 2 0,374394 -4,015373 -2,765546 -2,220396 1,276377
POR -1,152442 7 4,979947 -3,953352 7 4,074437 -3,047204 7 1,836519 -3,864156 -6,401397
SPA -2,06045 1 1,061574 -2,038034 1 1,109089 -1,161518 1 0,429909 -2,486326 -4,162381 -1,995446 -2,641364
SWE -0,63628 1 1,849774 -1,301067 1 2,411428 -0,35083 1 0,78686 -2,733207 0,570154 -2,063918 -0,825443
UK -1,295123 1 0,738366 0,385143 1 0,369542 -1,27681 1 0,293835 -3,416965 0,5587
PANEL(15) -9,099322 Rejects Ho -15,4303657 Rejects Ho -5,189738 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,9 -2,53 -2,576
PANEL(10-II) -4,43537 Rejects Ho -9,07512244 Rejects Ho -3,616093 Rejects Ho
Crit. Value(5%) -1,99 -2,6 -2,576
Table B10 - Estimated Panel Data Unit Root Tests for the regressor VSP (1970-2001)
SURADF(15) SURADF(10-II)IPS PANEL TEST with intercept IPS PANEL TEST with intercept and trend CHANG PANEL TEST
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 (continues to next page) 
EXPIRE EXPAUS EXPBEL EXPFRA
EXPBEL 7,57816
EXPSWE 10,648 6,46972 6,73862
EXPSPA 8,93673
UERFRA UERSPA UERITA UERUK UERBEL UERGRE
UERITA 7,22326 16,6264 8,40117 6,94015
UERSPA 6,18496
UERNLD 7,03584
UERFRA 6,71073
CPIBEL CPIFRA CPIIRE CPILUX CPIPOR CPISPA CPISWE CPIGRE
CPIDNK 8,22576 12,0723 11,1849 6,42169
CPIBEL 7,62868
CPIFIN 6,41331 7,29218 7,15777
CPIPOR 6,863
CPIUK 6,1886
IDEOLAUS IDEOLBEL IDEOLGRE IDEOLLUXIDEOLPOR IDEOLSWE
IDEOLGER 9,29362 36,7614
IDEOLIRE 8,0475
IDEOLDNK 7,39843
IDEOLGRE 19,1438 8,72266
LPSFIN LPSSPA LPSPOR
LPSGRE 43,4483 6,23878 21,1861
LPSFIN 18,2841
LPSPOR 13,4621
VPRGRE VPRNLD VPRAUS VPRFIN VPRBEL VPRLUX VPRDNK VPRFRA VPRITA
VPRAUS 8,44701 6,18241
VPRSWE 8,78786 10,6124
VPRBEL 9,39189 6,16556
VPRFRA 7,15384
VPRLUX 8,87047
VPRNLD 6,93401 6,25755
VPRGER 6,01816
VPRFIN 7,75065 9,6742
VPRIRE 8,34524
VPRPOR 6,28766
VPRITA 9,97082 7,16101
POP65FIN POP65GRE POP65DNK POP65ITA POP65FRA POP65GER POP65SWE
POP65AUS 6,1848
POP65BEL 24,4922
POP65IRE 18,0716 6,98005 25,2543
POP65FRA 8,8372 6,52867 22,1279
POP65GER 7,97855 7,86161
POP65GRE 6,53625
POP65SPA 7,98417 7,4907 6,01195
POP65NLD 6,46071
Table C - Granger Causality (Lag=2)
  
 190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPF1LUX EXPF1DNK EXPF1POR
EXPF1AUS 6,28339
EXPF1FRA 10,9002
EXPF1SWE 6,59737
EXPF2AUS EXPF2DNK EXPF2SPA EXPF2ITA EXPF2LUX
EXPF2ITA 7,69263
EXPF2FRA 10,9002
EXPF2GRE 7,1439
EXPF2UK 13,2502
EXPF2POR 7,05162
VSPAUS VSPNLD VSPGRE VSPBEL VSPLUX VSPIRE VSPSWE VSPSPA
VSPFIN 10,9689 9,25578
VSPLUX 6,69573 22,0333 6,26654
VSPAUS 10,4238
VSPSWE 11,0365 16,6041
VSPBEL 15,2154
VSPIRE 6,25617
VSPDNK 6,75445
VSPFRA 6,06008
VSPGRE 7,08081
VSPSPA 6,36684 6,3561
VSPUK 19,4593 7,03644
Table C - Granger Causality (Lag=2)
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Table D – Countries included in each initial model specification 
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Model E (selected model): 
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The PMG estimation of model A has the highest Log Likelihood, being equal to 822.2. However, the 
Hausman-test rejects ELEC1, the long-run coefficient homogeneity assumption, thus leading to the 
next specification with the highest Log Likelihood, model D, with a value equal to 793.6. After 
controlling for contemporaneous correlation, the Log Likelihood falls to 675,5, thus implying the 
selection of the model with the highest value after this control, which is found in the specification 
selected, with a Log Likelihood equal to 791.2, raising to 803 after contemporaneous correlation 
correction. The other models: B and C have Log Likelihood values equal to 783.9 and 785.6, 
respectively. 
 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
BEL * * *
DNK * * * * *
GER * * * * *
GRE * * * * *
SPA * * * * *
FRA * * * * *
ITA * * * *
LUX * * *
NLD * * *
POR * * * * *
FIN * * * * *
UK * *
Country included
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
 
 
Variable BEL DNK GER GRE SPA FRA ITA LUX POR FIN
elec0 0,011690 0,008389 0,009914 0,009910 0,011879 0,015309 0,010195 0,007248 0,009873 0,015261
3,6512 2,4705 3,9208 3,7662 3,3915 6,6572 3,7447 2,5003 3,0773 5,5343
elec1 0,003548 -0,000977 0,005244 -0,001736 0,002119 0,002927 0,000597 0,002931 0,001868 0,001250
1,2015 -0,3629 1,6853 -0,5822 0,6166 0,964 0,2595 0,9409 0,6638 0,3784
uer 0,005726 0,005586 0,004731 0,004897 0,004765 0,007246 0,005196 0,005764 0,005575 0,005512
11,1919 10,2904 10,2647 9,6377 6,7882 14,6544 12,5843 12,6301 13,1064 11,4367
cpi(-1) -0,025309 -0,031934 -0,032456 -0,023080 -0,018388 -0,017987 -0,026318 -0,029998 -0,028252 -0,027519
-4,4361 -5,3627 -7,2119 -3,5194 -2,4744 -3,4258 -5,6616 -6,5571 -6,0816 -4,7652
ideol(l) -0,003819 0,001303 -0,001525 0,000371 0,003932 -0,003504 -0,000991 0,000221 0,000397 -0,001039
-2,6248 1,219 -1,2547 0,3131 2,0646 -1,6287 -1,0186 0,1926 0,343 -0,751
lps -0,052784 -0,016461 -0,031071 0,002028 -0,000106 -0,048165 -0,048857 -0,021799 -0,008189 -0,073165
-1,9107 -0,9515 -1,4496 0,102 -0,0041 -1,903 -3,1152 -0,8998 -0,4487 -1,8605
vpr 0,069335 0,075075 0,207089 0,096673 0,117986 -0,109086 0,023609 0,048263 0,128832 0,092851
1,3962 1,9707 3,5657 1,815883 2,2872 -3,108 0,5508 1,0577 2,7202 2,257
pop65 2,129420 1,928219 2,482684 1,978726 2,701742 1,618446 1,756757 1,937135 2,078686 1,861288
7,8833 8,3123 10,3332 9,1213 13,1698 4,7315 8,5771 8,8547 9,5177 7,0108
t-student statistic are in italic.
Excluded Country
Table E - Sensitivity analysis of long-run coefficientes to reduction of country coverage
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DFE MG Hausman-Test PMG Hausman-Test PMG_Corrigido
elec0 0,017134 0,005359 3,048103 0,015918 2,511680 0,013887
6,6038 * 0,7483 5,6225 * 4,5026 *
elec1 0,012070 0,001107 4,209610 0,006881 1,102604 0,004144
4,0846 * 0,1844 2,6439 * 1,8137 **
uer 0,002805 0,004517 0,078565 0,001920 0,180946 0,002719
3,4845 * 0,734 2,3053 * 3,5333 *
cpi(-1) 0,012793 0,017222 0,002669 0,043555 0,093988 0,023493
1,172 0,1994 4,5802 * 2,0885 *
ideol(l) 0,002805 0,004646 0,410589 0,003233 0,060326 0,005581
3,4845 * 0,7796 1,9223 ** 3,3204 *
lps -0,093553 -0,188428 0,954232 -0,045429 2,245852 0,014874
(-5,7844 *) (-1,9174 **) (-1,7889 **) 0,7499
vpr 0,024808 -0,474855 1,042957 0,131048 1,543411 0,194882
0,4356 -0,9649 1,8503 ** 3,0588 *
pop65 1,710613 1,462582 0,048746 1,561565 0,007568 2,426867
5,5004 * 1,261 6,4262 * 11,0516 *
Hausman Test 9,795470 7,746374
exp(-1) 0,668091 0,471492
-0,331909 -0,528508
d(ideol) 0,000858 0,004068 0,000477
0,5279 1,2281
Hausman Test 0,000477
Nº of countries 7 7 7 7
Nº of obs. 217 217 217 217
Log likelihood 688,1836 617,4858 582,3202 586,3992
Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, FRA, ITA, LUX and FIN. t-student statistics are in italic.
***significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; * at 1% level
Table F - PMG estimates including only countries where coalition governments dominates
Adjustment speed
Short-Run Coefficients
Long-Run Coefficients
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Equation specification includes a constant term for each country not reported here. 
 
 
Variable BEL DNK GER GRE SPA LUX NLD AUS FIN SWE
uer(l) -0,004422 -0,000259 -0,002665 -0,000013 -0,005851 -0,006413 -0,003652 -0,002719 -0,003123 -0,002662
-1,989 -0,1171 -1,2943 -0,0064 -2,5248 -3,2982 -1,3893 -1,2268 -1,3387 -1,5528
cpi(l) -0,001254 -0,020242 -0,010206 -0,064489 -0,003130 -0,009206 -0,005191 -0,006217 -0,002083 -0,011358
-0,0328 -0,5718 -0,2764 -1,032 -0,0607 -0,242 -0,155 -0,1683 -0,0624 -0,2974
ideol(l) 0,011793 0,002430 -0,002770 0,001702 0,011228 0,002167 0,005200 0,003387 -0,003718 0,002535
2,6014 0,5007 -0,6073 0,3087 2,6479 0,5894 1,3307 0,7298 -0,8777 0,5539
lps 0,312314 0,224317 0,205279 0,244504 0,210329 0,239336 0,283607 0,279148 0,098804 0,258287
9,6917 5,5994 6,6143 7,0401 5,0235 7,6357 7,7248 8,7677 2,7798 8,5366
vsp(l) 1,457063 1,213615 1,639151 1,118185 1,509800 1,497054 1,473722 1,608067 1,543661 1,272125
6,6833 6,1598 4,7881 5,0523 7,7745 8,0417 5,667 7,0228 7,05 5,9578
t-student statistics are in italic.
Table G - Sensitivity analysis of long-run coefficientes to reduction of country coverage
Excluded Country
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DFE MG Hausman-Test PMG Hausman-Test PMG_Corrected
uer(l) 0,012350 0,000400 1,809462 0,002561 0,059688 -0,000092
8,3002* 0,0445 1,5459*** -0,0412
cpi(l) -0,058009 0,000689 0,676521 -0,028819 0,170664 -0,016828
(-9,5242*) 0,0096 (-5,8763*) -0,3568
ideol(l) -0,012260 -0,013666 0,012933 -0,006844 0,328106 -0,010063
(-4,1626*) -1,0795 (-1,5437***) (-1,9822**)
lps(l) 0,268893 -0,068185 10,039348 0,188821 6,388389 0,073199
8,2446* -0,6167 4,2075* 1,8258*
vsp 2,048278 0,937815 4,009506 1,663122 1,596399 1,959286
10,4122* 1,6072*** 15,3711* 16,1581*
Hausman Test 16,547770 8,543246
expf(-1) 0,742987 0,275251 0,662974 0,610480
-0,257013 -0,724749 -0,337026 -0,389520
d(uer) -0,002011 -0,002058 4,69194E-08 -0,001859 -0,004196
-0,63 -0,4152 -0,5447 -1,2253
d(cpi) 0,093737 -0,146514 5,942793 -0,024886 -0,040973
1,3988*** -0,6623 -0,9432 -1,1625
d(ideol) -0,003258 -0,002036 0,000038 0,000853 -0,000102
-0,9391 -0,3404 0,1621 -0,02
d(lps) -0,011540 -0,098669 0,171303 -0,062864 -0,102928
-0,2237 -1,2829 -0,6875 -1,0371
Hausman Test 6,114134
Nº of countries 8 8 8 8
Nº of obs. 248 248 248 248
Log likelihood 581,7549 528,10445 463,8638 479,7434
0,94 0,35 0,50 0,58
Included countries: BEL, DNK, GRE, SPA, LUX, NLD, FIN and SWE.
t-student statistics are in italic. ***significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; * at 1% level
Short-Run Coefficients
Adjustment speed
TABLE H - Estimation results under an alternative model specification
Long-Run Coefficients
R
2
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Analysing a government’s “failure” in the pursuit of general societal preferences in 
democratic decision-making is described through the theoretical model and 
corresponding empirical application in the first two parts of the dissertation. The 
analysis shows that a public choice theory approach per se does not solve the 
intercommunication problem between collective decision-making and societal 
preferences, given that it assumes delegation of decision power to a restricted group 
of individuals, namely the government, through a voting process. 
In this part of the dissertation, we look to allocate, according to society, collective 
choice concerning the provision of a public good, that of “government” and, discuss 
the conditions that meet the consensus of society.  
The approach looks to a social welfare theory in the sense that in a first phase, 
government implementation should proceed from a collective decision, without 
impairing delegation of power of a political process of the elected government to 
follow. 
Although Olson (1977) demonstrated that failure in collective action results from 
the rational behaviour of individuals that act according to a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
reality demonstrates that under correct incentives society is able to organise itself in 
deciding or influencing public decisions. Pressure groups are a good example of such 
behaviour. 
In democratic regimes, it is known that political decisions are established among 
institutions, in which elected incumbents make collective decisions according to 
specific rules. The fundamental role of institutions is not here relegated to second 
plan, rather it allows society as a collective whole to decide which institutions are 
preferred before the process of delegating power to political entities. 
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The decision relative to the provision of a public good, namely “government”, is 
presented in the theoretical model proposed in the third part of this dissertation 
resulting from the collective choice of society. When considering processes of 
government decentralisation, although popular consultation procedures such as 
referendums can occur, it is generally public choice that determines the decision 
process. The third part of the dissertation looks to complement this approach with 
another focused strictly on societal preferences. 
In this sense, the third part of the dissertation discusses the ideal decentralised 
regime as an institutional organisation for the provision of a specific public good  
“government”, as an alternative to an implemented regime denoted by centralisation. 
The theoretical model proposed intends to evaluate under what circumstances is it 
necessary to define jurisdictions, either through regionalisation or segregation,  
bearing in mind that the decentralisation process is a reconfiguration of how power is 
shared among individuals in society. 
This third part contemplates a survey of the major developments in the field and 
how it relates to the proposed theoretical model. The survey serves as a framework for 
the model, which is later introduced. 
The survey presented in Chapter 1 looks to systematise previous theoretical strands 
of literature that provide for an evolutionary study on the problem of defining 
jurisdictions. These approaches precede a political economy analysis of the issue. 
In this sense, the survey follows two perspectives.  
In what concerns the previous theoretical branches of literature, the perspective is 
to summarise the main contributions that lead to the definition of jurisdictions. With 
this purpose a descriptive approach is made, covering the first part of the Chapter 1. 
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In the second part of the Chapter, a comparative perspective is adopted. Firstly, the 
primer model that relies on a political economy approach to explain the territorial 
partition into smaller units is presented. Secondly, the main points of convergence and 
divergence between subsequent works in the field and the theoretical model proposed 
in Chapter 2 are evidenced. 
Part Three of this dissertation is as follows. A survey of the literature is introduced 
in Chapter 1. The basic theoretical model is presented in Chapters 2 and 3. An 
extension to accomplish region formation is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
introduces the compensatory transfers between communities. Chapter 6 provides 
conclusions. 
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1. The political economy models and the definition of jurisdictions - A survey 
 
1.1. The descriptive approach 
 
1.1.1. Previous theoretical models  
 
The papers that rely on a political economy perspective to explain the partition of a 
territory in nations or in jurisdictions are related to the local public good literature as 
well as to the fiscal federalism literature, to which Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) 
were the seminar contributors. 
The Tiebout’s work (1956) defined a way to efficiently allocate the public goods 
provision through a mechanism called “voting with the feet”. With this mechanism, 
the populations reveal their true preferences for the provision of the public goods, 
solving the known problem of free riding. 
That revelation of preferences and corresponding demand for public goods are 
made when the so called “consumer-voter” sorts himself in a certain community, 
choosing between available jurisdictions according to the set of public goods offered 
in each one. That moving possibility presented in Tiebout’s model acts like a market 
mechanism.1 
Oates (1972) defined that the choice between a decentralised and a centralised 
system should reflect a trade-off between spillovers and taste heterogeneity - result 
often referred to as Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem. With no spillovers and no 
identical districts, a decentralised system is superior. With spillovers and identical 
                                                          
1 Bewley (1981) presents an extensive critique to the main assumptions taken on the sorting mechanism 
defined by Tiebout to work. 
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districts, a centralised system is preferred. With spillovers and non-identical districts, 
the issue can only be resolved by comparing the magnitude of the two effects. 
Oates stated that the preference for centralisation over decentralisation when high 
spillovers exist is due to two factors. First, the free rider problem between the 
jurisdictions becomes aggravated with decentralisation. Second, high spillovers lead 
citizens to prefer more equitable spending on public goods and hence centralisation 
reduces the conflict of interest between jurisdictions. 
The decentralisation theorem assumes that central governments are unable to 
distinguish differences on individuals’ preferences in what concerns public good 
provision. Besley and Coate (1999) present a model where the central entity can 
differentiate the public good provision according to the preferences of each 
jurisdiction. In this framework centralisation produces a policy outcome that is 
responsive to taste heterogeneity. Thus, centralisation delivers the benefits of 
decentralisation without generating any of the costs. 
The theory of fiscal federalism makes use of Musgrave’s (1959, 1969) three fiscal 
functions: allocation, redistribution and stabilisation. The distribution and stabilisation 
functions should be fiscal competencies of a central government. The allocation 
function appeals for a decentralisation process, in which fiscal autonomy is given to 
governments closer to the constituents. 
Another branch of literature that also explains the configuration of jurisdictions is 
the club theory. A club is a voluntary group of individuals which commonly agree in 
the production and consumption of one or more public goods, sharing between them 
the cost and benefits resulting from that. It implies a cooperative perspective of 
action. The non-participants on the club or the excluded ones do not benefit or have 
any harm from the provision of the club good. Buchanan (1965) and Wooders (1978, 
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1980) initiated this strand of literature that is being developed until today. This strand 
of literature separates the definition of jurisdictions from the territorial component. In 
this literature the space is absent from the theoretical models. 
The partition of individuals assumes that all members of a jurisdiction consume the 
same amount of the local public good and pay an equal share of the provision cost in 
which the same crowding (determined by the number of members in each jurisdiction) 
apply. This partition allows maximisation of the utility achieved by individuals. 
Under these circumstances McGuire (1974) suggests that occasionally segregation 
is unattainable or meaningless.  This occurs when the national population presents 
identical tastes and endowments, thus suggesting that a differentiation pattern cannot 
be found among individuals.  As such, similar demand behaviour and, consequently, 
group formations hinder any improvement to the utility attained. McGuire also refers 
that even when individuals present different tastes and endowments they may display 
similar demand curves. 
Pretending to explain the phenomenon of territorial partition, in the 90’s a political 
economy approach is made. Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997) work, which leads to an 
increasing number of contributions on the issue, initiates the new approach to the 
problematic of nations/jurisdictions definition. The political economy literature on the 
size and distribution of nations and jurisdictions mainly focus on the factors that 
determine the integration versus segregation/secession. This renewed interest for the 
ideal partition of population and territory appears as natural if a historical perspective 
on the number of states in the world was taken. 
The world in 1815 was composed of 35 states and grew to 46 states in 1890, 63 in 
1920, 154 in 1993 and is approximately 185 nowadays. This increasing speed of 
evolution in the number of countries in the world is an outcome of an increasing 
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implementation of democratic regimes, as stated by Hiscox and Lake (2001). The 
recent disintegration of both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union has lead to the 
emergence of a larger number of new states. The growing tendency to largest states to 
break up into smaller parts has been followed by an increasing fractionalisation of the 
states into smaller territorial partitions. The partitions assume differentiated forms: 
either the definition of regions or federations or partitions into even smaller territorial 
units like municipalities. Anyway, the territorial partition led to the definition of 
jurisdictions with political power. Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003) emphasise the 
great tendency towards decentralisation in Europe. 
 
1.1.2. The Alesina and Spolaore’s political economy model 
 
The political economy approach2 intends, as the local public good literature and 
fiscal federalism literature, to address the question of the desirable partition of the 
territory, or equivalently how many governments should be implemented in a certain 
space. Although being inspired on the precedent branches of literature the political 
economy approach introduces a step forward. Taking explicitly in consideration the 
inherent implications of governments’ power share when a territorial partition occurs, 
the new strand of literature has introduced a new look on the problematic of the 
definition of jurisdictions. 
A major contribution on the field is given by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) 
(hereafter AS) presenting a political economy model to explain the efficient number 
of countries in the world. The model describes a trade-off between a decrease on the 
                                                          
2 Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore (1995) and Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) review the literature on 
this issue. The former paper focuses on the size of jurisdictions and the latter on the size and 
distribution of nations. 
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individual utility associated with the distance that mediates individual location and the 
local where the public good is provided and an increase on the individual utility when 
the public good financing is shared with a larger number of individuals. Using a 
model formulation where individuals are uniformly distributed on a segment 0 1, , the 
authors derive the efficient number of countries ( N * ) in a world 3 and analyse its 
stability.4 The model can easily be seen in a framework of a state.  
In AS model population is already territorially sorted according to Tiebout’s 
(1956) preferences assumption and the main issue is to have jurisdictions with 
partitions of population of equal size, replicated N  times,5 where each citizen pays an 
equal cost share for the public good provision.6 
The optimal number of countries is increasing in the benefits of the public good 
and cost of distance and decreasing in the cost of the public good. 
                                                          
3 Some related works, namely, Alesina and Spolaore (2000) and Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2000) also 
derive the efficient number of countries. 
 
4 Using a discrete model where individuals are separated with a length of one between neighbors, 
Cechlárová, Dahm and Lacko (2001) also found the efficient and stable partition of the world 
population into N  countries. Dahm (2002) extended the analysis and discuss the implications to the 
location of the public good when one more individual is added to a country. 
 
5 Using a model with three types of individuals regarding the preferences for a public good with equal 
size but not totally territorially sorted, Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2002) find that centralisation may 
welfare dominates decentralisation. That outcome is conditioned to the degree of heterogeneity in 
individual’s preferences, the degree of geographical segregation of individuals and the degree of their 
mobility across regions.  
 
6 In contrast, using also an equal cost sharing model but where citizens are defined as having a 
differentiated taste for public goods, translated into a correspondent differentiated demand, Jehiel and 
Scotchmer (1997) (hereafter JS) present a model that shows that in the equilibrium, under free mobility 
and after sorting, high-demand jurisdictions are much larger than low-demand jurisdictions.  
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The conditions to ensure that the optimal number of countries is a stable one are 
then reported. Subsequently, the authors defined the compensatory schemes in order 
to guarantee the stability of the territorial partitions. 
 
At this point it is important to distinguish the model that is introduced in Chapter 2 
from other related models, thus modifying a descriptive perspective followed until 
now to a comparative one. 
 
1.2. The comparative approach 
 
1.2.1. The distance concept  
 
“Government” is the public good that is provided in the AS model, which has a 
territorial dimension.7 Simultaneously, the AS model assumes that individuals in the 
world (state) are homogeneous and the differentiating element between individuals is 
the distance each one is from the public good location, which implies a physical 
dimension. 
Panizza (1999, forthcoming) also derives a model where the distance as a physical 
measure is considered: one from the centre of the country and the other from the 
centre of jurisdiction, where the mainland is already partitioned in jurisdictions of the 
                                                          
7 Having a territorial implementation this “government” differs from Frey’s (2001) notion of 
government. In fact, Frey solves what he called the “geography of problems” defining political units in 
a network of competing jurisdictions in which government has no territory configuration. The author 
refers to quasi-governmental organisations as the United Nations as an example of such government 
without territory. In those jurisdictions named FOCJ, the political units have functions, which extend 
over variable areas that can overlap. Having in mind a nation, this type of government does not apply 
since in this case governments have authority over some specific territory. 
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same size. However, its main concern is different from the one present in the AS 
paper since the author intents to evaluate the ideal degree of centralisation that 
prevents secession. For that, the author uses those distances and a per capita amount 
spent on a certain public good by two levels of government: a central and a local one. 
The distance concept can be captured by a measure of political influence, which is 
not a physical measure. Crémer and Palfrey (1999) use the concept of influence 
coefficients in which a district influence could not necessarily be equal to the 
population weight it has when districts form what they called a confederation. To 
those authors the influence coefficients evaluate how policies of different districts are 
influenced by the preferences of other citizens of other districts under an institutional 
arrangement defined as confederation. The confederation is a collection of districts 
with rules regarding the aggregation preferences of the members of the various 
districts, producing policy outcomes that can vary across those districts.  
Crémer and Palfrey’s work considers that centralisation (confederation) produces 
outcomes that are different from citizens’ ideal points. In their model the benefit of 
centralisation relies on the risk reduction that each district faces of having too 
differentiated policies when policies are made independently. 
Wittman (2000) also uses a non-physical distance measure defined as the distance 
an individual is from an ideal point on a continuum of political preferences. The loss 
from a political position implementation different from the one preferred by 
individuals is established as being quadratic. 8  
                                                          
8 Although inspired in AS model, the model described by Wittman differs from AS model both because  
it allows migration and because it introduces a production function as well as an extortion function. 
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The theoretical model that is proposed tries to reconcile these two perspectives of 
distance introducing a measure of individual political power evaluated by the weight 
that each group of individuals has on society. 
 
1.2.2.  Centralisation vs. Region/Segregation in opposition to Centralisation 
vs. Segregation 
 
The common approach to study the implementation of a decentralised regime is 
made through full segregation. Although there are other intermediate forms to 
implement decentralised outcomes they are less broadly analysed. In this point of 
Chapter 1, the most important papers in the field that describe decentralisation as a 
one level outcome are surveyed. The decentralisation processes that allow two level 
outcomes are also presented, although with a differentiated approach from the one 
that is made in the model introduced in Chapter 2. 
Using the AS model, Goyal and Staal (2003) (hereafter GS) derive the group size 
dimension that vote by majority on union (centralisation) or on two regions 
(segregation). GS use a uniform distribution of individuals partitioned between those 
who are located on the left of the middle preferences and those who are on the right, 
which is analogous to Haimanko, Breton and Weber (2002-a and b) (hereafter HBW) 
approach. In the model considered by GS, the size of a region constrain the separation 
argument since in that case the tax advantage of sharing the public good cost 
dominates the loss in political influence traduced by a closeness loss to the public 
good. Consequently, GS model induces an excessive bias towards the centralised 
regime.  
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GS also found that under a majority voting the aggregate welfare is not maximised. 
The equilibrium solution brings more regions than socially desirable. This is so 
because the GS model introduces excessive incentives for a unilateral separation. 
With a unanimous voting rule, as the one specified in the model of Chapter 2, the 
unilateral separation without the approval by the other groups is not allowed. 
Piketty (1996) describes a mechanism with majority voting that determines the 
existence of federalism or independence between several countries, thus allowing also 
two political levels. The author identifies the federalism as a centralised outcome in 
which each country has the same weight in the federal voting process, independently 
from the population size.  
The Piketty model processes in two stages. Firstly each country votes on a federal 
policy and secondly, through voting it decides to adopt the federal policy or to leave 
the federation. In the last case, the leaving country pays a fixed cost to the remaining 
federation. In this sense, federalism, as described by the author, is a commitment 
device to obviate an undesirable federal break-up in stage 2. The compensatory 
mechanisms described in Chapter 5 of this part are in accordance with such argument. 
The status quo could also be seen as a disincentive to extremely small groups to 
separate. However, the independence, in the model of this part, does not necessarily 
imply a payment between groups, since it allows independence to be preferable to 
centralisation to all groups, thus not necessarily generating a loss to the other 
participants under centralisation when one group separates, as in Piketty model. 
The models that were briefly referred above focus on two political outcomes: 
centralised public good provision or full segregated public good provision. 
The model proposed here includes a third possibility, which is one of the 
contributions of the model. As a special case, two groups can find advantage in 
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merging into a region as an intermediate solution between centralisation and 
segregation. In this sense, the model allows either centralisation, which occurs when 
all groups share the public good provision; or full segregation when all groups 
provide in isolation the public good; or a region in which some groups merge and 
provide the public good collectively. 9  
The inclusion of a third group in the analysis opens a whole range of interesting 
issues, that the two-country (region) models as the ones already referred are unable to 
capture. 
Differences on the size of the groups determine the form how groups organise in 
order to provide the public good, bringing to alternative solutions, according to the 
groups’ dimension that composes each society.  
Ellingsen (1998) also analyses the trade-off between centralisation and segregation 
between two regions, but where only one region produces the public good, which 
leads to an externality to the other region. Regions are different in size and in taste 
parameters. Again the solution of the trade-off is by majority voting.  
Harstad (2000) extends Ellingsen’s work considering an inclusion of a third region. 
However, the paper differentiates from the model introduced in the following 
Chapter, since in the former only one region produces the public good and the other 
regions can free ride, which permits to incorporate the externality problem in the 
analysis. 
                                                          
9 Vorsatz (2003), using three heterogeneous players, follows a closer argument. If players have 
different sizes, then they have a differentiated efficient effort. Then, the utility each player achieves is 
differentiated according to the solution of having isolated players or players united into a coalition. 
Thus, the non-cooperative bargaining appears here as a fundament to the formation of unions between 
players. Instead, in the theoretical model proposed here, when it is considered that two groups can 
merge into a region, the model is assuming that groups only prefer to unite if there are no alternative 
outcomes that bring them the same utility, namely full segregation. 
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Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001-b) (hereafter AAE), using a partition of 
population into countries with similar size but where individuals value differently the 
public good, study the benefits of a union versus segregation10 when the public good 
provided in one country generates externalities to another country.11 The authors 
extend their work in other paper (2001-a) where they investigate an optimal 
institutional design of fiscal federalism relying on decentralisation of expenditures 
and a system of subsidies and transfers between countries. They argue that since some 
of those transfers can be politically unfeasible, the existence of flexible unions can 
mitigate the problem. 
The model introduced in this part distinguishes from AAE model in its argument to 
have centralisation as well as in the model formalisation. In the model of Chapter 2, 
centralisation is beneficial once it allows the public good financing to be shared with 
more individuals and in AAE model the centralisation allows to internalise the 
externality effects. Moreover, the provision by a certain group or a set of groups in the 
theoretical model of this part does not bring any externality to the other individuals 
that do not belong to that group(s). The only effect on the other groups is merely 
financial in the sense that if one group does not have enough size to sustain the public 
good provision, the other group(s) might co-finance its provision. 
Using two regions, one coastal and the other hinterland and where the former 
region is the biggest one, Arzaghi and Henderson (2002) discuss the conditions that 
                                                          
10 Etro (2001) defines a model with three countries that allows an intermediate solution defined as a 
decentralised equilibrium. In spite of that, the trade-off of its model is different from the one used in 
the model presented in Chapter 2. Etro defines the trade-off between the internalisation of the 
externalities caused by a certain policy on other country and the cost of having a country outside a 
union free riding. 
   
11 Gradstein (2000) follows a related research line, although with a differentiated formal model. 
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make desirable to both regions engage into a federal structure where the local public 
good is decided collectively or into a separation process. Although considering only 
two regions this model also allows three outcomes: federation, separation or the 
remaining of the status quo defined by a unitary government. The model differs from 
the one that is proposed in Chapter 2 either because it only considers two types of 
citizens or because the decision processes on public expenditure is made with 
majority voting. At first, the model also considers that population and income are 
immobile as well as a differentiated income across regions. As an extension, the 
authors present the case of a mobile population where population size and income in 
the two regions are endogenous. 
Seabright (1996) also approaches the question of the appropriate level of 
decentralisation allowing a local, a regional or a central government. However, the 
article is focused on a different problematic, since Seabright intends to identify which 
level motivates most governments to act in the interest of citizens. In this sense, the 
trade-off is between the benefits on policy coordination with centralisation and the 
corresponding decrease on government’s accountability. 
 
1.2.3. Majority voting rule vs. unanimous voting rule 
 
The unanimity rule, as an ensuring mechanism to achieve both efficiency and 
stability with a collective decision, finds support on social choice literature. In this 
literature the Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) work is the classic contribution. In The 
Calculus of Consent, the authors state that in the absence of what they called 
“decision-making costs”, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. With decision-
making costs equal to zero and allowing compensatory mechanisms (“side-
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payments”)12 between those who support a certain decision and those who oppose, 
then any inefficient proposal will certainly be rejected, thus only the efficient 
decisions will be accepted. In fact, if a certain individual is harmed with a certain 
proposal, then it will not be a movement towards Pareto principle. 
The economic literature has produced arguments in which the right to secession is 
viewed as a disciplining device that prevents the exploitation of a minority by a 
majority (see Buchanan and Faith, 1987), that a majority voting system allows, but is 
eliminated with a unanimous voting system. In an extreme point of view, there is a 
possibility for the reverse to occur. In that case a minority group dictates the outcome 
of a collective decision, thus exploiting the majority. 
In this sense, a relation to Olson’s (1977) argument can be made. The author 
originally referred to the concept of the “exploitation of the great by the small”. 
The works that explain the territorial partition based on the AS approach rely on 
the majority voting rule. The only exceptions were the AAE (2001-a) and Lockwood 
(1998) papers. 
The AAE paper discusses the role that differentiated institutional rules play on the 
country’s institutional organisation. Explicitly, the AAE paper compares the 
implications for the institutional form of countries related with the voting rule that is 
implemented in each of them: simple majority, qualified majority or unanimity.  
Lockwood considers the possibility of unanimous voting using three region model, 
allowing an outcome between centralisation and segregation. In Lockwood model the 
public good also generates externalities across regions. The major implication is that 
                                                          
12 For the cases in which those side-payments between individuals are not allowed, Guttman (1998) 
derives a minimum efficient majority-voting rule, given that under these circumstances, the unanimity 
rule is found to be sub-optimal. 
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with this voting rule the decentralisation (segregation outcome) is implemented only 
if the constitution allows side payments between regions. 
 
1.2.4. The efficiency and stability issues and the role of transfers 
 
The present Section describes the role of transfers as an ensuring mechanism to the 
stability of jurisdictions. The previous works on the subject are summarily reviewed 
and the link to the theoretical model described in this part is pointed out. 
Individuals located on the border between two jurisdictions can provoke instability, 
as indicated by AS. On the border the individuals can be indifferent to belonging to 
one or another jurisdiction, given that at that point they are at the same distance from 
the public good. In this view, the author defines compensatory mechanisms within a 
jurisdiction in order to ensure that an individual on the border has no incentive to 
belong to a neighbour jurisdiction. 
Following an approach much in line with AS paper, Josselin and Marciano (2000) 
describe a unitary state as a heterogeneous spatial club in which the individual 
willingness to accept the constitutional power of the government is decreasing with 
distance from its location. Thus, peripheral regions become important in threatening 
unity. The model discusses optimal constitutional status for those regions on the 
periphery in order to sustain the unity, thus putting the attention on stability issues. 
Breton and Weber (2002) and HBW (2002-a and b) also discuss efficiency and 
stability when the population has a continuous cumulative distribution of preferences. 
That preference arrangement leads to a population partition between citizens on the 
left and citizens on the right relatively to the middle of a country. The HBW (2002-a) 
paper introduces the polarisation question, described as being the case in which 
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individuals are more homogenous within a jurisdiction than across jurisdictions. With 
this interpretation the transfer mechanism is introduced in order to prevent those 
individuals too distant in terms of their own preferences to have an incentive to 
separate. The model only allows two levels for the public good provision: 
centralisation or segregation outcomes, given the population partition into two groups. 
In those models, transfers are designed to be an equalisation mechanism between 
advantageous and disadvantageous regions of a country in order to prevent secession 
threats that might occur by those who are in disadvantage.  
The model that is proposed here considers that individuals do not have an incentive 
to change between groups since groups are sorted according to homogeneous 
characteristics. In this sense, mobility is not attractive. The stability in the model 
depends on the size that each group has, determining to each group a different 
incentive regarding the desired regime for public good provision. More precisely, 
some groups can be better with decentralisation while others can be better with a 
centralised regime. This differentiated incentives can difficult the finding of a 
dominant solution to all groups, thus leading to solutions that are a compromise 
between groups. The existence of multiple equilibrium solutions is the main source of 
a potential political instability. In this sense, the model of Chapter 5 defines transfer 
mechanisms between groups in order to redistribute the net gains of a decentralisation 
process by all groups. With appropriate transfer amounts any blocking incentive that a 
group might initially have is obviated, which will turn impracticable the 
decentralisation process, given the unanimous voting rule.13  
                                                          
13 The redistribution here has a different meaning from the one usually described in regional 
redistribution models, where rich regions make transfers to poor regions as in Persson and Tabellini 
(2000). In the model of Chapter 2 as in AS model, citizens have the same income, thus here the 
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In the model extension described in Chapter 5, transfers are a way to prevent that 
some group, finding more advantageous the centralised provision, can block a 
decentralised public good provision. Transfers in this sense are a mechanism to 
prevent that secession does not occur, contrarily for example to HBW (2002-a) model.  
Bolton and Roland (1997) also present a model that only allows centralisation or 
segregation and where the compensatory mechanisms between regions are introduced 
as a way to prevent secession. Once again, in this model, the remaining of the status 
quo at the hands of those who want centralisation, given the majority-voting rule, 
differentiate from the mechanism present in the model of the third part of this 
dissertation. 
The transfer mechanism that is proposed in the theoretical model of this 
dissertation, which allows the implementation of a decentralised process in the cases 
in which full segregation is not feasible, is in line with the following Alesina’s (2002-
pp.13) argument. 
 
“By Coase (1960) theorem, precisely because the optimal configuration of 
countries maximises total welfare, it generates enough total welfare so that 
transfer schemes between winner and losers can make the optimal number of 
countries (jurisdictions)14 at least weakly preferred to any other configuration of 
borders”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
redistribution mechanism intends to prevent any group from blocking the decentralisation process, 
given the unanimity-voting rule.  
 
14 The word in parenthesis is a reinterpretation of mine. 
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Alesina also states that if transfers are not allowed, the voting in a referendum to 
the configuration of borders may generate partitions of the territory, which are too 
small comparing with the optimum. The main question that can be pointed out is that 
in practice transfers can be difficult to implement or unfeasible namely because of a 
commitment problem.15 
In order to avoid this problem, in Chapter 5 is assumed that the compromises 
regarding transfers, after being negotiated, accepted and established between groups, 
are translated into a constitutional obligation, ensuring that any group unilaterally will 
not break their compromises without law violation. The constitution can be seen as a 
pact between groups.16 Each group must be better with a specific compromise than 
without it, which a unanimous voting mechanism that constrains the best interest of 
all groups seems to guarantee. Under these circumstances the collective decision on 
the configured decentralised form of the public good provision will remain stable. 
Further, as pointed out by Wittman (1991-pp.129): 
                                                          
15 Collective action problems have been frequently solved under a non-cooperative environment 
between individuals, assuming that each individual faces differentiated incentives, thus eliminating any 
cooperative behaviour. However, very often, a cooperative behaviour between individuals is found. 
What makes this happen? Robert Putnam (1993) introduced the concept of social capital that helps to 
explain some of the social cooperation that happens in real world. Social capital is described as being 
the accumulation of social relations capable of providing individual incentives to take part in collective 
actions, which prevents society from being a set of individuals acting as if they were in a social 
vacuum. Paldam (forthcoming) defines social capital concept in the language of game theory, as being 
the excess propensity groups have to play cooperative solutions in prisoners’ dilemma games. 
 Bjornskov and Svendsen (2002) prove, using a set of European countries, that social capital is 
higher in countries with a high level of decentralisation. In these set of countries the authors include 
Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Contrarily, countries with a high degree of 
centralisation evidence lower social capital. Included in those countries are: Portugal, Belgium and 
France. 
 
16 Acemoglu (2002) states that the Coase Theorem is a good approximation of reality if it is possible to 
make commitments via constitutions. 
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“When commitments are credible, then the size of nations (jurisdictions) tends 
toward the optimal.” 
 
The model proposed abstracts from the question of how inter-groups transfers will 
be implemented. After being created the government will potentially be managed by 
an elected authority that will collect the taxes and make the inter-municipal transfer 
allocations. However, despite from the functioning shape that the government will 
adopt, it must be emphasised that a reliable transfer mechanism must be previously 
settled, in order to express a credible commitment between groups, as pointed out by 
Bordignon and al. (2001). The authors also refer the role that written legislation might 
have, through the establishment of simple rules, as a device to ensure pre-defined 
inter-municipalities transfer commitments.17  
Persson and Tabellini (2000) point out that with transfer mechanisms an inefficient 
public good provision is implied, given that the number of its beneficiaries are lower 
than its contributors. The authors referred this inefficient provision as the “common-
pool” problem. This perspective was already identified by Olson (1969) through the 
violation of the “fiscal equivalence”, where there must be a match between those 
individuals that receive the benefits of a certain public good and those individuals 
who pay it. However, the public good provided by a decentralised entity must be an 
improvement towards Pareto optimality compared with the status quo. 
                                                          
17 The main arguments used to criticise the Coase theorem, as a reasonable outcome, appears related 
with the political implementation of governments in which politicians in power serve their own 
interests or some social group interests as the expense of the society at large. In this sense it can be said 
that any commitment only will be feasible if the elected politicians that will manage the government 
afterwards, will be moved only by benevolent incentives, thus maximising the welfare of the society. 
The politician must have such behaviour when the public good is provided either by a region or by a 
municipality. 
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As Le Breton and Weber (2001-pp.11) emphasise:  
“Stability of co-operation requires not only positive gains from being together but 
also the ability to distribute these gains without creating secession prone regions. 
That is, the stability requirement is stronger than the efficient one. (…) If co-
operation is stable, it is also efficient.” 
 
Under a unanimous voting rule as the one that is considered in this Part, a group 
that has to co-finance the public good provision of another group could find 
preferable to secede by war rather than segregate or form a region. Secessions give 
rise to a birth of new nations, as pointed out by Bordignon and Brusco (2001). 
Instead, the model that is presented in Chapter 2 assumes that the war cost is 
sufficiently high to outweigh any cost that monetary transfers to another group 
(municipality) can entail. In this sense, any group only can segregate peacefully under 
the rules constitutionally established. The questioning of nation’s unity is not 
explicitly exploited in the theoretical model of Chapter 2, thus setting apart the usual 
unilateral secession issues. 
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2. The basic model of jurisdictionary boundaries 
 
A political economy perspective to explain the formation of countries has a 
substantial development during the 1990s. A closer approach can be followed in the 
configuration of jurisdictions, as an outcome of country partition into smaller units. 
This kind of analysis becomes more relevant if the great tendency towards 
decentralisation in Europe was considered.18  
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) introduce a political economy model to explain the 
efficient number of countries in the world. Their model relies on the following trade-
off: a decrease on the individual utility associated with the distance that mediates 
individual location and the local where the public good is provided and, an increase 
on the individual utility, when the public good financing is shared with a larger 
number of individuals. Using a model formulation where individuals’ heterogeneity 
results from the distance each individual is from the public good provided, the authors 
derive the efficient number of countries in the world and analyse its stability. Besides 
the distance from the public good location, individuals are homogeneous. 
A formulation analogous to the one proposed by AS is also used in the theoretical 
model proposed, but here individuals reside into a municipality with other 
                                                          
18 As Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003-pp.8) state:  
“If we consider the populations of those countries implementing moves towards devolution, 87% of 
the total European population has experienced some sort of decentralisation since the late 1970s, 
covering eight out of the fifteen member countries. (…) In Europe the centralist tendencies 
prevalent in the continent up until the 1970s have been reversed. Belgium became a federal state in 
the early 1990s, Italy is currently moving in that direction and regions in Spain enjoy in some cases 
greater powers than states in federations. (…) Even the traditionally centralist France has 
introduced limited measures toward greater regionalisation.” 
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homogeneous individuals, forming a homogeneous group. Groups are heterogeneous 
regarding the value that each one retrieves from the public good. 
The groups are territorially sorted, occupying each one a different partition of the 
territory, as in AS model. 19  
The main issue in AS work is to have jurisdictions with partitions of population of 
equal size, replicated several times. Contrarily, in the model proposed here each group 
that forms a certain territorial partition (municipality) can have differentiated size. 
The consequences of those groups’ differences in size to the organisational form that 
can be chosen to provide the public good is then explored. 
In this sense, the model concerns the most appropriate set of individuals that 
should finance the public good provision. 
The income is homogeneous across all individuals regardless of the group each one 
belongs to, as it is assumed in AS model.20 In this sense, this model distinguishes 
from models like Bolton and Roland (1997) in which the main force leading to 
segregation is the existence of income differences across regions. 
The analysis considers the existence of three differentiated groups. Considering 
that each group resides in one municipality, consequently a nation that is composed of 
three well-defined municipalities is established. The quantity of the public good that 
each individual accedes to is always the same in the present model, although being the 
                                                          
19 Auffhammer and Carson (2003) point out the Germany and the Switzerland cases as examples in 
which heterogeneous population are territorially sorted. In the former case, the north population is 
almost exclusively protestant and the catholic population is mostly concentrated in the south. In the 
latter case, different languages coexist in three different spatial domains. 
 
20 Using the European Union as a framework it can be argued that this assumption is not too stringent. 
In fact, Boadway and Hayashi (1999-pp.634) reinforce the argument: 
“Differences in EU country size reflect mainly population differences since per capita income 
differences are relatively small.”  
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correspondent utility and the number of contributors differentiated when the public 
good is replicated, i.e., when a decentralisation process is implemented. 
The interest to contribute to the public good provision is a choice taken by each 
group (direct democracy)21 and is not a result from an elected representative politician 
who chooses the public good provision and its financing form (representative 
democracy). More precisely, in the model it is taken into account that a nation is 
comprised of groups of citizens rather than by single agents, contrarily to models that 
rely on elected representatives. In those models representatives have their own 
interests, evidencing differentiated preferences from the ones expressed by population 
that elect them. 
The distance concept has also a different meaning in the present model. Distance is 
reinterpreted as a loss in influence power that an individual has when he shares the 
public good provision with other individuals that do not belong to his group. 
In this perspective the distance measure is not physically evaluated, rather 
assuming a measure of political influence. 
However, the model maintains a physical bases. In fact, the implementation of the 
public good, defined as being the “government” 22 has a territorial dimension. Using a 
                                                          
21 Giving autonomy to each citizen as in direct democracy the model is assuming that citizens are best 
equipped to find their own solutions as defended by Hausken and Knutsen (2002). The authors state 
that the cost associated with the erection of governmental units, the adjustment of unit borders and the 
possible death of units can only be achieved through the inclusion of the citizens in the decision 
making process. 
 
22 Instead of government, this model could consider the public good provided as the one that satisfies 
individual preferences regarding a certain continuous political dimension as in Breton and Weber 
(2002) or the one that attains to individual preferences on the location of a set of public projects as in 
Haimanko, Breton and Weber (2002-b). 
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political economy model, which relies inevitably on power forces, implies a 
geographic dimension. As argued by Gérard-Varet and Thisse (1997-pp.22):  
“All power has a territorial base”.23  
The model presented in this Chapter assumes that when the public good provision 
is shared with other groups, the higher the influence power of each group on the 
“government” definition, the greater will be the value retrieved by each individual. 
This influence power is a direct effect of the group size. The individual utility is 
maximised when each individual does not have to share the public good provision 
with individuals belonging to other groups, i.e., when an individual has complete 
influence power. 
With a centralised provision of the public good each individual achieves the 
highest share cost of the public good provision but suffers the major loss on his 
influence power, since “government” profile is influenced by the other groups that 
comprise nation and is not an exclusive determination of his group. On the contrary, 
separation brings a benefit since each group alone influences the public good 
provision but entails a loss associated with the reduction in the number of individuals 
with whom the individual can share the provision cost.  
When the three groups finance the public good, a centralised provision is 
considered, which involves the entire nation, i.e., the status quo. When two groups 
merge and leave the centralised provision it is because those groups are forming a 
region and when one group in isolation provides the public good, that case is referred 
to full segregation.  
                                                          
23 In their work, fiscal federalism assumes a territorial emphasis and the implications of neglecting the 
space component in the definition of jurisdictions is also discussed. 
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Under this understanding any change on a departure situation, which is defined as 
being the centralised regime, must be evaluated by each group according to the 
benefits and costs24 that it might bring to them. 
In this sense, individual gains versus costs25 obtained under each one of the two 
possible decentralised outcomes are compared with the status quo. Balancing the 
benefits and costs of each regime, the model allows the definition of the condition, 
which ensures that a decentralised process is beneficial compared to a centralised 
regime. Considering that population is composed of three groups, which can have 
different sizes, the main question is to evaluate how these differences in size 
constraint the preferences of groups over the regimes that should provide the public 
good. 
Moreover, under a rule of unanimity, as proposed here, any small group has 
enough force to block the process leading to decentralisation, which implies that the 
process must be beneficial for all the intervening groups.26 
                                                          
24 Young (2002) states that this approach relying on an economic analysis of benefit/cost is reasonable, 
given the functioning democracies and industrialised welfare states where minorities have enough 
authority. In fact, established democracies have the necessary mechanisms to guarantee that those 
individuals, who belong to a minority are not oppressed. 
 
25 The economic costs and benefits of central and local public finance are the central theme in the field 
of fiscal federalism, being the benefits of decentralisation stated in the well-known Oates’ (1972) 
“decentralisation theorem”. 
 
26 Example of unanimity voting for a change on a status quo can be found either in Europe or in the 
United States. In 1997, in Goteborg (the second largest municipality in Sweden) three of the 21 
municipality parts, namely Askim, Torslanda and Alvsborg intend to separate. On a referendum the 
three parts were prone to secession but only about 12 percent of the voters in the rest of Goteborg 
accepted that partition. In this condition, the secession of those three parts was denied as reported by 
Brink (2003). Los Angeles also recently faced a separatist attempt from the San Fernando Valley, 
Hollywood and San Pedro Harbor area. The pretensions were defected in a popular referendum in 
November 2002, although it passed narrowly in the Valley, as pointed out by Penn (2003). 
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As Alesina and Spolaore (2003) refer, majority-voting leads to inefficient 
outcomes since it implies the creation, under democratic regimes, of a larger number 
of countries than the optimal one. 
This part intends to complement those works, introducing the unanimous voting as 
the mechanism that can simultaneously ensure an efficient and stable public good 
provision. In this perspective, the paper contributes to the discussion of the issue. 
 
2.1. The Model 
 
Consider a country with population of size N . Citizens of the country are 
territorially arranged according to their preferences for a public good, defined as 
“government”. According to this arrangement, the country presents three types of 
citizens i  12 3, ,l q , each one forming a homogeneous group. Preferences regarding the 
public good provision are heterogeneous between groups. 
Consider also that each group resides in one municipality (lower territorial division 
of the country). In this sense, three municipalities with fixed boundaries compose the 
country. This means that population is already territorially sorted according to 
Tiebout’s (1956) preferences assumption. Thus, there is no further role for citizens’ 
mobility between municipalities.27  
                                                          
27 This argument follows directly Alesina and Spolaore (1997-pp.1030) that state:  
“If there was no relationship between location and preferences, then there would be no 
presumption that a country would be geographically connected”. 
    Further, as emphasised by Oates (1972-pp.34) mobility of voters is not essential to the 
decentralisation theorem. 
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The weight of each group in population is denoted as  i , which can be of different 
sizes, with  i
i=
 =
1
3
1. Thus, i
iN
N
= , where Ni  is the number of individuals 
belonging to group i  and N  is the national population. So, by definition, 0 1 i . 
The individuals are assumed to be perfectly foresighted and utility maximisers. 
The utility of the representative individual that belongs to group i  is denoted as  
U ag y ti i i= + −                   (2.1) 
for i  12 3, ,l q . 
Individuals in the three groups earn the same exogenous income y  and pay a per 
capita tax ti , with t t ii = , . Thus, y t−  is consumption of private goods. 
The variable gi  represents the value the individual attaches to the “government” 
provision. The parameter a , a  0 , is interpreted as the marginal utility of the public 
good. 
 
2.1.1. The status quo 
 
The status quo is a centralised regime, where a central government provides the 
public good “government” denoted as G .  
Under the centralised regime the public good is given as g
N
N
Gi
i= .  
The individual value of government is discounted by the relative size of group i . 
Under a centralised provision, group i  does not decide in isolation the public good 
provision; each group must share this decision with the other. In this sense, group i  
retrieves only a fraction of the benefit that it would obtain if it had an absolute control 
over the central government’s choices regarding the public good provision. For a 
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given G  figure, each group retrieves less value under central provision than it could 
achieve if it were to provide the public good “government” alone. 
The benefit that group i  achieves is a direct result of its weight in national 
population. Given so, the larger the group i , the higher will be the benefit retrieved 
with the public good under central provision. 28 
The utility function of the representative individual expressed in (2.1) becomes, 
under the status quo, as: 
U aG
N
N
y ti
c i= + − ,                    (2.2) 
for i  12 3, ,l q . 
The maximisation of problem (2.2) faces three constraints.  
Firstly, recall G  is the output value of the public sector. The production of this 
value requires resources, whose total cost is F . Hence, there is an accounting identity 
to bear in mind G F= . 
Secondly, it is assumed that the provision cost F  is totally financed out of a 
uniform contribution levied upon all citizens, irrespective of their location. Therefore, 
Nt F=  is the public budget constraint. 
Finally, the economy must stand for the public good provision in the sense that the 
fiscal effort to sustain the “government” provision does not exhaust disposable 
economic resources. So, the “government” provision must attain to the economic 
constraint given as F Ny . 
                                                          
28 At this point, the central planner’s decision process can be seen as in a parliamentary regime, where 
the chamber directly reflects population interests weight, rather than as the outcome of one 
representative’s options. 
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The budget constraint is then given as Nt F Ny=  . Accordingly, the tax price t  
meets the following conditions t y t
F
N
  = . 
Incorporating the budget constraint into the utility function (2.2), the indirect utility 
function is given as 
U aG
N
N
y
F
N
i
c i= + −                    (2.3) 
So, under the status quo, a centralised regime provides the “government”, whose 
level does not correspond to the bliss valuation of each group because all of them 
collectively share the access to it.  
At this point it is assumed that the country’s constitution imposes that any change 
to the status quo requires unanimous voting. Equivalently, the public good provision 
by any decentralised regime is only feasible if all groups retrieve a welfare 
improvement compared to the one achieved under a centralised regime. As Alesina 
and Spolaore (2003-pp.35) emphasise:  
“If borders can be redrawn by majority voting, and unilateral secessions are 
permissible, then, in general, there is no guarantee that a non-centrally planned 
equilibrium will produce the social optimum.” 
The unanimity voting gives voice to the minority groups since any group can block 
the decentralised provision of the public good no matter how small its weight is in the 
national population. 
  
2.1.2. Segregation 
 
With segregation, each group determines alone the public good provision, thus 
retrieving the maximum benefit from the public good provision G , i.e., g Gi = . This 
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is so because in isolation the group i  does not share the provision outcome with the 
other groups, being the group on their own the relevant population for the decision of 
“government” implementation.  
The utility obtained by the representative individual is then denoted as 
 U aG y ti
s
i= + − .                  (2.4) 
Each citizen now consumes “government” according to his bliss point. This is so 
because each group retains full control over the public good provision. However, 
there is a drawback to this new arrangement: it costs more to each citizen. This is so 
because, with segregation there are fewer taxpayers to finance the same cost of 
government, F . The higher tax burden reduces individual optimal utility. 
A decentralised provision of the public good “government” on each municipality 
implies that each group finances the fixed cost resulting from its implementation. So 
this cost is replicated three times. Accordingly, F  can be seen as a fixed cost 
resulting from “government” implementation and is independent from group size. 
The budget constraint of group i  is now defined as N t Fi = , given uniform tax 
payment. Simultaneously, community i  must have enough resources to support the 
provision by its municipality, i.e., F N yi . 
This implies that the budget constraint of group i  is given as N t F N yi i=  . 
So, the tax price with segregation must satisfy the following conditions: 
t y t
F
Ni
  =  
Given these conditions, expression (2.4) can be re-written as the indirect utility 
function 
U aG y
F
N
i
s
i
= + −                   (2.5) 
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Given the fixed cost in the provision of the public good, each group in isolation 
benefits less from scale-economies: the larger the size of the contributing group, the 
smaller the individual cost shares. Efficiency gains in bureaucracy or in tax collection 
are examples where having a centralised provision of the public good obviates the 
replication of such costs. 
Thus, the smaller the group the higher the gains each group obtains by retaining 
full control over the public good provision, but the higher will be the per-capita cost 
associated with the “government” financing. 
The value of the public good “government”, denoted as G , remains equal to the 
respective cost of provision, F .  
Briefly, through this model two main forces are found, that can lead to a 
centralised or a decentralised provision of the public good. The smaller the group, the 
higher will be the per capita tax necessary to finance the public good, which favours 
centralisation. However, the centralised provision of the public good deviates from 
individual bliss points which lower individual utility. This central government’s 
deviation decreases with group size, which is an argument in favour of 
decentralisation.  
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3. Welfare comparison between segregation and centralisation 
 
Under the unanimity rule, the segregation process occurs if for the three groups the 
following condition holds:U Ui
s
i
c , where Ui
c  and Ui
s  are the utility that each citizen 
achieves with a centralised regime and with segregation, denoted by expressions (2.3) 
and (2.5).  
Equivalently, it can be stated that the condition holds if: 
  aG y
F
N
aG
N
N
y
F
Ni
i+ −  + − , i .  
Otherwise, the status quo remains. 
For group i , the net gain from segregation is defined as 
U U aG
N
N
F
N
F
N
i
s
i
c i
i
− = −
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ1 .               (3.1) 
The first term of expression (3.1) captures the increase in individual utility due to 
segregation and springs from the additional control over the public good provision 
that allows individuals to retrieve full value from the public good that is provided. 
This effect is denoted as A  and called the “control effect”, i.e., A aG
N
N
i −
F
HG
I
KJ1 . The 
second term reflects the additional financing effort an isolated group must support 
compared to the centralised provision. This utility change is denoted as B  and labels 
the “scale-economies effect”, i.e., B F
N Ni
 −
F
HG
I
KJ
1 1
.  
Thus, the former effect captures the positive impact of segregation and the latter 
the negative impact that results from lower scale-economies. 
The analysis of both effects allows to find a minimum group size that brings the 
dominance of effect A over effect B. This leads to the first Proposition. 
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Proposition 1: Segregation satisfies the unanimity criterion if
1
i
a
N
 . 
 
Proof: 
Using the identity G F=  and solving (3.1) in order to the value of Ni  that 
bringsU Us c= , it becomes 
aN aNN N Ni i i
2 = − + , or equivalently, 
aN aN N Ni i
2 1 0− + + =( ) .        
Using the solving formula the value of Ni  is given as 
N
aN aN aN
a
i =
+ + + −
−
1 1 4
2
2b g b g
. 
Then, 
N
aN aN
a
i =
+ + −
−
1 1
2
b g b g
 
The solution becomes 
N
a
i =
1
    N Ni = .                 (3.2) 
The second case where N Ni =  is uninteresting because in that particular case 
there is no room for decentralisation. The nation encompasses only one jurisdiction. 
Things get appealing in the case N
a
i =
1
, or, equivalently, a
N i
=
1
. In this case 
segregation brings the same utility to individuals as centralisation, but there is space 
for the formation of jurisdictions, i.e., a spatial partition of the population with a 
dimension inferior to the nation.  
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Accordingly, segregation can only be superior to centralisation when a
N i

1
. The 
first case is considered with a
Ni

1
. 
Recalling (3.1) and rewrite it as  
U U G a
N
N N N
i
s
i
c i
i
− = −
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ
L
NM
O
QP
1
1 1
,               (3.3) 
then when a
Ni

1
, it reinforces the term 1−
N
N
i  vis-à-vis the term 
1 1
N Ni
− , 
compared to the case a
N i
=
1
. This means that in this case the scale-economies effect 
dominates the control effect, i.e., A B . 
As a result, when a
Ni

1
, segregation dominates centralisation, i.e., U Us c . 
The above result can be equivalently re-written as N
a
i 
1
.                   
 
The intuition behind this result is that segregation is only desirable for all groups if 
the utility loss from the scale-economies effect is overweighed by the utility gains 
from the control effect and everybody votes for segregation.  
The violation of Proposition 1 by at least one group, i.e., if for some group N
a
i 
1
, 
it implies that segregation cannot be attained, given the unanimous voting mechanism. 
This circumstance leads to a blocking behaviour by such group(s) to the segregation 
process. 
Given so, the following Corollary can be stated. 
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Corollary 1: The status quo always prevails if there is at least one group where the 
following condition holds: 0
1
 a
Ni
. 
 
Proof: 
Returning to expression (3.3) when a
Ni

1
 it reinforces the term 
1 1
N Ni
−  vis-à-
vis the term1−
N
N
i , compared to the case a
N i
=
1
.  
As a consequence, when a
Ni

1
 centralisation is welfare superior to segregation, 
i.e. U Us c , since in this case the effect B dominates effect A.  
If at least one group faces this case, then it will find preferable to maintain the 
status quo. 
Equivalently, the above condition can be written as N
a
i 
1
. Considering that by 
definition Ni 1, then for the result to sustain the parameter a  has to be strictly 
positive.           
 
Having in mind that it is necessary to find  i
iN
N
= , then a second Corollary can 
be stated. 
 
Corollary 2: With a
N i
=
1
, groups are indifferent between segregation and 
centralisation if  i
aN
=
1
 or if i =1 . 
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Proof: 
Using expression (3.2) and dividing by N , then  
N
N aN
i =
1
    
N
N
i = 1.  
Once again the process of decentralisation only finds space for implementation 
when  i
aN
=
1
, since when i =1  the nation encompasses only one jurisdiction. 
When  i
aN
=
1
, a spatial partition of the population with a dimension inferior to 
the nation becomes viable then.         
 
Analysing the result with a
N i
=
1
, it can be stated that segregation brings to each 
group the same utility as centralisation. However, the group dimension varies 
according with the national population. This implies that when the dimension of 
national population is large, for the same condition a
N i
=
1
, a group with a smaller 
dimension is found. 
Bearing in mind that segregation is beneficial to centralisation for values of 
a
Ni

1
, it is important to evaluate how the group’s dimension evolves with the lag 
between the parameter a  and 
1
iN
. This analysis introduces the following two 
Propositions. One when a Ni  is considered and the other when the parameter a  
varies between 0 a Ni . 
The first case is expressed in the following Proposition. 
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Proposition 2: When a Ni  segregation is the dominant solution for any group’s 
dimension. 
 
Proof: 
Using the solution expressed in Proposition 1 it can be seen that for N
a
i 
1
 and 
with 1a  , any value of 
iN  satisfies the inequality.  
Returning to the “control” and the “scale-economies effects”, given as 
A aG
N
N
i= −
F
HG
I
KJ1  and B F N Ni= −
F
HG
I
KJ
1 1
,  
and using the equality G F= , the two effects can be equivalently re-written as 
A aN
N N
NN
i
i
i
=
−F
HG
I
KJ  and B
N N
NN
i
i
=
−F
HG
I
KJ . 
When 
1
N
a N
i
i   it is easily seen that A B=  for values of N
a
i =
1
. However, the 
two effects do not intercept for values of the parameter a  given by a Ni . In this 
case, A B , which means that segregation is always preferable to centralisation, even 
for a group dimension with only one individual.      
 
Summing up, when a Ni  the “control effect” always dominates the “scale-
economies effect”. The gains an individual achieves by the fact of accessing in 
isolation to the public good are enough high, in order to compensate the cost 
associated with the “government” provision. This is a situation where segregation 
always dominates centralisation. Under this scenario the segregation process is the 
natural outcome. Graph I represents this scenario. 
 251 
 
 
 
The straight line in Graph I indicates the gain that group i  achieves with 
segregation and corresponds to the representation of effect A . The curve represents 
the loss in utility that group i  obtains with segregation by sharing the public good 
financing with a fewer number of individuals, and corresponds to effect B . 
 
When instead of a Ni , the second case where 
1
N
a N
i
i   is considered, the 
Proposition below presents the result. 
 
Proposition 3: When 
1
N
a N
i
i  , the benefits of segregation arise for a group 
dimension larger than when a
N i
=
1
 is considered.     
 
 
Graph I - Segregation dominates centralisation
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Proof: 
Beginning by defining
N
N aN
i
'

1
 as well as 
N
N aN
i =
1
 and comparing with the 
solution of Corollary 2, then 
N
N
N
N
i i
'
 . This implies that Ni
'  must satisfy the 
following condition: N Ni i
'  .   
So, the dimension of Ni
'  comparing with the value of Ni  that makes segregation 
indifferent to centralisation, is larger than when a
N i
=
1
 is considered. 
Under these circumstances the  i
'  defined as being equal to 
N
N
i
'
 becomes larger 
than  i . The group dimension that makes segregation preferable to centralisation 
becomes larger the wider is the difference between a  and 
1
N i
.    
  
As a consequence it seems that the reverse is expected when 
1
0
i
a
N
   as is 
shown by the following Corollary. 
 
Corollary 3: When 
1
0
i
a
N
  , centralisation dominates over segregation for a 
group dimension smaller compared with the basic case: a
N i
=
1
. 
 
Proof: 
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Considering now 
N
N aN
i
''

1
 and 
N
N aN
i =
1
. 
The comparison between the two expressions above leads to
N
N
N
N
i i
''
 . For the 
veracity of such inequality then  i
iN
N
''
''
=  must be smaller than  i . Given this result it 
can be stated that as the difference between a  and 
1
N i
 becomes wider, the group 
dimension for which the status quo prevails becomes gradually smaller.   
 
Another interesting issue is to evaluate which group’s dimension maximises the net 
benefit of segregation. In this sense the following Proposition is introduced. 
 
Proposition 4: The maximum net benefit each individual derives from segregation 
is attained for the group size  i aN
* = 1 . 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 1. 
 
To sum up, graph II shows the interval of values that strictly ensures to group i  to 
be better segregated than with a centralised regime. That occurs for 
1
1
N
a
i
   to 
which the correspondence is to a group dimension defined as
1
1
aN
i  . 
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The solution for the problem A B= , described in Proposition 1, is given as 
 i
aN
=
1
  =    i 1, when a
N i
=
1
. Under this case, the maximum gain from 
segregation is obtained when group i  has a dimension as  i
aN
=
1
. 
The effect on group dimension which makes segregation beneficial to 
centralisation when a
Ni

1
, is stated in the following Corollary. 
 
Corollary 4: When a
Ni

1
, the group’s dimension that maximised the net benefits 
of segregation is larger than when the case a
N i
=
1
 is considered. 
 
Graph II - Segregation strictly dominates centralisation
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Proof: 
Under this scenario the effect A dominates the effect B. Equivalently, using 
a
Ni

1
 it can be stated 
dA
d
dB
di i 
  
Solving it analogously to the Proposition 3, the following results are found 
  i
aN
' 
1
  i
aN
'  −
1
. 
Using the positive solution and comparing with solution when a
N i
=
1
, then it 
becomes  i i
'  .                     
 
As a synthesis of the previous analysis the following Lemma can be stated.  
 
Lemma 1: Segregation is only a feasible outcome if Proposition 1 holds. 
 
The policy implication of this result is that once the parameter a  and the 
population sorting into groups  i  are known it is possible to evaluate a priori the 
feasibility of a decentralised process leading to segregation. 
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4. The model extension 
 
The main issue in this Chapter is to discuss the implications when groups do not 
face the same incentives. Under a unanimity-voting rule, the opposing vote of one 
group is enough to block the decentralised provision as stated in Corollary 1. The 
inherent reasoning for that behaviour by a group i  is a dimension constraint that 
unables the group to be beneficial with segregation. Given the small dimension of 
group i , the group cannot exploit the “scale-economies effect”, thus favouring the 
centralised regime. 
Can the dimension problem29 be overtaken if two groups find beneficial to merge 
into a region?  
This Chapter shows that when communities do not redistribute some of the net 
gains achieved with decentralisation to communities that prefer centralisation, the 
only efficient and stable regime is either centralisation or full segregation. This result 
sets some reasoning for the questioning of the welfare improvement when unilateral 
secessions are admitted, which lead to too much fragmentation of a nation without 
being a step towards efficiency. In fact, this is the unanimity voting that ensures that 
no one community will be worse off under decentralisation. In this sense, and without 
the possibility of transfer between communities in order to generate an increase on 
                                                          
29 This dimension problem is a real phenomenon. As an example the case of the recent decentralisation 
process in the Czech Republic can be referred. In autumn 1990, the Czech Republic implemented the 
Communities Act that offered an extensive list of autonomous powers to communities. This led to a 
rethinking of the Act in 1992 since until then communities only had power to decide on matters 
concerning the community itself. At that date the change of the Act included the right of communities 
to create their unions. Under this perspective, local governments would be divided according to their 
capacity to implement delegated power, thus lowering the number of communities by the creation of 
new regions. 
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national welfare, only when all communities desire to be in isolation, the 
decentralisation has space to occur. Otherwise, the status quo will remain. 
  
4.1. The formation of a region 
 
A region is established when two groups agree to merge in order to provide the 
public good “government”. Therefore, the definition of regions as a union (club) of 
two municipalities appears as an intermediate solution between centralisation and 
segregation. As a member of a region, group i  does not accede in isolation to the 
public good but, in compensation, it shares the public good with a smaller number of 
individuals than when the group is ruled by a centralised regime.30 
The group j  is defined as j  12 3, ,l q such that j i . 
With the definition of a region, the utility of the representative individual of group 
i  is now given as 
U a
N
N N
G y ti
r i
i j
i=
+
+ − ,                    (4.1) 
for i j, , , 12 3l q  and i j . 
The public good “government” when provided by a region has the same fixed cost 
denoted by F  that is financed equally by the population of the region, i.e., the groups 
that accepted to merge. Once again, the region must stand for the public good 
provision so that the fiscal effort to sustain the “government” provision does not 
exhaust disposable economic resources. Consequently, the “government” provision 
still must attain to the economic constraint given by F N N yi j +d i . 
                                                          
30 This argument finds support on Baleiras (2001-pp.7): 
 “The more negotiators are in a club, the less power each has to influence the final choice”. 
 258 
The budget constraint is now defined as: 
t N t N F N N yi i j j i j+ =  +d i . 
Given the uniform tax contribution, tax receipts are then given as 
N N t F N N yi j i j+ =  +d i d i  
The common tax price of “government”, t , is, accordingly, denoted by the 
conditions  
t y t
F
N Ni j
  =
+
. 
Using the budget constraint, expression (4.1) is now given as 
U a
N
N N
G y
F
N N
i
r i
i j i j
=
+
+ −
+
              (4.2) 
The public constraint G F=  remains valid in the sense the value of the public 
good provided is evaluated by the respective cost of provision. 
 
4.2. Welfare comparison between regionalisation and centralisation 
 
The status quo is only changeable if groups find a better position with the 
definition of a region than with centralisation: U Ui
r
i
c . The analysis leads to the 
following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: The coalition of two groups into a region is a better outcome than a 
centralised regime for a coalesced group i  if a
Ni

1
, which implies that  i
aN

1
, 
i . 
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Proof: 
Using expressions (2.3) and (4.2), the condition U Ui
r
i
c=  holds if: 
  a
N
N N
G y
F
N N
a
N
N
G y
F
N
i
i j i j
i
+
+ −
+
= + − . 
For group i  the net gain from the definition of a region is given as 
 U U aG
N
N N
N
N
F
N N N
i
r
i
c i
i j
i
i j
− =
+
−
F
HG
I
KJ − + −
F
HG
I
KJ
1 1
.             (4.3) 
Defining the first term that captures the “control effect” as A ’ and the second term 
that translates the “scale-economies effect” as B ’ and redefining the problem as 
A B' '= , the two effects can be re-written as A aGN
N N N
N N N
i
i j
i j
'=
− −
+
F
HG
I
KJd i
 and 
B
F
N
N N N
N N
i j
i j
'=
− −
+
F
HG
I
KJ . 
Stating A B' '− = 0 , the equality becomes 
aGN Fi − = 0 ,  
because N  is different from 
i j
N N+ . 
Knowing that G F= , the solution is 
N
a
i =
1
.  
Using  i
iN
N
= , then the corresponding group size is given as  i
aN
=
1
. 
This implies that the definition of a region is a favourable outcome compared with 
the centralised regime for a
Ni

1
, i.e., the same lag of values for which segregation 
dominates centralisation.          
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The above Proposition allows the establishment of the following Corollary: 
 
Corollary 5: The status quo always prevails when 0
1
 a
Ni
, which corresponds 
to  i
aN

1
. 
 
Proof:  
Mutatis mutandis, the same analysis of Corollary 1 applies. 
 
The Corollary states that under the above conditions, if at least one group is better 
with centralisation than with segregation, then the group is simultaneously better than 
with regionalisation. 
This implies that, given the present condition, and without compensatory 
mechanisms, groups with a dimension below 
1
aN
 always prefer centralisation to any 
one of the referred decentralised regimes. 
 
4.3. Welfare comparison between regionalisation and segregation 
 
Even if all groups have a higher utility with segregation than with centralisation, 
would it be possible to have a coalition solution between two groups that bring them a 
higher utility compared to segregation? Putting it in another way, the definition of a 
region is only expected if this alternative brings a higher utility to those groups 
forming a region. Equivalently, it can be stated that it happens if  
U U U Ui
r
i
c
i
s
i
c−  − . 
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Equivalently, it can be written as 
aG
N
N N
N
N
F
N N N
aG
N
N
F
N
F
N
i
i j
i
i j
i
i+
−
F
HG
I
KJ − + −
F
HG
I
KJ  −
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ
1 1
1 ,         (4.4) 
using the expressions (4.3) and (3.1), respectively. 
The next Proposition states the necessary condition for the above inequality to 
hold. 
 
Proposition 6: The definition of a region is never the dominant strategy when 
a
Ni

1
. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 2. 
 
From Proposition 6, two consequences emerge. 
Firstly, a group that satisfies the condition a
Ni

1
 always prefers segregation to a 
definition of region. The above result is interesting since, given the unanimous voting, 
only if groups face that condition, can the decentralisation process be implemented. 
This implies that a group with a
Ni

1
 will block the process of independent 
jurisdictions: in this sense, a vote for regionalisation ends up, curiously, as a vote for 
the maintenance of the status quo. 
Secondly, if the voting regime allows for the independence of a group that desires 
to be in isolation, then it induces a social cost. In fact, those groups that find 
 262 
preferable to stand on the status quo will have to organise themselves into a region31 
in order to minimise the inflicted cost by those that prefer to be in isolation, given that 
in this case A B A B−  − ' ' 0 . 
Thus, the decentralised provision, with no compensatory mechanisms, only 
contemplates full segregation, under a unanimous voting regime. 
 
The following graphic presents the net gains achieved by group i  and sums up the 
two main conclusions of this part, at this point.  
 
Firstly, when a
Ni

1
, the effects B  and B'  are respectively superior to the effects 
A  and A' , implying in this case that centralisation is the only solution for that 
specific nation. In fact, as stated in Corollary 1 if one of the groups finds the above 
condition it will block any decentralisation process. However, if the unilateral 
secession was allowed, then groups that prefer centralisation would find a cost, that is 
                                                          
31 It is assumed that Municipalities are geographically distributed around a circle, thus allowing any 
municipality combination to generate a region. 
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smaller if two groups prefer centralisation. In this case, under the formation of a 
region the two groups share the public good provision cost, which translates into a 
lower per-capita tax compared with the alternative scenario in which one of the 
groups finds itself in isolation because the other groups prefer segregation. 
Secondly, when a
Ni

1
 the only feasible outcome is full segregation. 
Summarising, in the absence of any kind of compensatory mechanisms, the 
decentralisation process is only a Pareto optimum if the three groups that compose the 
nation prefer to be in isolation, meaning that in this case full segregation maximises 
welfare. Instead, if there is at least one group that is worse, if centralisation is replaced 
by any decentralised regime, then centralisation is the only regime that guarantees the 
satisfaction of the Pareto criterion. 
In this framework, centralisation appears as inducting a cost to some group(s) if it 
is not the desired outcome for all. The following Chapter analyses the impact on the 
theoretical model main results that emerge from the introduction of compensatory 
mechanisms. 
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5. Choices with compensatory transfers 
 
If one or two groups prefer to be in isolation and by that fact retrieve a positive net 
benefit, they will be disposable to cede some of such gain to those group(s) that find a 
cost when the centralisation regime is breaking up. If they do not do it, they will 
suffer a major loss given that, in such case, centralisation will be the regime that 
maximises welfare and attains both efficiency and stability. 
The efficiency condition is ensured when a Paretian view is considered, i.e., none 
community can face a utility reduction with decentralisation in comparison with the 
respective level achieved with centralisation. The stability condition is guaranteed 
when none of the communities has an incentive to change to a different institutional 
regime from the one where each community is. 
In this sense, four scenarios emerge. The scenarios are presented according to two 
views. The scenarios called A  denote the cases in which only one group is better with 
segregation. The scenarios identified by B  represent the cases in which there are two 
groups better with the implementation of the decentralisation process. It is important 
to remind here that N N N N= + +1 2 3 , and that i  12 3, ,l q . 
The four scenarios are the following. 
A1- Group 1 prefers to be in isolation but groups 2 and 3 find advantageous to 
remain with centralisation. In this scenario, groups 2 and 3 accept a regional 
arrangement between them if they are compensated for the loss they will suffer when 
centralisation is abandoned, which is a consequence of letting the group 1 be in 
isolation. 
In this case, given the unanimity voting regime, groups 2 and 3 only accept the 
secession of group 1 if the group that benefits from segregation redistributes its gains 
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in order to compensate those that lose from separation. The compensation must be 
such as to allow that groups 2 and 3 are not worse when they form a region compared 
with centralisation, thus allowing the group 1 to be segregated. 
A2- Group 1 prefers to be in isolation and groups 2 and 3 find advantageous to 
remain with centralisation, but in this case the two groups that are worse do not find a 
platform to sustain a region and prefer to be in isolation. 
In this case, group 1 has to compensate groups 2 and 3 that also desire to be in 
isolation. Under this scenario, the nation faces complete segregation. 
B1- Groups 1 and 2 are better with decentralisation and accept to form a region as 
well as to compensate the loss of group 3 that prefer the status quo. 
In this case, groups 1 and 2 are ready to lose some of their net gain, obtained with 
regionalisation, in order to compensate for the loss inflicted to group 3 that prefers 
centralisation. The transfer has to restore the utility level of group 3 as it will be with 
centralisation. The compensation is only feasible if it still guarantees a positive net 
benefit to groups 1 and 2. 
B2- Groups 1 and 2 are better when each one is in isolation but both compensate 
the loss felt by group 3 that was better with centralisation. 
In this scenario the final outcome is also full segregation, although allowing a 
transfer from groups 1 and 2 to group 3. 
The analysis of the scenarios is presented according to the separation between 
those cases typified as A  and those expressed as B . The Propositions of this Chapter 
resumes the main findings of cases A  and B . 
Briefly, it can be stated, that when the possibility of compensatory mechanisms is 
introduced in the model, the decentralisation appears as the natural outcome. After 
comparing the scenarios, full segregation emerges as the more likely event. In this 
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framework, those communities that desire to be in isolation, meaning that they have a 
positive net gain with the change from the status quo, would be disposal to transfer 
some part of the gain to communities that would be worse with decentralisation, in 
order to ensure that those communities will be, after decentralisation, as well as they 
were with centralisation. The mechanism of compensations ensures that the Pareto 
efficiency as well as the stability condition will be reached. 
Moreover, the regionalisation is a second-best choice. The definition of a region 
emerges, as being the preferable institutional arrangement, when the nation has 
specific characteristics, namely a nation composed of large communities that shares 
the national space with very small communities. In this special case, the definition of 
a region is a movement towards Pareto optimum but the stability cannot be 
guaranteed since communities prefer to be in isolation if they are allowed, rather than 
to be under regionalisation. This result posits a doubt about the stability of some of 
the territorial configurations of regions, sometimes extensively discussed and 
reconfigured in some countries, when regions are seen as an intermediate level 
between centralisation and full segregation. 
 
5.1. Cases in which only one community is better in isolation 
 
Considering first the scenario 1A , then group 1 compensates the utility loss felt by 
groups 2 and 3, that organise themselves into a region, by the fact that they are no 
longer under centralisation, their preferred regime. This means, given respectively 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, that N
a
1
1
  as well as N
a
2 3
1
,  .  
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Even with this compensation group 1 must find advantages in the segregation 
outcome. This means that its net gains, after the compensatory mechanism, remains 
positive, although smaller than if such transfer was not necessary. 
 
Proposition 7: When group 1 is better in isolation and groups 2 and 3 are 
institutionally organised into a region, the decentralisation process with 
compensatory mechanisms is unanimously voted if 
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 3 1 1 2 3
1 2 3 2 3 1
2N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N
+ − + +

+ + −
, which is accomplished if 
1 2 3N N N + . 
 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 3. 
 
Considering now the scenario 2A , group 1 has to compensate the other groups, 
which now do not form a region, staying each community in isolation. This scenario 
will be feasible only if, as in the previous one, group 1 has a positive net benefit after 
the compensatory transfer. 
 
Proposition 8: When group 1 is better in isolation and groups 2 and 3 are also in 
isolation, the decentralisation process with compensatory mechanisms is 
unanimously voted if 
( )
( )( )
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 2 3 1
N N N N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N N
− − +

+ − +
, which is 
accomplished if 2 31
2 3
N N
N
N N

+
. 
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Proof: 
See appendix 4. 
 
Comparing the results stated in Propositions 7 and 8, the latter holds for smaller 
values of 
1N  than for the former. This means that the values that ensure the veracity 
of Proposition 7 also verify Proposition 8. The implication of such observation is that 
the dimension of group 1 that admits the compensation of the loss inflicted to a region 
also allows for a compensation of the other communities if they are in isolation. 
However, considering that Proposition 7 is more demanding than Proposition 8 it 
implies that the definition of a region is a particular case, that is only expected if there 
is a significant difference in size between those communities that prefer centralisation 
and group 1 that desires to be in isolation.   
Putting it another way, when group 1 has a dimension not too much differentiated 
from the other groups, the group prefers to support full segregation rather than having 
a region that could have a larger dimension than the proper group 1. In the case 
expressed by Proposition 7, in which group 1 has a dimension that exceeds the 
dimension of the other groups taken all together, group 1 can prefer to sustain a region 
rather than support two communities with an excessive reduced dimension. 
 
The analysis above leads to the following Corollary. 
 
Corollary 6: Group 1 that prefers segregation supports the definition of a region 
between groups 2 and 3, that are worse with regionalisation than with 
centralisation, if 
1 2 3N N N + . Otherwise, the group prefers to support two 
independent communities.  
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The definition of a region appears here consequently as a second-best choice. 
 
Analysing the three results above, full segregation is welfare improving, with 
compensatory transfers, if Proposition 8 is verified. The values that ensure the 
veracity of the necessary condition of Proposition 7 accomplish integrally the 
necessary condition of Proposition 8, meaning that Proposition 8 guarantees the 
sufficient condition for decentralisation to be an improvement towards Pareto 
optimum. Groups 2 and 3 face the same utility as if there were no decentralisation, 
implying that at least they do not oppose to the process, since they will be at least as 
well as they were before decentralisation. Simultaneously, even with the 
compensation between communities, the group 1 finds itself with a higher utility than 
if decentralisation did not take place. At the end, nation achieves both efficiency and 
stability with the decentralisation process based on full segregation. 
The compensation of the smaller groups 2 and 3, when organised in a region, is 
only welfare improving if group 1 is large enough to be superior than the smaller ones 
taken jointly. The reason for this result is that group 1 will not find any advantage in 
supporting the utility loss of a region that has a larger dimension, and obviously a 
higher power, than its own. If group 1 is large enough, either regionalisation between 
groups 2 and 3 or their staying in isolation will reach a movement towards Pareto 
optimum. When group 1 has a dimension too much differentiated from the other two 
groups that encompass the nation, the decentralised regime can assume, either the 
form of full segregation or the form of a territorial partition between a region and a 
group in isolation. Both solutions ensure the efficiency condition.  
Besides, considering that groups 2 and 3 will be compensated in both cases by the 
utility loss suffered with the change of the institutional regime, then they can pressure 
 270 
to be in isolation. This idea can be rejected by group 1 if groups 2 and 3 are 
effectively too small. In this framework, it is not possible to infer about the stability of 
a decentralisation process that allows for the definition of a region. 
 
On the next step it is shown the conditions that make two groups that are better 
with decentralisation accept to compensate the loss that the other group finds when it 
was not under centralisation. The following proofs accomplish the above scenarios 
1B  and 2B . In these scenarios, two groups, defined as being the groups 1 and 2, 
accept to compensate the loss inflicted to the third group, the group 3. 
 
5.2. Cases in which two communities are better with decentralisation 
 
The analysis proceeds first with the scenario 1B  in which the groups 1 and 2 accept 
to join into a region and support the loss that group 3 faces when centralisation is 
dropped, which leads to the Proposition below. 
 
Proposition 9: Even when compensatory mechanisms are allowed, two groups, 
that are better with the decentralised regime, never prefer to stay in a region to 
support the utility loss imposed to the third group. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 5. 
 
Considering now the last scenario 2B , in which groups 1 and 2 remain in isolation 
but accept co-operatively to compensate for the utility loss imposed on group 3 by the 
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fact of centralisation having been broken down. The following Proposition states the 
main finding. 
 
Proposition 10: When groups 1 and 2 prefer to be in isolation, full segregation is 
unanimously voted with compensatory transfers if 
( )
( )
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
N N N N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N N
+ − −

− − +
, which is accomplished if 
( )
2 3
1
2 3 2 3
NN N
N
N N N N N

− +
. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 6. 
 
The above Propositions evidence that if two groups are better in isolation they will 
never form a region. Those groups that prefer to be in isolation will secede and co-
operatively will recess the cost that the third group would find by leaving 
centralisation. The compensation mechanism intends to ensure that with the secession 
of the two groups that desire to be in isolation, the third group is at least as well as if 
the decentralisation process was not implemented. Once again full segregation 
appears both as an efficient and stable solution to the decentralisation process. 
The analysis of the present Chapter adopted the perspective of group 1 but the 
results sustain if the view of another group is considered. 
 
At this point some reflection about the main results is necessary. 
Firstly, looking at the theoretical model that Part Three of this dissertation 
presents, it appears as an evident conclusion that once groups are formed, as 
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previously assumed, the anticipated knowledge of the value of parameter a  is 
determinant for the implementation of the decentralisation process. The model 
accepted that society, by revealing the value of parameter a , makes possible to 
evaluate the adequacy of implementing a decentralised institutional form. However, 
given that the citizens’ public good valuation is not observable, the knowledge of the 
effective value that such parameter takes is a demanding and eventually not precise 
task. It seems as a final conclusion that depends on the society’s capability to truly 
express their valuation of the public good “government” the determination of the ideal 
institutional form for a nation: centralisation, regionalisation or complete segregation. 
Secondly, in the absence of a compensatory mechanism, the only feasible regimes 
that achieve both Pareto efficiency and stability are the full segregation or the 
maintenance of the status quo. 
Third, when the compensatory mechanism is introduced, full segregation regime 
appears as a most likely event rather than regionalisation. Effectively, full segregation 
guarantees both an efficient and stable outcome. The configuration of a region 
emerges as a particular case, in which stability could not be sustained, although 
reaching efficiency. The definition of a region is seen, then, here as an intermediate 
solution and a particular one because it is only desired if two highly small groups 
share a nation with a group that is extremely large compared with the other ones.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
The partition of the world in nations has faced an enormous change during the last 
fifty years.  Nations of great dimension have been successively breaking up into 
nations of smaller dimension. Simultaneously, the power management in each nation 
has been gradually shared with sub-territorial units, leading to a growing process of 
decentralisation. The subsidiary principle broadly defended as a way to approach 
political power to citizens and improve the adequacy of political decisions to citizens’ 
preferences has definitely played an important role. 
Many of the theoretical models on the territorial configuration into jurisdictions 
have relied on a majority voting mechanism, which allows for a unilateral secession. 
Such unilateral behaviour can be welfare reducing if some territorial units prefer to 
remain under centralisation. Thus, the majority voting does not ensure the Pareto 
criterion, since after the decentralisation process, some communities can find 
themselves worse than with centralisation. At the same time, given that secession by a 
community without the agreement of the other communities generates a cost to some 
of them, it induces instability in the configuration of the territorial partition in 
jurisdictions. 
The voting issue is not commonly analysed and the inherent implications of a 
unanimity voting are frequently discarded. The unanimity voting only admits any 
change from a departure situation if no community finds itself worse after the change 
than in its absence, which is a social advantage compared with the majority voting. 
The unanimous voting guarantees, in this sense, both a step towards the Pareto 
optimum and a national stable equilibrium.  
 274 
The voting by unanimity implies the definition of a redistribution mechanism 
between those communities that finds an increase in individual utility with the 
territorial partition into sub-units to those communities that face a reduction in 
individual utility, in order to achieve feasibility for a process leading to the definition 
of jurisdictions. 
The third part of this dissertation discusses the implications of moving from a 
centralised regime to a decentralised one for the provision of a public good defined as 
“government”. In this sense, a status quo is compared with two alternative solutions 
to implement a process leading to decentralisation: full segregation or an intermediate 
solution where a region and a community in isolation share a national territory. 
The conclusions of this part can be split into two categories. On the one-hand the 
theoretical model analyses the allowed form of decentralisation when the 
compensatory mechanisms are not considered or not admissible by communities. On 
the other-hand, considering the existence of transfer mechanisms, the model presents 
alternative combinations of communities which origin the possibility of having full 
segregation or regionalisation. 
When the compensatory mechanisms are not considered, a nation with three types 
of individuals only accepts one of the following institutional organisation forms for 
the “government” provision: full segregation or centralisation. 
The partition of the country into three communities is only possible, giving the 
unanimous voting mechanism, if to have three “governments” is welfare improving, 
i.e., all groups that encompass the nation find themselves better with full segregation 
than with centralisation. This outcome satisfies simultaneously the criterion of 
efficiency, in accordance with the established by the Oates’ Decentralisation 
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Theorem, as well as the criterion of stability, since there is no territorial arrangement 
that would increase individual utility. 
Given the absence of compensation between communities, none solution besides 
centralisation is welfare improving if at least one community prefers to remain under 
the status quo. In this special case there is no room for either regionalisation or 
segregation.  
The alternative hypothesis of territorial organisation is more diversified when the 
compensatory mechanisms between communities are allowed for in the theoretical 
model. 
If one group prefers to be in isolation, then it is so because it finds a positive net 
benefit. That benefit should be shared with the other group(s) that suffer(s) a cost with 
the fact of such group being in isolation. This means that the former group(s) should 
transfer some of the net benefit achieved to the other group(s) in order to guarantee 
that the decentralisation process leads to a welfare improvement. 
The results present in the previous Chapters allow to conclude that full 
segregation, with a system that considers a mechanism of transfers, is the first-best 
choice, given that in such regime efficiency is attained without penalising the results 
on stability. The regionalisation appears as a second-best choice, whose feasibility is 
only expected when there is a group with an extreme difference in dimension from the 
other two groups. 
The theoretical model presented finds evidence that the tendency is for full 
segregation to be beneficial compared with intermediate forms of decentralisation 
such as the definition of regions. The results found put in question the adequacy of 
implementing several regions in Portugal. It seems that dimension is effectively a 
central issue when the definition of the most reasonable form of decentralisation is 
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evaluated. From the theoretical model it can be stated that regions is only a desired 
institutional organisation if communities in isolation are extremely small to manage 
the public good “government”. Such evaluation has not been done yet. 
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Appendix 1: 
Returning to the “control” and the “scale-economies effects”, given as 
A aG
N
N
i= −
F
HG
I
KJ1  and B F N Ni= −
F
HG
I
KJ
1 1
,  
then the maximisation of the net benefit of segregation is evaluated through the 
analysis of the curves that measures the two effects. 
Using  i
iN
N
= and analysing the slope of both effects the following conditions are 
found: 
dA
d
aG
i
= −  and 
dB
d
F N F N
N
F
Ni
i i
i i
 
 
=
− − −
= −
1
2 2 2
b g
. 
The group size that maximises the net gain of segregation is given as 
dB
d
dA
di i 
= . 
Solving this, then it becomes
F
N
aG
i
2
= .  
Equivalently, it can be stated as  i
F
NaG
2 = . 
Using the identity G F= , the following solution is found: 2
1
i
aN
 = . This leads to 
the following results,  i
aN
=
1
  i
aN
= −
1
. 
Discarding the negative result since it violates the initial assumption that i  0  
then segregation brings a maximum utility to individuals when group i  has a 
dimension equal to  i
aN
* =
1
.        
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Appendix 2: 
The analysis of the comparative net benefit between the formation of a region over 
centralisation and segregation over centralisation is found through the analysis of the 
difference between A'  and B'  effects, i.e., A B' '− , correspondent to the left hand side 
of the inequality (4.4) and, the difference given as A B− , represented by the right-
hand side. 
aG
N
N N
N
N
aG
N
N
F
N N N
F
N N
i
i j
i i
i j i+
−
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ  + −
F
HG
I
KJ − −
F
HG
I
KJ1
1 1 1 1
 
Equivalently, 
aG
N
N N
F
N N N
i
i j i j i+
−
F
HG
I
KJ  + −
F
HG
I
KJ1
1 1
                               (A.2.1) 
Using the equality G F= , the inequality (A.2.1) becomes 
aN
N N
a
N N N
i
i j i j i+
− 
+
−
1 1
. 
After some rearrangements it can be re-written as 
aN N aN N aN N N N Ni i i i i j i i j− −  − −   
Solving it in order for the parameter a , it becomes a
Ni

1
. 
As a consequence, segregation is always welfare improving compared to the 
definition of a region when a
Ni

1
.            
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Appendix 3: 
For the decentralisation process to be feasible, group 1 has to compensate the loss 
in utility felt by groups 2 and 3 when they change from the status quo to the 
configuration of a region. 
The compensatory transfer, using the expression (4.3) that states the utility loss 
observed when a group moves from centralisation to regionalisation, is then given by 
3 32 2
1
2 3 2 3 2 3
1 1
2A
N NN N
C aG aG F
N N N N N N N N N
     
= − + − − −     
+ + +     
 
Using (3.1) that expresses the net gain of group 1 when it was in isolation and the 
symmetric of CA1 , the problem is now given as 
1
1
1
1 1
1 0A
N
aG F C
N N N
  
− − − −   
   
             (A.3.1) 
Stating G F=  and solving it in order for parameter a , inequality (A.3.1) becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 2 3
2 3 1 1 2 32 0
a NN N N N N N N NN N N N N N NN N N N N N
N N N NN N N N
+ − + − + + − + + −
− + + − + 
Equivalently, 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 2 32a N N N N N N N N N N N N N+ + −  + − + +  
The condition is given, then, as 
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 3 1 1 2 3
1 2 3 2 3 1
2N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N
+ − + +

+ + −
.           (A.3.2) 
Analysing inequality (A.3.2), the following observations can be made. 
From Corollary 1 it is known that parameter a  has to be strictly positive. 
Simultaneously, according to the scenario established in 1A , groups 2 and 3 are 
smaller than group 1, because N
a
1
1
  and N
a
2 3
1
,  .  
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The conditions assumed under the scenario A1  imply that 
2 3 12N N N+  , thus 
stating a negative numerator. For parameter a  to be strictly positive it is then 
necessary to ensure a negative denominator. In this sense, the necessary condition for 
inequality (A.3.2) to hold is given by 
2 3 1N N N+  .               (A.3.3) 
Under scenario 1A , group 1 in isolation finds an advantage when compensates the 
other groups that organise themselves into a region if its dimension is higher enough 
to be bigger than the region.         
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Appendix 4: 
Under the scenario A2  group 1 has to transfer an amount to other groups that 
ensures them in isolation the same utility as if they were with centralisation. 
This implies that, using expression (3.1), the compensation is now given by 
32
2
2 3
1 1 1 1
1 1A
NN
C aG F aG F
N N N N N N
     
= − − − + − − −     
      
 
The problem translates then in the following inequality: 
1
2
1
1 1
1 0A
N
aG F C
N N N
  
− − − −   
   
           (A.4.1) 
Using the identity G F=  and solving it in order for parameter a , (A.4.1) is re-
written as 
( )1 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 3
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
a N N N N N N N N NN N N N N N N
NN N NN N NN N N N N
− + − + 
− − +
 
After some rearrangement it becomes 
( )( ) ( )1 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3aN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N+ − +  − − + . 
Thus, the values that make the inequality (A.4.1) to hold is given by 
( )
( )( )
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 2 3 1
N N N N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N N
− − +

+ − +
.           (A.4.2) 
Looking at expression (A.4.2), it can be seen that the denominator is negative since 
1 2 3N N N N+  + . So, for parameter a  to be strictly positive, as necessary according 
to Corollary 1, the numerator has to fulfil the following condition 
( )1 2 3 2 3N N N N N+   . 
Solving it in order for 
1N , the necessary condition for inequality (A.4.2) to hold is 
given by 
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2 3
1
2 3
N N
N
N N

+
.               (A.4.3) 
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Appendix 5: 
Under the scenario 1B , groups 1 and 2 compensate the utility loss of group 3, 
expressed by expression (3.1), given as 
3
1
3
1 1
1B
N
C aG F
N N N
  
= − − −  
   
 
The condition that ensures the feasibility of the compensatory mechanism from 
groups 1 and 2 to group 3 is expressed as 
1 1 2 2
1
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
2 0B
N N N N
aG aG F C
N N N N N N N N N
     
− + − − − +      
+ + +     
      (A.5.1) 
Using the identity G F=  and after some rearrangement the inequality (A.5.1) is 
now given as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
3 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2
3 3 1 2 1 22
aN NN N N N NN N N N N N N N N N
NN N N N N N N
− + + − + − + + + 
− + − +
 
Simplifying the expression it becomes 
( )( ) ( ) ( )3 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 32aN N N N N N N N N N N N N− − +  − − − +  
The parameter a  must satisfy, then, the following condition: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
3 1 2 1 2 3
3 3 1 2 1 2
2N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N
− − − +

− − +
.           (A.5.2) 
In this scenario if groups 1 and 2 prefer to be under decentralisation this means, 
according to Proposition 1, that 1,2
1
N
a
 . Simultaneously, for group 3 the Corollary 1 
holds, i.e., 3
1
N
a
 . 
The conditions assumed regarding the correspondent group’s dimension make the 
denominator to have a negative sign, given that in this scenario 
3 1 2N N N + . Then, 
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for the parameter a  to be strictly positive, the numerator has also to have a negative 
sign. 
This is equivalent to impose that ( ) ( )3 1 2 1 2 32N N N N N N N− −  + . The inequality 
(A.5.2) is satisfied if, equivalently, it was stated that 
( )1 2 3
3 1 22
N N N
N
N N N
+

− −
.  
Since by definition N  is positive, then the following condition has to be 
accomplished 
3 1 22 0N N N− −  . The inequality can be equally expressed as 
1 2
3
2
N N
N
+
 . 
Given that group 3, in this scenario, is worse with the definition of communities, 
then its dimension cannot be superior to either group 1 or group 2, since if it was true 
group 3 would also prefer segregation, facing a gain instead of a loss. Thus, a 
contradiction is found, meaning that the dimension of group 3 does not induce groups 
1 and 2 to be in a region rather than in isolation. This implies that inequality (A.5.2) 
cannot be accomplished, meaning that group 1 and 2 never organise themselves into a 
region when they have a higher net gain with full segregation.  
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Appendix 6: 
The compensation mechanism is equal to the transfer considered in scenario 
1B , 
i.e., 
 31 2
3
1 1
1B B
N
C C aG F
N N N
  
= = − − −  
   
. 
The condition that makes groups 1 and 2 to transfer some of their net benefits to 
group 3 is given as 
1 2
2
1 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 0B
N N
aG F aG F C
N N N N N N
      
− − − + − − − −       
      
.       (A.6.1) 
After some rearrangements and using once again G F= , the inequality (A.6.1) can 
be translated in the following one  
( ) ( )1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3aN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N− − +  + − −  
Solving it in order for the parameter a , the condition that satisfies the constraint 
that groups 1 and 2 find a positive net gain when compensate the loss faced by group 
3 by leaving centralisation is given as 
( )
( )
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
N N N N N N N N N N
a
N N N N N N N
+ − −

− − +
.           (A.6.2) 
Analysing the inequality (A.6.2) it can be seen that the denominator is positive. 
Then, for the parameter a  to be strictly positive the numerator has also to have a 
positive sign. 
This implies that the following inequality has to be satisfied 
( )3 1 2 1 2 1 2 3NN N N NN N N N N+  + .           (A.6.3) 
Solving it in order for 
1N , the expression (A.6.3) becomes 
( )1 2 2 3 3 2 3N NN N N NN NN N+ −   and ( )2 1 1 3 3 1 3N NN N N NN NN N+ −   
which leads to 
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( )
2 3
1
2 3 2 3
NN N
N
N N N N N

− +
. 
This condition ensures that the two groups still have a positive net gain, after the 
compensatory transfer.        
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FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH 
 
A PhD dissertation is only a step in the long-way that a researcher has to follow. 
The taste and incentive for the deepening of knowledge accompanies the researcher 
during his/her academic career.  
This dissertation, composed of three parts, is not a closed document, in the sense 
that allows future development of the analysed issues. In fact, there is a space for 
further developments and extensions in the future.  
Some of the future lines of research that could be explored in each of the parts that 
encompasses this dissertation are identified below. 
The exposed directions of development to each part do not intend to be exhaustive, 
but only to be a point of reflection for future routs that a research in the field of Public 
Economics and Political Economy can open. 
The theoretical model presented in the first part allowed the possibility that each 
incumbent can be a candidate in all the election periods. However, if a nation has a 
constitutional constraint defined in a term-limit, then incumbency at some point 
appears an impossible event, thus leading to a zero re-election chance in that period. 
In spite of that the incumbent knows that after a period in which she is unable to have 
a tenure, in the subsequent electoral period she can be a candidate to the exercise of 
the budget management again. How this interruption in tenure possibilities constrains 
the incumbent behaviour is not explored in the theoretical model. The evaluation on 
the budget bias composition resulting from an irregular incumbency over periods, 
given the limitation of candidate to run on elections after some time in the exercise of 
power emerges as an interesting point for future research. 
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The re-election chances appear in the theoretical model described in Part One as 
being an outcome of two tenure periods in office, i.e., after incumbent’s choices on 
both budgets (post-election period and pre-election period). However, it is reasonable 
to think that voters form an opinion about incumbent’s performance in the middle of 
her staying in office. Putting it differently, re-election chances between the first half 
and second half periods are not the same. The question that arises now is: Does the 
existence of popularity differential given by different re-election probability at the end 
of post-election period do constrain the political budget cycle width that arises in pre-
election period? 
Any government has a critical popularity level that is a function of the forthcoming 
election nearing. If a government feels electorally safe, i.e., with a surplus over its 
critical popularity level, the government evidences a differentiated behaviour rather 
than when the government holds a popularity deficit. This reflection could lead to a 
model re-evaluation in order to accommodate the scenario in which the popularity 
level achieved in post-election period constrains the second budget tenure’s options. 
Such evaluation will be left for future research. 
The introduction of the second state of nature in the first part: the hypothesis of the 
incumbent’s election defeat emphasises the question that an incumbent usually does 
not have a short sight perspective of her future. In this sense, the incumbent evaluates 
her performance while in office looking also for its implications on her uncertain 
future, because re-election is not guaranteed. 
The question that emerges is that a narrow or wider political budget cycle should 
be expected when it is considered an incumbent who does not care about the 
consequences of the defeat scenario, thus without evidencing any reputation concern. 
It also seems an issue to be developed in the future. 
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An interesting issue for further developments of the second part is to evaluate the 
effects on budget that arise from the monitoring control that the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact impose. Although the central governments face a 
restringing force imposed by the fiscal regime that elapses from EMU and leads to a 
reduction on the size of public finances and consequently on expenditures, the 
government maintains the flexibility to select the composition of public expenditures 
according to the electoral agenda. 
The evidence of an electoral cycle on the expenditure size may vanish along the 
time imposed by the referred restringing forces. However, that pressure cannot be felt 
when analysis is focused on the weight each type of public expenditures has on 
budget. A test for a structural break in series related with the impact of the Stability 
and Growth Pact appears necessary to check if electoral budget cycles in the 
composition of public expenditures have in fact changed after the imposition of a 
European Union budget control. 
The theoretical model described in the third part of this dissertation considers that 
communities interact co-operatively in order to obtain an efficient and stable 
institutional organisation to provide the public good “government”. However, when 
there are two communities that are better under decentralisation and one is worse 
under such regime, the compensatory mechanism can be guaranteed by only one of 
the communities that prefer decentralisation, if the second opts to free ride. This 
incentive to be out of the compensatory mechanism introduces another problematic 
that is driven away from the theoretical model described in this part. The problematic 
is the non-cooperative behaviour between communities when more than one has the 
obligation to compensate the losses inflicted in utility of the other group. Some of the 
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main findings of this part may change when the non-cooperative behaviour of 
communities is taken into consideration. 
Further, the theoretical model assumes that the groups that prefer centralisation 
accept to be compensated by the loss they have on utility by the fact of abandoning 
the status quo in order not to be worse under decentralisation. However, given the 
unanimous voting mechanism nothing prevents those communities with power to 
block the decentralisation process from asking for more than that. This hypothesis is a 
very likely one and the introduction, in the theoretical model, of such constraint 
appears as being an area with space for future developments. 
Another possible extension for the theoretical model introduced in this part is to 
consider that the parameter a  is not an observable value, thus remaining as private 
information of each community, meaning that such parameter could be heterogeneous 
across groups instead of the homogeneous hypothesis considered in this part. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation comprehends three parts. The dissertation is classified under the 
Economics research area and establishes a relationship in the following research areas: 
public finance and political economy. 
For each of the three parts that comprise the dissertation, a different question is 
addressed. 
In an attempt to obtain an answer for each of the questions raised, the essential 
dilemma of public choice theory was considered and served to guide inherent discussion 
towards possible answers. 
As such, on the one hand, detaining agents of political decision power are not 
directed exclusively by benevolent motivations towards the common good of society, as 
social welfare theory suggests. On the other, selfish interests do not solely guide agents 
of political action. 
This dissertation looks to relate these two approaches by suggesting an integrated 
vision of the problem of the process leading to political decision-making. 
Politically-induced manipulation of the public budget mix is analysed in the first 
part of the dissertation. Some literature on political budget cycles justifies manipulation 
in terms of asymmetry of information between the two intervening agents in the 
political process; often the incumbent has privileged information compared with voters. 
In parallel, the common approach adopted in analysing the opportunistic manipulation 
of the public budget according to an electoral agenda considers absolute values.  
The theoretical model proposed in Part One raises the following questions. Is a 
politically-induced manipulation of the public expenditure composition expected if the 
incentive introduced by asymmetric information ceases to exist, i.e., if the model 
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considers complete information? Is there be wide consensus about the increase of public 
expenditures around elections when its composition is analysed, hence that some 
categories of public expenditures are more electorally manipulated as elections draw 
nearer? The main findings from the first part of the dissertation state a definite yes to 
these questions. 
Even when the incumbent does not have privileged information, an incentive to 
manipulate the public budget remains, thus generating a bias towards some categories of 
public expenditures. This is so because future incumbency is an uncertain event, 
meaning that in the next electoral period there is a possibility that the incumbent could 
be defeated. Therefore, the incumbent will try to maximise his or her own utility while 
in office, subject to constraints imposed by voter preferences regarding the public 
expenditure composition. The categories of expenditures do not provide the incumbent 
with equally distributed privileges over time. Current expenditures bring utility in the 
same period they are achieved, while capital expenditures require a one-period delay in 
order to provide utility. By understanding this difference, the incumbent has an 
incentive to manipulate the public budget composition prior to elections prone to 
current expenditures, thus inducing a public budget bias. 
The model presented in the first part identifies the incumbent as having two 
priorities: to be re-elected and to acquire reputation, which is determinant if defeat 
occurs. In this sense, the incumbent has selfish interests that surpass other benevolent 
interests. In conserving one’s reputation, which is determined by society at large and not 
exclusively by voters, the incumbent also faces a constraint imposed by society’s 
preferences over the composition of the public expenditures. The model shows that 
when voters constitute a significant share in society, the incumbent manipulates the 
public expenditure composition towards those categories that are more preferred by 
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voters. The opposite occurs when a society has a smaller number of participating 
electors, reducing the incumbent’s incentive to spend more in those public expenditure 
categories that favour voters. We observe that in these cases, other categories are taken 
up that benefit society at large. 
The second part of the dissertation attempts to evaluate the adequacy of the 
theoretical model in terms of the predictions originally established in the first part under 
a framework confronted with contrasting literature on electoral manipulation of public 
budget. Although in developing countries the political budget cycles are identified as 
common practice, there are some controversial results when the analysis reverts to 
developed countries, namely, European Union countries. 
As a consequence, the second part of the dissertation sets up the following 
questions. Does the European Union have an opportunistic political budget cycle 
induced by elections? Is there a manipulation of the public expenditure composition 
prior to elections that are more prone to some categories, hence generating a bias on the 
budget mix, as anticipated by the theoretical model? 
Using the recent econometric technique, the Pooled Mean Group estimator, the 
second part supports the theoretical predictions in the European Union set of countries. 
Firstly, governments of the European Union do manipulate the budget mix when the 
timing of elections approaches. Secondly, a wider difference between the number of 
individuals in society and those that vote induces a decrease in the manipulation of 
public expenditures prone to the expenditures categories preferred by voters. 
Part Three of the dissertation introduces a theoretical model that compares the most 
adequate institutional organisation to provide “government”, as a public good, when a 
nation has territorial partition in three well-defined communities, with different sizes 
and heterogeneous preferences between them in terms of public good value. 
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Departing from territorial organisation without autonomous communities ruled out 
by a centralised government, the implications of implementing a process of 
decentralisation can assume two forms: full segregation or regionalisation. The full 
segregation scenario implies the emergence of three governments while regionalisation 
is based on two governments. The regionalisation hypothesis is discarded in many 
previous works in the political economy configuration of jurisdictions. Its inclusion 
leads to some interesting results. 
Discussion and analysis that follow in the third part considers a constitutional 
framework that imposes a unanimous vote turnout for any change to the status quo, an 
approach not widely used in the literacy field which relies essentially on the majority-
voting rule. 
Bearing in mind the above framework, the third part explores the following 
questions. How do we establish an ideal institutional organisation that is able to 
simultaneously achieve economic efficiency and stability? Does the answer change 
when a transfer mechanism between communities is introduced? Is there always room 
for a decentralisation process that configures regionalisation?  
The theoretical model demonstrates that firstly, in the absence of compensatory 
mechanisms between communities, the only feasible regimes are either centralisation or 
full segregation. These regimes fulfil both the efficiency and stability conditions. 
Secondly, when transfer mechanisms are introduced and communities that are better 
under decentralisation compensate communities that are worse, the two decentralised 
regimes appear as feasible, which can be either full segregation or regionalisation. 
However, the first-best choice is full segregation, as in the case of absence of transfers. 
Regionalisation emerges as a second-best choice and occurs when a larger community 
has to divide with two smaller communities, within the same national territory. 
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Interestingly, while full segregation ensures the Pareto optimum and a stable solution, a 
region tends to be unstable because the two communities that merge prefer to be in 
isolation rather than be aggregated. 
This dissertation offers insight into the way that politicians manage political power 
and, how the desire to adjust differences in terms of preferences guides political power. 
The former case corresponds to Parts One and Two of the dissertation while Part Three 
examines the latter. 
In the three parts presented, the exercise of political influence is led by selfish 
interests rather than by benevolent ones. The rationality of decision-making rely 
essentially on an individualistic perspective, leaving aside the most desired level of 
welfare for a society. The first part of the dissertation describes a distortion mechanism 
brought by elections and the opportunistic view of those that have the political power to 
decide how much of the public expenditure budget to spend on each category, for each 
period. The third part of the dissertation presents a model that directly gives voice to the 
population. A direct democracy perspective rather than a representative one determines 
“government” supplies as a choice of citizens.  
The three parts point out that there is no such thing as decisions in the political 
economy framework that are completely isolated from individual interests because 
politics are made by men and women that hold specific convictions in terms of own 
priorities, which are not separate from their individual preferences. Such behaviour can 
be more or less prominent but is invariant in the political decision process. Efficiency 
and stability are not easy tasks to accomplish under this framework, since individuals 
that comprise a society are heterogeneous, holding different hierarchy of priorities and 
interests.  
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The role of public economics and political economy fields of research on the issue is 
to contribute towards the diagnostics of such realities and to propose ways to minimise 
some of the consequences that emerge from inefficiency in the economy, that appear as 
inevitable. This aim should guide political decisions in order to reach a better political 
and economic environment as well as achieve improved society welfare. 
